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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The last global financial crisis casted doubt on the level of understanding the 
financial markets‘ stakeholders have on financial institutions risks and 
complexities. The economic recession, which began in 2008, resulted in the 
crash of some financial institutions that led to the development of new 
procedures and guidelines in the banking industry.  
A proof that banks are too clever for regulators was evident in Q4 2012 when 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) conducted a study to understand how 
banks measured the riskiness of their assets. The EBA concluded there were 
"material differences" in the way risks are measured across 89 banks in 16 
countries. Andrea Enria, chairman of the EBA, said some of the differences 
could be accounted for by more explanation about the methodology being used. 
"But this is not enough. The remaining dispersion is significant and calls for 
further investigations and possibly policy solutions", he added 
1
.  
In this line, former British prime minister Tony Blair has accepted some 
responsibility for the state of Britain's economy after admitting his government 
failed to understand the complexity of the financial sector or foresee that it was 
on the brink of crisis, “I think what happened – and this is really important for 
people to understand – this global financial crisis was the product of a whole 
new way that the financial and banking sector has been working in this past 20 
or 30 years, where you have got this deep integration of the global economy 
and where you have a lot of financial instruments that were created whose 
                                                     
 
1
 The Guardian, 2013. Banks still too clever for regulators. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2013/feb/26/banks-regulators-risk-measurement-europe-eba 
Accessed: 14/12/15 
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impact people didn't properly understand", he said
2
. 
The banking business is highly regulated because depositary financial 
institutions capture public savings and have specific risks and complexities that 
make their financial statements opaque and difficult to analyze by the general 
public (Petrella and Resti, 2013; Morgan, 2001). So, it is difficult to understand 
that in a sector with such a strict regulatory environment nothing could be done 
to foresee and prevent the last global financial crisis. The characteristics that 
make financial institutions different from other type of companies were, at the 
end of the day, the causes of their collapse.  
To understand and monitor the specific risks in the financial sector firms, the 
US regulator designed the CAMELS rating system, which is commonly used 
by regulators worldwide to assess the strength of financial institutions and to 
evaluate the level of bank risks (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
2013). The risks that this approach assesses are the specific risks of financial 
institutions: capital risk, assets quality, management skills, earning and 
profitability, liquidity risk and sensitivity to market risk. The CAMELS 
approach is not only used in the US as it is the approach used by regulators 
worldwide. One example is the supervisory method used by the Banco de 
España (the Spanish regulator) which is called Risk-Based Supervisory 
Methodology Approach and it is based on the CAMELS rating system. This 
method helps to assess which institutions are more likely to develop problems 
in the future, in order to dedicate additional supervisory resources and to 
prevent future crises (Banco de España, 2011).  
One of the main characteristics of the financial sector is that it is filled with 
firms that are too big, complex, and ―systemically important‖ to manage, 
govern, or allow to fail. Professor Simon Johnson and several other important 
                                                     
 
2
 The Guardian, 2012. Tony Blair admits Labour didn't fully understand complex financial sector. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jul/22/tony-blair-labour-financial-crisis Accessed: 14/12/15 
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scholars argue that the best way to prevent future financial disasters at the 
expense of society is to break-up the largest financial institutions. The rationale 
behind this is that with smaller financial institutions, a potential collapse of 
some of them would not bring the international finance system into turmoil 
(Johnson, 2011). Johnson admits that smaller financial institutions would not 
be sufficient to ensure financial stability, but they would ensure more efficient 
supervision and will reduce systemic risks in cases of financial turmoil. In an 
attempt to end ―too big to fail‖ and protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act as a response to the 2008 financial crisis. But, 
according to Sen. Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, ―Dodd-Frank has actually encouraged 
the biggest banks to become larger and more concentrated‖.  
To add complexity to the ―too big to fail‖ problem, another factor that 
distinguishes banks with other firms is that only the former use deposits to 
finance themselves. Deposits, in the form of bank accounts, are not only held 
by households but also by businesses that use them for transaction purposes 
and reserves. Banks finance themselves with deposits and equity capital and 
invest in risky assets. Archarya et al. (2014) show that ―leverage must be high 
enough to induce the discipline imposed by creditors, but low enough to ensure 
that the bank‘s risk taking is not excessive‖. They argue that this optimal 
capital structure can be broken by the presence of regulatory safety nets such as 
deposit insurance, bailouts or central banks acting as lender of last resort.  
These safety nets are used by regulators to avoid the intermediation services 
collapse that could impact on the financial stability of the economy. But the 
safety nets could encourage banks to increase the leverage and at the same 
time, depositors face lower risk that could lead them to be less involved in the 
monitoring of bank‘s management performance.  
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Considering this, setting an optimal capital requirement is the desire of every 
financial services sector regulator because it will help them to comply with 
their mandate of keeping financial stability. In order to address and monitor the 
banking business risks, regulators use risk management tools to achieve 
regulatory objectives. Such supervisory efforts increase during periods of 
financial turmoil because bank opacity tends to increase (Flannery et al., 2010) 
and hence, regulators use stress tests to assess not only the vulnerability of 
individual banks but also of the entire banking system (Drehmann et al., 2010; 
Sorge and Virolainen, 2006). As the main concerns of regulators is financial 
failure, they design a supervisory system that allows them to prevent 
institutional failure that could lead to the breakdown of the main financial 
functions in the economy such as the payment system, savings transformation 
and the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Weber, 2014).   
The European Banking Authority (EBA) was established in January 2011 in 
the wake of the financial crisis as part of the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) and took over all existing responsibilities and tasks of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The EBA describes 
itself on its website as follows: “The main task of the EBA is to contribute to 
the creation of the European Single Rulebook in banking whose objective is to 
provide a single set of harmonised prudential rules for financial institutions 
throughout the EU. The authority also plays an important role in promoting 
convergence of supervisory practices and is mandated to assess risks and 
vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector.” The use of stress testing after the 
financial crisis by the EBA is consistent with Basel III requirements that move 
towards a system of banking supervision more risk-oriented, especially 
generating measures or models that can anticipate or show vulnerabilities of 
financial institutions. 
In May 2009, the CEBS carried out an EU-wide forward-looking stress test of 
the banking system, building on common guidelines and scenarios, for a 
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sample of 22 major European cross-border banking groups. Under the baseline 
scenario, which reflects the macro-economic projections, the banks‘ aggregate 
Tier 1 capital ratio (a measure of banks‘ financial health) was estimated above 
9%, compared to the Basel minimum requirement of 4% in force in 2009. The 
aggregate Tier 1 ratio for the banks in the sample was estimated to remain 
above 8% and no bank was supposed to see its Tier 1 ratio falling under 6% as 
a result of the adverse scenario.  
The 2010 stress testing exercise included a sample of 91 European banks, 
representing 65% of the European market in terms of total assets, in 
coordination with 20 national supervisory authorities. It was conducted over a 
2 years horizon, until the end of 2011, under severe assumptions. The stress 
test focused mainly on credit and market risks, including the exposures to 
European sovereign debt. As a result of the adverse scenario after a sovereign 
shock, 7 banks were supposed to see their Tier 1 capital ratio fall below 6%. 
The threshold of 6% was used as a benchmark solely for the purpose of the 
stress test exercise. All banks that were supervised in the EU needed to have at 
least a regulatory minimum of 4% Tier 1 capital ratio by that time. For the 
institutions that failed to meet the threshold in the stress test exercise, the 
competent national authorities were required to be in close contact with these 
banks to assess the results of the test and their implications, in particular in 
terms of need for recapitalization.  
In 2011, the EBA conducted a EU-wide stress test that targeted 90 banks in 21 
countries. The aim of the 2011 EU-wide stress test is to assess the resilience of 
the banks involved in the exercise against an adverse but plausible scenario. 
Eight banks fell below the capital threshold of 5% Tier 1 Capital Ratio over the 
two -year time horizon. Sixteen banks showed a Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 
between 5% and 6%. On the basis of these results, the EBA had also issued its 
first formal recommendation stating that national supervisory authorities 
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should require banks whose Tier 1 Capital Ratio falls below the 5% threshold 
to promptly remedy their capital shortfall.  
The 2014 stress test included 123 banking groups across the EU and including 
Norway with a total of EUR 28,000 bn of assets covering more than 70% of 
total EU banking assets. The impact of the stress test was assessed in terms of 
the Tier 1 Capital Ratio for which a 5.5% and 8.0% hurdle rate were defined 
for the adverse and the baseline scenario respectively. Over the three-year 
horizon of the exercise, 24 banks would fall below the 5.5% Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio threshold and the overall shortfall would total EUR 24.6 bn. 
In July 2015 the EBA announced the 2016 EU-wide stress test exercise is 
expected to be launched in the first quarter of 2016, with the release of the 
detailed scenario and methodology. The assessment and quality checks are 
expected to be concluded by the third quarter of 2016, when EU banks' 
individual results will be released. 
Stress tests are also used by individual banks as a risk management tool to 
assess their own weaknesses and exposure to risk, following the guidelines and 
recommendations set by regulators that aim to identify how much capital the 
bank needs to be prepared against shocks that could impact on its current 
capital and to the minimum capital requirements (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006; Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004).  The similarity of stress testing 
used at a macro level with the techniques used by individual banks as an 
integral part of the risk management system (see Summer, 2008), together with 
the recommendation of supervisors about the use of stress tests as risk 
management tools for banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; 
Financial Stability Forum, 2008), suggest that stress testing is becoming very 
important for regulators (Drehmann et al., 2010). 
Recent studies discuss the informational role of stress testing to bank 
management and financial markets. Goldstein and Sapra (2013) discuss 
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whether the stress testing results should be disclosed or not. Based on the 
argument that stress tests are not able to tests scenarios that are extreme enough 
to simulate a true scenario, Das (2011) argues that the disclosure of stress 
testing results is inherently flawed.  In a recent study related to the disclosure 
of 2011 EU stress test results, Petrella and Resti (2013) find evidence of prices 
drop for tested banks on pre-results date (dilution effect) showing the concern 
of investors about the possibility that these banks could be under-capitalized. 
Their research shows that the stress tests produce ―valuable information for 
market participants‖. The release of bad results by regulators should call the 
industry attention and lead bank managers to improve the quality of the risk 
management tools used to assess the entity strength (D‘Cruz and Crippa, 
2012). 
As financial institutions are vital for financial stability, governments have to 
avoid their collapse at all costs and hence, devote a significant amount of 
resources to rescuing the banks. The bankruptcy of a bank has immediate 
social costs on depositors as well as an impact on other banks, on the payment 
system, and can destabilize the entire banking sector. This is why, by the end 
of February 2009, the financial rescue schemes which involved capital 
injections, bank asset purchases, guarantees and the issuance of banking 
securities, swaps and other guarantees amounted to a total government 
commitment of 22 % of GDP for the European Union and 29 % of GDP for the 
United States. The US banks had to write down more than $600 billion in 
assets and accounted losses for more than $1 trillion in market capitalization 
after 2007-2008. In the United Kingdom the situation was quite similar. 
Haldane (2010) estimated that the ‗social wealth transfer‘ in saving ‗too big to 
fail‘ banks in the UK amounted to approximately £50 bn in 2009, on top of 
approximately £140 bn of lost GDP generated by the crisis.  
As a consequence of the effort that the society as a whole made to rescue the 
financial system, financial institutions were viewed by the society as profit 
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maximizing companies that did not look after their clients‘ interests but for 
their own managers‘ interests (Dow 2011). Moral hazard in the financial sector 
has been analyzed in relation to loans granted to clients that were not 
creditworthy, high risk sophisticated financial products offered to financially 
unsophisticated clients and also because the states provided unlimited support 
to banks in the form of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort (Dow, 
2011). The main discussion around moral hazard relates to the fact that 
depositary financial institutions are tempted to take on higher risks because of 
the protection they have from central banks through the lender-of-last-resort 
facility or depositor protection through state-sponsored deposit insurance 
(Calomiris, 1998; Önder and Özyildirim, 2008; Ratnosvski and Huang, 2009).  
According to a survey conducted among banking executives at 225 companies 
done for PR and communications firm Makovsky by market researcher 
Ebiquity by mid-2014, more than 80% of financial institutions‘ 
communications, marketing and investor relations managers said that they 
think the financial crisis of 2008 is still having a negative impact on their 
companies. Banking executives concede it will take several more years for 
banks to regain the trust they lost
3
.  
Baker et al. (2013) find that customers experiencing negative emotions with a 
service failure usually respond non-verbally and may file a third party 
complaint. Then, the FI can appear in a public complaint report that the agency 
issues. This fact will affect future profits of the FI because reputation will 
decrease (Rose & Thomsen, 2004).  
 
 
                                                     
 
3
 Money.cnn.com, 2014. Banks know that customers hate them. 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/17/investing/banks-crisis-reputation/ Accessed: 14/12/15 
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Financial institutions can show customers they care about them by handling the 
complaints they file about the services they provide timely and efficiently. To 
make sure this is the case, regulators require financial institutions to design and 
implement a complaint handling process.  
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) policies 
require financial services firms to informally resolve customers' complaints 
within the end of the next business day. Failing that, the complaint becomes 
formal and recordable. After an eight-week period from being made formal, the 
customer can refer the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 
for an independent final resolution. The FCA has proposed extending this 
resolution period from one to three business days while also allowing 
customers to immediately refer any dispute to the FOS. This new rules will be 
in force by 2016. 
Banco de España, the Spanish banking regulator, publishes information on 
customers‘ complaints to increase financial services sector transparency.  Users 
must file the complaint directly with the FI‘s Complaints Service (CS) or 
Ombudsman. If the FI does not reply within two months or replies negatively, 
the user can file the complaint with the BE‘s CS. Reports of the BE‘s CS are 
not binding for FI, so they can: a) ignore the decision; b) be proactive and 
amend the error before the BE issues the report; or c) be reactive and rectify 
after the report issuance.  If the FI takes remedial actions during that process, 
the BE closes the file. The BE Governor, Luis María Linde said “We will talk 
to the banks. We are going to provide the resources we can, but the banks have 
to pay more interest and be more involved in this area of customer care. We 
will talk to banks and credit institutions to make this happen" 
4
. 
                                                     
 
4
 Eldia.es, 2014. Linde pedirá a la banca atender las reclamaciones de consumidores. 
http://web.eldia.es/economia/2014-06-18/1-Linde-pedira-banca-atender-reclamaciones-consumidores.htm 
Accessed: 14/12/15 
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The new approach of complaints handling aims to meet the growing relevance 
and social impact of financial institutions relationship with customers, which is 
a component of great importance for the sound functioning of the financial 
services sector and is a matter that regulators is considering as relevant. An 
efficient complaints‘ handling process is part of a firm‘s Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies. BBVA includes in its 2014 Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report a chapter title ―Responsible client management - Claims 
and Complaints management‖ where it is stated “The customer experience and 
the service quality are the key levers to attract and retain customers in the new 
competitive environment. Claims, as a source of the voice of the customer, 
allow us to identify the causes behind the complaints and activate action plans. 
Undoubtedly, they represent a moment of truth, which provide relevant 
information to management about the reasons of customer dissatisfaction” 
(BBVA, 2014).  
 The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the financial services 
sector not only refers to firm‘s responsibility for the impact that their actions 
have on their stakeholders, but also to their role as financial intermediaries 
(Prior and Argandoña 2009). De la Cuesta-González et al. (2006) argue that the 
CSR concept affects the financial sector from a two-pronged perspective: a) in 
the internal dimension which implies the implementation of environmental and 
socially responsible initiatives within the entity‘s internal management 
procedures and b) in the external dimension, which implies the incorporation of 
CSR into the entity‘s business of financial intermediation and investment in the 
financial markets. This should lead to incorporating environmental and social 
considerations in the design of the financial products, in the credit policies and 
investment strategies. Consequently, the business strategy and the risk 
management should take CSR into account.  
The idea of the inclusion of CSR in risk management programs in the financial 
sector has been taken into account by Bangladesh Bank (the Central Bank of 
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Bangladesh) in recent policies issued (Bangladesh Bank 2011). In this policy, 
the Bangladeshi authority requires the environmental risk to be incorporated in 
the Core Risk Management (CRM) that mandates considering environmental 
risk in the overall credit risk assessment methodology applied by banks. 
Additionally, this will have an impact in the computation of Risk-Adjusted 
Capital Ratio and the CAMELS rating of the institution. 
Considering this, the Global Reporting Initiative has issued the GRI Financial 
Services Sector disclosures, a sector supplement that addresses specific 
industry issues that are not contemplated in the general GRI guidelines. The 
external dimension of CSR in financial institutions mentioned by de la Cuesta-
González et al. (2006) is contemplated in the ―Product and service impact‖ 
section of the GRI Financial Services Sector supplement (Global Reporting 
Initiative 2013). It requires the firm to design and implement procedures for 
assessing and screening environmental and social risks in business lines, 
process and monitor clients‘ implementation of and compliance with 
environmental and social requirements included in agreements, transactions 
and initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and services 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2013).  
The Financial Services Sector disclosures contains a set of disclosures for use 
by all financial institutions that cover key aspects of sustainability performance 
that are relevant to the Financial Services Sector and which are not sufficiently 
covered in the general GRI guidelines: 
 FS1 Policies with specific environmental and social components 
applied to business lines 
 FS2 Procedures for assessing and screening environmental and social 
risks in business lines 
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 FS3 Processes for monitoring clients‘ implementation of and 
compliance with environmental and social requirements included in 
agreements or transactions 
 FS4 Processes for improving staff competency to implement the 
environmental and social policies and procedures as applied to business 
lines 
 FS5 Interactions with clients/investees/business partners regarding 
environmental and social risks and opportunities 
 FS6 Percentage of the portfolio for business lines by specific region, 
size (e.g. micro/SME/large) and by sector 
 FS7 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a 
specific social benefit for each business line broken down by purpose 
 FS8 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a 
specific environmental benefit for each business line broken down by 
purpose 
 FS9 Coverage and frequency of audits to assess implementation of 
environmental and social policies and risk assessment procedures 
 FS10 Percentage and number of companies held in the institution‘s 
portfolio with which the reporting organization has interacted on 
environmental or social issues 
 FS11 Percentage of assets subject to positive and negative 
environmental or social screening. 
 FS12 Voting policies applied to environmental or social issues for 
shares over which the reporting organization holds the right to vote 
shares or advises on voting 
 FS13 Access points in low-populated or economically disadvantaged 
areas by type 
 FS14 Initiatives to improve access to financial services for 
disadvantaged people 
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 FS15 Policies for the fair design and sale of financial products and 
services 
 FS16 Initiatives to enhance financial literacy by type of beneficiary 
Whilst the Financial Services Sector Supplement became operational in 2008, 
its use become obligatory for reporters to be recognized as a GRI A-Level 
reporter as of 1 January 2010.   
1.2 Motivations of this research 
The recent global financial crisis made clear the lack of understanding the 
financial institutions‘ stakeholders had about the level of risk and complexities 
these institutions have. Governments and regulators realized they were not 
achieving the objectives of monitoring financial institutions to make sure they 
are healthy to constitute a stable financial system. Bank management realized 
they were not identifying new risks and complexities in the industry and hence, 
they were not addressing and mitigating them appropriately. And financial 
services users lost trust in banks in the wake of the crisis.  
In this new financial services sector scenario, governments and regulators 
implement new regulatory risk management tools such as stress tests that help 
to identify financial institutions weaknesses timely. Financial institutions also 
incorporate these regulatory tools as part of their risk management system to be 
aligned with the regulator. This regulatory tool is not commonly used in 
emerging markets and this adds to the opacity of these markets. Additionally, 
to regain the trust of their more demanding customers, financial institutions get 
involved in corporate social responsibility activities. Customers require banks 
to manage their complaints timely and proactively and dissatisfied customers 
tend to switch bank and this translates in a profit reduction of the financial 
institution.  
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These changes in the financial services sector are recent, so research is needed 
to understand what are the characteristics of the banks that are incorporating 
the information provided by the regulatory stress testing exercise to adapt their 
risk profile and adjust their capital ratio, whether this attitude differs between 
emerging and developed markets, what are the characteristics of the banks that 
get involved in corporate social responsibility activities to be closer to their 
customers and what are the characteristics of the banks with higher reputation.  
The need to understand the changes in this new global financial services sector 
is the main motivation of this thesis.  
The results of this study will be useful for regulators, to better understand the 
effect of the new regulatory tools used, how the supervised institutions react to 
them and to adapt regulations and policies; for financial institutions, to 
understand the usefulness of stress testing as a component of their risk 
management system; for customers, to better understand the behavior of the 
financial institutions to which they trust their savings and for researchers, to 
build on the banking research and to identify future research avenues.     
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. The structure and content of each 
chapter is as follows:  
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, motivation, objectives and the 
importance of the thesis. The first chapter also articulates the main research 
questions and the context of the study.  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review, research design and methodology, 
results and conclusions related to stress test and bank risk profile: does stress 
testing play a disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
Under the theory that individual financial institutions and regulators use stress 
tests as a risk management tool, results show that financial institutions with 
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certain risk profile receive a more negative impact in the stress test performed 
by the regulator and modify their capital ratio through risk shifting. The 
findings also show evidence that regulatory stress tests play a disciplinary role 
in determining bank‘s target capital ratio.  
Chapter 3 presents the literature review, research design and methodology, 
results and conclusions related to capital structure adjustment and risk shifting 
moral hazard: the bank opacity effect in emerging markets. Results show that 
Latin America & The Caribbean (LAC) banks adjust different sets of 
accounting indicators, which are determined following central bank and 
accounting policies, to compute their Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1CR) and Total 
Capital Ratio (TCR) because there is no other available information to consider 
in the calculation due to the higher opacity in emerging markets.  On the 
contrary, EU banks count with additional information in a more transparent 
market and adjust their capital ratios according to additional information and 
not on accounting information. We also find stronger evidence of risk shifting 
moral hazard in LAC banks than in EU banks, because even though in both 
markets some banks‘ specific characteristics determine the risk level, only in 
LAC the T1CR adjusts differently than TCR. Finally, the results also provide 
evidence that even though LAC banks have larger capital buffers, they are 
much riskier than EU banks. 
Chapter 4 presents the literature review, research design and methodology, 
results and conclusions related to corporate social responsibility and bank risk 
profile: Evidence from Europe. Financial institutions with lower capital risk, 
higher liquidity risk, higher profitability in the banking business and higher 
sensitivity to market risk tend to issue a corporate social responsibility report 
(CSR). Among the financial institutions that issue a CSR report, the ones with 
lower profitability in the banking business disclose higher quality CSR 
financial services sector specific information while the ones that get their CSR 
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report assured by PwC and EY or that do not get the report assured do the 
opposite. 
Chapter 5 presents the literature review, research design and methodology, 
results and conclusions related to complaints management and bank risk 
profile. The main results show that financial institutions usually ―amending‖ 
errors have a different risk profile from those usually ―rectifying‖ errors. This 
research may help regulators monitor financial institutions. 
Chapter 6 presents the literature review, research design and methodology, 
results and conclusions related to reputation loss and risk management in the 
banking industry. Results show that financial institutions with large and 
complex business structures, with significant amounts of loans and liquid 
assets booked, with low capitalization level, that are highly profitable in the 
banking business and that issue a sustainability report, are at risk of losing 
reputation if they are not able to have an appropriate risk management system.  
Chapter 7 presents the general conclusions of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.1 – The rationale behind the thesis’ chapters 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: Stress test and 
bank risk profile: does stress 
testing play a disciplinary and 
informational role to adjust the 
capital ratio? 
CHAPTER 3: Capital structure 
adjustment and risk shifting moral 
hazard: the bank opacity effect in 
emerging markets 
CHAPTER 5: Complaints 
management and bank risk profile 
CHAPTER 4: Corporate social 
responsibility and bank risk 
profile: Evidence from Europe 
CHAPTER 6: Reputation loss 
and risk management in the 
banking industry 
 
The first chapter of the thesis 
investigate the informational 
and disciplinary role that 
stress testing play to adjust 
the capital ratio and the 
second chapter investigates 
the potential impacts that the 
absence of stress testing in 
emerging markets has on the 
banks‘ capital structure 
 
Financial institutions play an 
important social function in 
the financial inclusion 
process in the economy and 
CSR is considered in the 
product design process and 
the credit risk policy. So, 
financial institutions 
incorporate social and 
environmental risk 
management in their risk 
management system. This 
will have an impact on the 
computation of the Risk-
Adjusted Capital Ratio used 
to get the Tier1 Capital Ratio. 
Hence, the risk profile of a 
bank will impact on the 
banks‘ capital structure. 
Reputation risk management, 
including managing 
customers‘ complaints, is 
inseparable from other 
organizational processes 
management. The level of 
exposure to reputational risk 
depends on the adequacy of 
the internal risk management 
process. 
The side effects of reputation 
loss do not only impact on 
the financial institution‘s 
profit and loss account but 
also put the business 
continuity at risk.  
In order to avoid reputational 
damages and to maintain 
market confidence, a bank 
should develop 
methodologies to measure as 
precisely as possible the 
effect of reputational risk in 
terms of other risk types (eg 
credit, liquidity, market or 
operational risk) to which it 
may be exposed. 
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Figure 1.2 – Panel A – Chapters’ objectives and hypotheses  
CHAPTER 2: Stress test and 
bank risk profile: does stress 
testing play a disciplinary and 
informational role to adjust the 
capital ratio? 
Objective 1: To investigate how 
banks use the stress test results to 
adjust their risk profile and 
whether stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role 
to determine bank capital structure 
H1: The deviation that the 
predicted stressed Tier 1 capital 
ratio has from the current 2010 
Tier 1 capital ratio (stress test 
impact) depends on current 2010 
bank risk factors such as capital 
risk, the quality of assets, 
managerial skills, the level of 
earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk and the 
sensitivity to market risk 
H2: The deviation that the 
predicted stressed Tier 1 capital 
ratio has from the current Tier 1 
capital ratio of an individual bank 
(stress test deviation) in the 
stressed years depends on the 
current bank risk factors such as 
capital risk, the quality of assets, 
managerial skills, the level of 
earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk and the 
sensitivity to market risk and the 
capital structure adjustment 
strategy (capital increase or asset 
reduction) 
H3: The deviation that the current 
Tier 1 capital ratio has from the 
target Tier 1 capital ratio of an 
individual bank depends on the 
current bank risk factors such as 
capital risk, the quality of assets, 
managerial skills, the level of 
earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk, the 
sensitivity to market risk and the 
occurrence of regulatory stress 
tests 
 
CHAPTER 3: Capital structure 
adjustment and risk shifting moral 
hazard: the bank opacity effect in 
emerging markets 
Objective 2: To investigate 
whether emerging markets 
financial institutions adjust Tier 1 
Capital Ratio (the risk-weighted 
capital ratio) differently from 
Total Capital Ratio (the book 
value capital ratio) taking 
advantage of higher bank opacity 
than in developed markets 
H4: The determinants of the gap 
between the current and the target 
risk level in emerging markets are 
different from those in developed 
markets due to higher bank 
opacity. 
 
H2: Risk shifting moral hazard 
determinants in emerging markets 
are different from those in 
developed markets due to higher 
bank opacity.  
 
H3: The determinants of the gap 
between the current and the target 
capital structure in emerging 
markets are different from those in 
developed markets due to higher 
bank opacity. 
 
H1: Capital structure adjustment 
determinants in emerging markets 
are different from those in 
developed markets due to higher 
bank opacity.  
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Figure 1.2 – Panel B – Chapters’ objectives and hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: Complaints 
management and bank risk profile 
CHAPTER 4: Corporate social 
responsibility and bank risk 
profile: Evidence from Europe 
CHAPTER 6: Reputation loss 
and risk management in the 
banking industry 
Objective 3: To investigate 
whether the risk management 
system of the financial institution 
impact on the propensity of the 
company to issue a sustainability 
report and on the propensity to 
publish a sustainability report 
containing high quality financial 
services sector specific 
information 
Objective 4: To investigate the 
complaints management in the 
Spanish financial institutions by 
analyzing the link between 
responsiveness to customers‘ 
complaints and FI‘s risk profile 
Objective 5: To investigate the 
relationship between the bank 
reputation and its risk profile 
H1: The bank propensity to issue 
a sustainability report does not 
depend on bank risk factors such 
as capital risk, the quality of 
assets, managerial skills, the level 
of earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk and the 
sensitivity to market risk. 
 
H2: High quality financial sector 
specific information on 
sustainability does not depend on 
bank risk factors such as capital 
risk, the quality of assets, 
managerial skills, the level of 
earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk, the 
sensitivity to market risk and on 
the type of auditor. 
 
H2: The FI reactive attitude 
towards error rectification does 
not depend on bank risk factors 
 
H1: The bank reputation does not 
depend on bank risk factors such 
as capital risk, the quality of 
assets, managerial skills, the level 
of earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk, the 
sensitivity to market risk and also, 
on the issuance of a sustainability 
report. 
 
H1: The FI proactive attitude 
towards error amendment does not 
depend on bank risk factors 
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1.4 Objectives of the study 
The global financial crisis brought a new scenario in the financial services 
sector, showing regulators implementing risk management tools such as stress 
tests to monitor the strength of financial institutions and hence, the financial 
system stability, and also the financial institutions incorporating stress testing 
as part of their risk management system to be aligned with the regulator‘s 
practices.   
Prior studies focus on different aspects of stress testing such as: a) the different 
types of stress test, sensitivity stress test and stress test scenarios (Fender et al., 
2001), b) the selection of the scenarios to use in the stress test excercise that 
according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) must be ―severe but 
plausible‖ (Alfaro and Drechman, 2009; Breuer et al., 2009) and c) whether the 
stress testing results should be disclosed or not (Petrella and Resti 2013; 
Goldstein and Sapra 2013; D‘Cruz and Crippa, 2012). Prior studies find that 
stress tests as part of a bank risk management system are useful to determine 
the sufficient capital buffer size (Peura & Jokivuolle, 2004), to evaluate the 
bank‘s reaction to different adverse scenarios, its credit portfolio quality 
(Worrell, 2008) and to identify the level of capital required to support the 
current level of risk taking (Kuritzkes et al., 2002). 
The general objective of this thesis is to understand the risk profile of financial 
institutions that: a) use the regulatory stress test results to adjust its capital ratio 
and how the stress test exercise impacts on this ratio, b) tend to issue a 
sustainability report and the quality of the information disclosed, c) react 
proactively or reactively to the customers‘ complaints and d) have higher 
reputation.    
Little is known about how banks use the stress test results to adjust their risk 
profile and whether stress testing play a disciplinary and informational role to 
determine bank capital structure, so, this study aims to investigate it and this is 
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its first objective (Objective 1). In the view that stress tests are part of the risk 
management system of banks, we aim to identify the risk profile of banks 
(following the CAMELS approach as in Kerstein and Kozbeg, 2013; Jin et al., 
2011, Jin et al., 2013a, Jin et al., 2013b) that tend to receive a more negative 
impact in the stress testing exercise. We also investigate the risk profile of 
banks that use the information provided by the stress test results to modify their 
Tier 1 Capital ratio and how this modified capital ratio relates to the capital 
ratio the bank had in the year targeted by the stress test exercise. In the study, 
we also aim to identify the risk profile of banks that show a smaller gap 
between the current and the target capital ratio, how they adjust their current 
capital ratio to the target before and after the stress test results are released, and 
whether the target Tier 1 capital ratio is related to the stressed capital ratio 
resulting from the stress test exercise.  
It is important to note that stress testing is not yet a common practice among 
regulators in emerging markets. This is due to the existence of severe 
deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework and lack of liquid 
markets for bank shares, subordinated debt and other bank liabilities and assets 
needed to validate the real worth of a bank as opposed to its accounting value 
(Rojas-Suarez, 2002a). It is also relevant to recall that although the Basel 
Accords state that its positions are not recommended for application in 
emerging markets, emerging markets financial institutions use the Accords as 
appropriate banking standards (Balin, 2008). This includes the Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio that it is not subject to a standard stress testing exercise throughout these 
emerging markets.   
Additionally, taking into account Petrella and Resti (2013) findings that show 
that stress tests results reduce bank opacity because they provide investors with 
relevant information, the second objective of this study is to investigate 
whether emerging markets financial institutions adjust Tier 1 Capital Ratio (the 
risk-weighted capital ratio) differently from Total Capital Ratio (the book value 
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capital ratio) taking advantage of higher bank opacity than in developed 
markets (Objective 2). This study also investigates whether banks in emerging 
and developed markets adjust their risk level differently. This is of special 
interest because there is no consensus on the measure of capital that banks use 
internally to make decisions (Jokipii and Milne, 2011). This study provides 
evidence whether banks in emerging and developed markets use total capital 
ratio (based on accounting standards) or Tier 1 Capital Ratio (based on Basel 
Accords) to make decisions and the bank‘s characteristics that impact on the 
capital structure. This study also looks for evidence of higher risk shifting 
moral hazard in emerging markets than in developed markets as a consequence 
of higher emerging markets‘ bank opacity. In addition, the study explores 
whether emerging markets financial institutions align their actual Tier 1 and 
Total Capital Ratio to the corresponding targets and whether their risk profile 
over time is related to such deviation considering the higher market opacity 
than in developed markets. Finally, this study investigates the deviation 
between the current and the target risk level of banks in both markets. It is of 
special interest to know whether the 2008/09 financial crisis has an impact on 
such deviations (Teixeira et al., 2014). 
The first two objectives of this study investigate the informational and 
disciplinary role that stress testing play to adjust the capital ratio and the 
potential impacts that the absence of stress testing in emerging markets has on 
the banks‘ capital structure.  
The remaining objectives of this study are related to the relationship between 
bank corporate social responsibility, bank reputation and bank risk profile. 
Integrating CSR into corporate risk management not only helps the company to 
get information about the current risks that threaten the company but also 
offers an effective mean to mitigate them (Mengze and Wei 2013; de la 
Cuesta-González et al. 2006; Kytle and Ruggie 2005).  Considering this, we 
argue that the financial institution risk profile (following the CAMELS 
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approach will influence the propensity to issue a CSR report and also the 
propensity to publish a sustainability report containing high quality financial 
sector specific information. Under a theory that financial institutions play an 
important social role in the financial inclusion process in the economy and that 
CSR is considered in the product design process and the credit policy, financial 
institutions incorporate social and environmental risk management in their risk 
management system. The third objective of this study is to investigate whether 
the risk management system of the financial institution impacts on the 
propensity of the company to issue a sustainability report and on the propensity 
to publish a sustainability report containing high quality financial services 
sector specific information (Objective 3). 
This study contributes to the extant literature by finding a relationship between 
Corporate Social Reporting (CSRR) and GRI Financial Services Sector 
disclosures -using a Financial Services Sector disclosure Index (FSSI) we 
developed- with the type of risk and complexity of financial institutions. 
Moreover, we shed some light in understanding the profile of the financial 
institutions that incorporate CSR into their risk management systems. 
The fourth objective of this study is to contribute to the extant literature by 
investigating complaints management in the Spanish financial institutions and 
by analyzing the link between responsiveness to customers‘ complaints and 
FI‘s risk profile (Objective 4). The study provides a novel insight into Spanish 
financial institutions motivations to react proactively or reactively to 
customers‘ complaints. Finally, the fifth objective of the study is to investigate 
the relationship between the bank reputation and its risk profile (Objective 5). 
1.5 Research questions 
Building on the main objectives of the study that were described earlier in 
Section 1.4, this study proposes the following specific research questions to 
correspond with the five objectives:  
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Objective 1: To investigate how banks use the stress test results to adjust their 
risk profile and whether stress testing play a disciplinary and informational role 
to determine bank capital structure: 
1) What is the risk profile of banks that tend to receive a more negative 
impact in the EU-wide stress testing exercise?  
2) What is the risk profile of banks that use the information provided by 
the EU-wide stress test results disclosed to modify their Tier 1 Capital 
ratio? How does this modified capital ratio relate to the capital ratio the 
bank had in the year targeted by the stress test exercise? 
3) What is the risk profile of banks that show a smaller gap between the 
current and the target capital ratio? How they adjust their current capital 
ratio to the target before and after the stress test results are released? Is 
the target Tier 1 capital ratio related to the stressed capital ratio 
resulting from the stress test exercise? 
Objective 2: To investigate whether emerging markets financial institutions 
adjust Tier 1 Capital Ratio (the risk-weighted capital ratio) differently from 
Total Capital Ratio (the book value capital ratio) taking advantage of higher 
bank opacity than in developed markets: 
4) Do emerging markets banks take advantage of higher bank opacity in 
that markets to adjust their Tier 1 Capital Ratio? 
5) Do banks in emerging and developed markets adjust their risk level 
differently? 
6) Is risk shifting moral hazard in emerging markets higher than in 
developed markets as a consequence of higher emerging markets‘ bank 
opacity? 
7) Do emerging markets financial institutions align their actual Tier 1 and 
Total Capital Ratio to the corresponding targets? Is their risk profile, 
considering the higher market opacity than in developed markets, 
related to such deviation? 
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8) Is the deviation between the current and the target risk level of banks 
similar in emerging and developed markets? 
Objective 3: To investigate whether the risk management of the financial 
institution impact on the propensity of the company to issue a sustainability 
report and on the propensity to publish a sustainability report containing high 
quality financial services sector specific information: 
9) Does the risk profile of the financial institution impact on the 
propensity of the company to issue a sustainability report? 
10) Does the risk profile of the financial institution impact on the 
propensity to publish a sustainability report containing high quality 
financial services sector specific information? 
Objective 4: To investigate the complaints management in the Spanish 
financial institutions by analyzing the link between responsiveness to 
customers‘ complaints and FI‘s risk profile: 
11) What is the risk profile of banks that react proactively to customers‘ 
complaints? 
12) What is the risk profile of banks that react reactively to customers‘ 
complaints? 
Objective 5: To investigate the relationship between the bank reputation and its 
risk profile: 
13) What is the risk profile of banks with higher reputation? 
1.6 Research design and methodology 
Chapter 2 of the research empirically investigates the risk profile of banks that 
receive a more negative impact in the EU-wide stress testing exercise, the risk 
profile of banks that use the information provided by the EU-wide stress test 
results to modify their Tier 1 Capital ratio and the risk profile of banks that 
show a smaller gap between the current and the target capital ratio. The results 
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of this chapter provide answers to Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 (H1, H2 and 
H3, respectively) that match the Research Objective 1. The findings of this 
chapter bridge the gap in the literature associated with the financial institutions 
risk profile and the impact that stress test results has on the financial institution 
capital ratio adjustment.   
The bank risk profile is proxied by the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach. 
The sample includes banks targeted by the 2011 European Union (EU) stress 
test carried out by the European Banking Authority (EBA) with available 
financial data for the 2010, 2011 and 2012 year-end. Using the 2010 year-end 
financial data, the stress test simulation covered two years, 2011 and 2012. To 
test H1 and H2 the study uses linear regression models and to test H3 the study 
uses the Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM). 
Chapter 3 empirically examines how banks in developed and emerging markets 
adjust their capital structure, the capital ratio banks use in these markets to 
make decisions, the risk shifting moral hazard in these markets and the 
determinants of the gap between the target and the current capital ratios and 
risk levels and what are the corresponding speeds of adjustment in both 
markets, associated with Research Questions 4 to 8 (H1, H2, H3 and H4, 
respectively) and Research Objectives 2.  
The bank risk profile is proxied by the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach. 
The sample includes emerging and developed markets banks with available 
financial data for the period 2008-2013. The sample of emerging markets 
banks includes banks from Latin America (LAC) while the sample of 
developed markets banks includes banks from the European Union (EU). To 
test H1 and H2 the study uses the Generalized Method of Moments estimator 
and to test H3 and H4 the study uses linear regression models. 
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Chapter 4 of the research empirically investigates the impact that banks‘ risk 
profile has on the propensity of sustainability reporting and this reporting 
quality in the European banks targeted by the 2014 EU-wide stress test. The 
results of this chapter provide answers to Research Questions 9 and 10 (H1 and 
H2, respectively) that match the Research Objectives 3. The findings of this 
chapter bridge the gap in the literature associated with the financial institutions 
risk profile and the financial institution propensity to CSR reporting and the 
quality of this report.   
The bank risk profile is proxied by the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach. 
The CSR reporting quality if proxied by the Financial Service Sector 
disclosures Index (FSSI). we develop using content analysis, an approach 
commonly used in CSR reporting. The FSSI is developed using the sixteen 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Financial Services Sector disclosures 
indicators. The empirical research is conducted on a sample of 2014 EU-wide 
stress test sample of banks with available public information from 2011 
through 2013. To test H1 and H2 the study uses linear regression models. 
Chapter 5 of the research empirically investigates Spanish financial 
institutions‘ propensity to amend errors deriving from complaints by financial 
services‘ users within the Spanish regulator Complaints Service and how this 
propensity affects the financial institution risk profile. The results of this 
chapter provide answers to Research Questions 11 and 12 (H1 and H2, 
respectively) that match the Research Objectives 4. The findings of this chapter 
bridge the gap in the literature associated with the financial institutions risk 
profile and the financial institution propensity to react proactively or reactively 
to customers‘ complaints. 
The bank risk profile is proxied by the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach. 
The sample includes the Spanish depositary institutions with available public 
information from 2005 to 2012 receiving more than fifteen reports in favor of 
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its customers in the yearly report that the Banco de España‘s Complaint 
Services issues. To test H1 and H2 the study uses linear regression models. 
Chapter 6 of the research empirically investigates the impact that risk 
management has on corporate reputation in the financial sector. The results of 
this chapter provide answers to Research Question 13 (H1) that match the 
Research Objective 5. The findings of this chapter bridge the gap in the 
literature associated with the financial institutions risk profile and the financial 
institution reputation. 
The bank risk profile is proxied by the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach. 
The sample includes the Spanish depositary institutions regulated by the Banco 
de España with available public information from 2005 through 2012. Based 
on the information published by the Banco de España regarding claims and 
complaints filed by financial institutions‘ customers, we define bad reputation 
banks as the financial institutions that are among the top ten companies that 
received the largest number of claims and complaint during the year. To test 
H1 and H2 the study uses linear regression models. 
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Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play 
a disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
2.1 Introduction 
The development of the financial system is crucial for the development of the 
economy as a whole and the banking system is a key element in a country‘s 
financial architecture. The economic recession, which began in 2008, resulted 
in the crash of some financial institutions that led to the development of new 
procedures and guidelines in the banking industry. 
During a period of financial crisis, regulators increase their supervisory efforts 
using different supervisory tools to comply with their mandate of keeping 
financial stability. Research shows that bank opacity tends to increase in a 
context of financial turmoil (Flannery et al., 2010) and hence, regulators use 
stress tests to assess the strength and vulnerability of the banking system 
(Sorge and Virolainen, 2006).   
Since 2007, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has carried out EU-wide 
stress tests “to assess the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market 
developments, as well as contribute to the overall assessment of systemic risk 
in the EU financial system” (EBA, 2013). In 2011 EBA decided to undertake 
the stress testing exercise as a tool that should “deliver additional information 
as to the resilience of the banking system without raising unnecessary doubts 
on the continued progress shown by the industry on the way to stability” (EBA, 
2013). 
Regulators and individual banks use stress tests as a risk management tool to 
assess how much capital the bank needs to be prepared against shocks that 
could impact on its current capital ratio (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006; Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004).      
 
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
56 
 
In the view that stress tests are part of the risk management system of banks, 
one of the objectives of this paper is to identify the risk profile of banks 
(following the CAMELS approach as in Kerstein and Kozbeg, 2013; Jin et al., 
2013a; Jin et al., 2013b; Jin et al., 2011) that tend to receive a more negative 
impact in the stress testing exercise. Our second objective is to find the risk 
profile of banks that use the information provided by the stress test results 
disclosed to modify their Tier 1 Capital ratio and how this modified capital 
ratio relates to the capital ratio the bank had in the year targeted by the stress 
test exercise. Finally, our third objective is to identify the risk profile of banks 
that have a smaller gap between the current and the target capital ratio, how 
they adjust their current capital ratio to the target before and after the stress test 
results are released, and whether the target Tier 1 capital ratio is related to the 
stressed capital ratio resulting from the stress test exercise. The objective of 
this paper is to investigate whether stress testing plays a disciplinary and 
informational role in determining bank capital structure.  
Our empirical research is conducted on a sample of banks targeted by the 2011 
European Union (EU) stress test carried out by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). Using the 2010 year-end financial data the regulator stressed 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012 in a baseline and an adverse scenario. 
In this paper we use the results released for the adverse scenario.  
Our results show strong evidence that banks with higher level of liquid assets, 
low levels of loan loss provisions and that are efficient get better results in the 
stress testing exercise in the more negative 2012 adverse scenario. These 
results show that banks with this risk profile are prepared to face severe 
scenarios and avoid negative impact on the Tier 1 Capital Ratio.   
The results also indicate that financial institutions with higher ROA but lower 
profitability in the banking business, with higher capital ratio, with higher level 
of loan loss provisions and with higher cost to income ratio manage to have a 
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higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio resulting from 
the stress test exercise. Additionally, the results provide evidence of capital 
structure adjustment through equity increase and assets decrease in the year the 
stress test results are disclosed (2011) and we also find evidence that banks 
revert in 2012 this potentially excessive adjustment, by shifting to riskier assets 
and increasing, as a result, the risk-weighted assets because they do not show 
higher current Tier 1 Capital ratio even though they increase equity. The results 
also show that the EBA Capital Exercise has no impact on the difference 
between the current and the stressed Tier 1 capital ratio, meaning that banks 
that were required to capitalize by the EBA adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio 
similarly to banks that had surplus in the Capital Exercise. 
We also show that banks align the current Tier 1 capital ratio to the target Tier 
1 capital ratio after the stress test results are disclosed and that they almost 
completely close the gap between the current and the target capital ratio in 
three years which is, in fact, the window period between stress tests in the 
European Union.  
The results as a whole give support to the disciplinary and informational role 
stress testing plays with banks in determining their capital structure.  
After this introduction that highlights the interests of research, the remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the theoretical 
framework analyzing the use of stress testing as a regulatory tool and the role 
of stress tests in an individual bank risk management system. In the third 
section we develop the hypothesis; in the fourth section of this paper we 
explain the empirical research, the sample, the methodology. We show the 
results in section five and we show our conclusions in section six.  
 
 
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
58 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Stress testing as a regulatory tool 
The banking business is highly regulated because depositary financial 
institutions capture public savings and have specific risks and complexities that 
make their financial statements opaque and difficult to analyze by the general 
public (Petrella and Resti, 2013). The distinctive characteristic of these entities 
are mainly determined by: a) the assets composition, which includes loans 
granted to third parties and the general public lacks the necessary information 
to evaluate the credit risk attached to these loans, b) the  highly liquid assets 
that are commonly booked in their financial statements which produce a 
constant change in the asset composition that is difficult to be followed by 
financial information users (Petrella and Resti, 2013) and c) the maturity 
mismatch caused because they borrow short from depositors and lend long to 
creditors, being this situation a source of interest rate risk in the banking book 
(IFRI-CRO, 2007; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
In order to address and monitor the banking business risks, regulators use risk 
management tools to achieve regulatory objectives. Such supervisory efforts 
are increased during periods of financial turmoil (Flannery et al., 2010) and 
hence, regulators use stress tests to assess not only the vulnerability of 
individual banks but also of the entire banking system (Drehmann et al., 2010, 
Sorge and Virolainen, 2006). As the main concern of regulators is a financial 
failure, they design a supervisory system that allows them to prevent 
institutional failure that could lead to the breakdown of the main financial 
functions in the economy such as the payment system, savings transformation 
and the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Weber, 2014). Regulators 
use two different approaches to measure capital adequacy: stress testing and 
Basel III capital requirements. Wall (2014) explains the difference between 
these two approaches. In the case of Basel III, it provides an unconditional 
static measure with the risk adjustment occurring in the risk weighting of assets 
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(the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio). In contrast, the stress tests 
measure the individual bank capital adequacy using conditional, dynamic 
measures with the risk adjustment occurring via reductions in capital (the 
numerator of the capital adequacy ratio). The Basel III ratios use data on past 
performance to estimate the loss distributions associated with various portfolio 
positions, which are then used to calculate the expected losses in the extreme 
tail of the distribution.  
In the case of the stress tests, they are dynamic because they simulate how 
these regulatory ratios would evolve over time and are conditional because the 
results are calculated for a specific adverse scenario. The stress test is to 
estimate changes in accounting capital following a certain accounting 
framework. The estimates of the change in accounting capital are based in part 
on estimates of each bank‘s losses in each portfolio in each period.  
While Basel III cannot be used to say what may happen in any particular 
scenario, individual stress test can do it. If the model used in the stress test 
exercise is correct, the stress test can provide a good estimate of what happens 
in a particular scenario.  
In this context, there are mainly two types of stress tests that can be used by 
regulators: a) sensitivity stress tests that measure the impact that a large change 
in an asset price has on a portfolio‘s value and b) stress tests scenarios that 
measure the effect on a portfolio of simultaneous significant moves in several 
asset prices (for example, interest rate, exchange rates, equity prices) and can 
be done based on a historical scenario or a hypothetical one (Fender et al., 
2001).  
One of the most important elements of a stress test is the selection of the 
scenarios to be used that according to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) must be ―severe but plausible‖ (Alfaro and Drechman, 2009; Breuer et 
al., 2009). The complexity of this subject is such that the 2008 market collapse 
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
60 
 
was driven by systemic events difficult to predict and that could have been 
dismissed ex-ante as implausible (Flood and Korenko, 2013; Breuer and 
Csiszár, 2013). To add to this complexity, the market collapse occurred when 
the system appeared to be stable (Borio et al., 2012).  
Goldstein and Sapra (2013) discuss whether the stress testing results should be 
disclosed or not. Based on the argument that stress tests are not able to tests 
scenarios that are extreme enough to simulate a true scenario, Das (2011) 
argues that the disclosure of stress testing results is inherently flawed.  
Notwithstanding that, the results of the 2011 EU stress test performed by EBA 
were released for the 91 participant financial institutions. The results suggested 
that at the end of 2010, twenty banks in the sample would fall below the 5% 
Core Tier 1 Ratio (the Tier 1 Capital Ratio is, from a regulatory point of view, 
a measure of the financial strength of a bank). 
In a recent study related to the disclosure of 2011 EU stress test results, Petrella 
and Resti (2013) find evidence of prices drop for tested banks on pre-results 
date (dilution effect) showing the concern of investors about the possibility that 
these banks could be under-capitalized. Their research shows that the stress 
tests produce “valuable information for market participants”. On the result 
publication date, they find price reaction for the tested banks. This shows the 
relevance of disclosing the results and the informational role of the stress test. 
The release of bad results by regulators should call the industry attention and 
lead bank managers to improve the quality of the risk management tools used 
to assess the entity strength (D‘Cruz and Crippa, 2012). 
2.2.2 Risk management and stress tests 
Stress tests are also used by individual banks as a risk management tool to 
assess their own weaknesses and exposure to risk. This is done following the 
guidelines and recommendations set by regulators that aim to identify how 
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much capital the bank needs to be prepared against shocks that could impact on 
its current capital and to the minimum capital requirements (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004).  The 
similarity of stress testing used at a macro level, together with the techniques 
used by individual banks as an integral part of the risk management system 
(see Summer, 2008), and the recommendation of supervisors about the use of 
stress tests as risk management tools for banks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006; Financial Stability Forum, 2008), suggest that stress testing 
is becoming very important for regulators (Drehmann et al., 2010). 
In a survey conducted in 2000 by central banks‘ representatives from the 
Group of 10 (G-10) countries, results show that banks rely on stress tests to 
assess exposure where illiquid conditions and poor historical data make the use 
of other risk management tools difficult and also find that risk managers use 
stress testing results as an effective mean to communicate risks to bank senior 
management (CGFS, 2001). Regulators learnt that due to the variety and 
complexity of the risks affecting the banking business, the only way to achieve 
their statutory mandate of keeping financial stability depends on the quality of 
each bank risk management system (Tarullo, 2008). 
The Bank for International Settlements, through the Pillar 1 (minimum capital 
requirements) of the Basel II framework “requires banks using the Internal 
Models Approach to determine market risk capital to have in place a rigorous 
programme of stress testing. Similarly, banks using the advanced and 
foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for credit risk are 
required to conduct credit risk stress tests to assess the robustness of their 
internal capital assessments and the capital cushions above the regulatory 
minimum. Basel II also requires that, at a minimum, banks subject their credit 
portfolios in the banking book to stress tests” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006). 
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Stress tests are the evaluation of the financial position of a bank under a severe 
but plausible scenario to assist in decision making within the bank. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) indicates that “board and senior 
management involvement is critical in ensuring the appropriate use of stress 
testing in banks’ risk governance and capital planning. This includes setting 
stress testing objectives, defining scenarios, discussing the results of stress 
tests, assessing potential actions and decision making”. Taking this into 
account, stress testing should form an integral part of the overall governance 
and risk management culture of the bank. The objective of bank internal stress 
testing is to promote the identification of risks, complement other risk 
management tools and improve capital management.  
Stress tests as part of a bank risk management system are useful to determine 
the sufficient capital buffer size (Peura & Jokivuolle, 2004), to evaluate the 
bank‘s reaction to different adverse scenarios, its credit portfolio quality 
(Worrell, 2008) and to identify the level of capital required to support the 
current level of risk taking (Kuritzkes et al., 2002). 
Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) analyze the bank‘s capital buffer (defined as the 
difference between the current capital ratio and the minimum capital 
requirement) for G-10 banks from 1997-2001 and found that rating sensitive 
capital requirements necessitate higher bank capital buffers at least for high 
and average loan portfolios because the capital requirement is volatile.  
Using a hypothetical but realistic group of six banks, Worrell (2008) shows 
that if a rapid credit growth causes a sharp increase of non-performing loans 
(NPL), banks may become insolvent in a relatively short time, but if credit 
quality is not affected, the group of banks remains well capitalized even with 
severe shocks.  Worrell (2008) argues that “regulators would be advised to pay 
special attention to credit quality indicators, and to intensify scrutiny of any 
bank which appeared to be weak in this area, or any bank where the NPL 
migration pattern was worse than average”.  
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Kuritzkes et al. (2002) discuss that the amount of capital that is required to 
support the level of risk taking is a concern for two group of stakeholders: a) 
debtors, policyholders, regulators and rating agencies who want the bank to 
hold sufficient capital to absorb risk under the most extreme scenarios because 
their main concern is bank solvency, and b) shareholders and investment 
analyst who are focused on the return the bank gets on the capital invested that 
will be useful to support risk taking because their main concern is profitability. 
They conclude that while both groups are concerned on capital level, their 
interests go in different directions, because a lower capital level for a certain 
degree of risk taking will make the bank less solvent but more profitable, and 
vice versa. To reach an optimal capital strcuture, banks may either increase 
their own capital or reduce its assets (Admati et. al., 2013). 
2.2.3 Dynamic adjustment of bank capital towards its target 
Banks are subject to regulatory capital requirements. However, these 
institutions often hold additional capital for many reasons (Berger et al., 2008), 
for example, as a hedge against having to raise new equity in the short term, to 
avoid the effect of volatile earnings and to be prepared in case some investment 
opportunities arise. As previously discussed in section 2.1, regulators use stress 
testing as a regulatory tool, which are mainly focused on assessing the 
compliance of minimum regulatory capital requirements.  
The line of research that studies bank capital regulation has also focused on the 
existence of determinants of optimal bank capital ratios (Francis and Osborne, 
2012; Allen et. al., 2011; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Diamond and Rajan, 
2000). In an ideal situation, banks would keep their optimal capital structure, 
but the existence of adjustment costs may prevent a quick adjustment to this 
target (Kuritzkes et al., 2002). In a cost-benefit analysis, the financial 
institutions evaluate the adjustment costs and the costs of operating with a 
suboptimal capital structure (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). There is a line of 
studies in banking research that investigates how banks set the target capital 
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ratio according to their specific characteristics and the speed of adjustment of 
their capital structures towards the target capital ratio (De Jonghe and Öztekin, 
2010; Berger et at., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006).  
Theoretical studies (e.g. Myers and Rajan, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; 
Allen et al., 2011) and empirical studies (Marcus, 1983; Flannery and Rangan, 
2008) show that banks have target capital ratios and that they adjust to their 
target quicker than non-financial firms. Flannery and Rangan (2006) analyze a 
sample of US firms and investigate whether a target capital level for firms 
exists and how quickly firms close the gap between the current and the target 
debt ratio. The study finds that a target level exists and that the firms close 
approximately one third of the gap in one year.   
Banks on average tend to reach their optimal capital ratios over time since they 
have incentives to maximize their profit. The optimal capital ratio can be 
proxied by the long-run target (optimal) capital ratio.  
If the bank is over-capitalized (the current capital ratio is higher than its target) 
the bank faces an opportunity cost. The bank can reduce its total funding costs 
by reducing its capital level. If the bank is under-capitalized (the current capital 
ratio is higher than its target), the bank is exposed to regulatory intervention 
and market constraints. If this is the case, the bank may want to raise its capital 
level. Cost of adjusting capital may be an important explanation why banks 
hold capital ratios above the regulatory minimum.  
Banks usually hold additional capital to the minimum capital ratios set by the 
banking regulator, as they maintain an additional capital buffer that in addition 
to the regulatory capital constitutes the banks‘ own internal capital target. This 
target, which is a desired capital ratio, is not observable to the general public.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
The inclusion of stress tests as an integral part of the risk management system 
of banks suggests the following hypotheses about the impact that stress testing 
has on the current capital ratio of a bank with a certain risk profile and the use 
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of risk management by individual banks to determine the current capital ratio 
in the stressed years following the disclosure of the macro stress test results:  
H1: The deviation that the predicted stressed Tier 1 capital ratio has from the 
current 2010 Tier 1 capital ratio (stress test impact) depends on current 2010 
bank risk factors such as capital risk, the quality of assets, managerial skills, 
the level of earnings and profitability, the level of liquidity risk and the 
sensitivity to market risk.  
H2: The deviation that the predicted stressed Tier 1 capital ratio has from the 
current Tier 1 capital ratio of an individual bank (stress test deviation) in the 
stressed years depends on the current bank risk factors such as capital risk, the 
quality of assets, managerial skills, the level of earnings and profitability, the 
level of liquidity risk and the sensitivity to market risk.and the capital structure 
adjustment strategy (capital increase or asset reduction). 
Considering that regulation plays a significant role in the determination of the 
target Tier 1 capital ratio and that stress tests are regulatory tools and also are 
part of the risk management system of banks, we posit the following 
hypothesis about the deviation the current Tier 1 capital ratio has from the 
target Tier 1 capital ratio and the risk profile of a bank: 
 H3: The deviation that the current Tier 1 capital ratio has from the target Tier 
1 capital ratio of an individual bank depends on the current bank risk factors 
such as capital risk, the quality of assets, managerial skills, the level of 
earnings and profitability, the level of liquidity risk, the sensitivity to market 
risk and the occurrence of regulatory stress tests. 
With these three hypotheses we will show the risk profile of financial 
institutions that get a more negative result from the stress testing exercise (H1), 
the risk profile of financial institutions that take advantage of the informational 
role of the stress testing results disclosure to adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio via 
an increase in capital or a reduction of assets (H2) and the risk profile of 
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financial institutions that show a smaller gap between the current and the target 
Tier 1 capital ratio and the speed of such adjustment (H3).  
2.4 Research Design 
2.4.1 Data sources and sample selection 
The 2011 EU-wide stress test exercise is carried out on a group of banks 
covering over 65% of the EU banking system total assets, and at least 50% of 
the national banking sectors in each EU Member State, as expressed in terms of 
total consolidated assets as of end of 2010. 
The sample includes banks targeted by the 2011 European Union (EU) stress 
test carried out by the European Banking Authority (EBA) with available 
financial data for the 2010, 2011 and 2012 year-end. Using the 2010 year-end 
financial data, the stress test simulation covered two years, 2011 and 2012.  
Banks financial data are gathered from the Orbis Database. The stress test 
targeted 91 banks for two years, 2011 and 2012. However, due to missing data 
in the Orbis database, a total of 122 bank-year are included in the sample to test 
hypothesis 1 (61 entities in 2011 and 2012), a total of 102 bank-year are 
included in the sample to test hypothesis 2 (53 for 2011 and 49 for 2012) and a 
total of 148 bank-year are included in the sample to test hypothesis 3 (37 
entities per year in the period 2011-2008). Details of the sample coverage by 
country are shown in Table 2.1. 
INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE 
The total assets of the 91 banks targeted by the EU-wide stress test amounts to 
27,472 million Euros. The sample to test hypothesis 1 and the sample to test 
hypothesis 2 represent 84% of the stress test targeted banks while the sample to 
test hypothesis 3 represents 67%. All the banks included in our sample are 
from the EU-region except for one Swiss bank. 
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2.4.2 Methodology and empirical model to test H1 and H2 
Our hypothesis 1 is tested using a regression model on stress test impact (STI). 
In order to obtain the impact the stress test has on the bank Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
in each stressed year (STI), we calculate the difference between the stressed 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012 with the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 
2010 taken from 2010 year-end financial statements. The data of stressed Tier 
1 Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012 was obtained from the stress testing results 
disclosed in the EBA website.  
Hypothesis 2 is tested using a regression model on stress test deviation (STD). 
In order to obtain the deviation of the estimated 2011 and 2012 Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio from the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 2011 and 2012, we calculate the 
difference between the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 2011 and 2012 taken 
from the corresponding year-end financial statements with the stressed Tier 1 
Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012. The data of stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 
2011 and 2012 was obtained from the stress testing results disclosed in the 
EBA website.  
2.4.3 Target capital ratio and the speed of adjustment – Hypothesis 3 
Following the extant literature (Daher et al., 2015; De Jonghe and 
Öztekin,2010; Berger et at.,2008; Flannery and Rangan,2006), we assume that 
at a certain point in time each bank has a Tier1 Capital Ratio, Tier1CRi,t,  that 
is a weighted average of the target Tier1 Capital Ratio, Tier1CR*i,t, and the 
lagged Tier1 Capital Ratio, Tier1CRi,t-1 : 
Tier1CRi,t = λTier1CR*i,t, + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1                                                                          (1) 
The higher lambda is, the higher the speed of capital-adjustment towards its 
target and the less rigid bank capital is. This variable speed of adjustment 
model estimates the bank´s characteristics that determine a specific target 
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capital ratio. To proxy for these bank characteristics we use the different risk 
areas covered by the CAMELS rating system.  
We model Tier1CR*i,t, as a function of these bank‘s characteristics (X):  
Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1                                                                                                                (2) 
Substituting the equation of target Tier 1 Capital Ratio (2) in equation (1) we 
obtain the following equation: 
Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1                                                (3)                                                
We estimate equation (3) following the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator. From this equation we got an estimate of the 
average speed of adjustment (λ) for all banks and the set of coefficients β that 
we use to estimate the target Tier1 Capital Ratio for each bank in each year 
using equation (2).  
We finally calculate for each bank the deviation the current capital ratio has 
from its target Tier1 Capital Ratio: 
DÊV i,t = Tier1CR*i,t - Tier1CRi,t-1                                                                                                   (4) 
Using panel data of banks targeted by 2010 stress tests with available financial 
information in the Orbis database for the period 2008-2012, we ended up with 
a sample of 148 bank-year. In the first step, we run equation (3) using panel 
data for the years 2011, 2010, 2009 and 2008 from where we obtained the 
average λ for all banks and the set of coefficients β. In the second step, we 
calculate the target capital ratio for each bank in each year (2012-2009) using 
equation (2) and finally, using equation (4), we calculate each bank deviation 
from its target capital ratio in each year (2012-2009). 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using a regression model on target deviation (DÊV) 
which is estimated on the sample of banks described in this section. 
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2.4.4 CAMELS measurement and variables selection 
The experimental variables of the models are taken from prior studies that have 
identified proxies for the different risk areas covered by the CAMELS rating 
system (Gambetta et al., 2015; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2013; de Claro, 2013; 
Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013; Jin et al., 2013a, Jin et al., 2013b; Jin et al., 2011 
and Fields et al., 2004).  
The CAMELS rating system is commonly used by regulators to assess the 
strength of financial institutions and to evaluate the level of bank risks (Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2013). The CAMELS approach is not only 
used in the US as it is the approach used by regulators worldwide. One 
example is the supervisory method used by the Banco de España (the Spanish 
regulator) which is called Risk-Based Supervisory Methodology Approach and 
it is based on the CAMELS rating system. This method helps to assess which 
institutions are more likely to develop problems in the future, in order to 
dedicate additional supervisory resources and to prevent future crises (BE, 
2011). In this line, Gambetta et al. (2015) use the CAMELS approach to 
identify the risk factors of Spanish Financial institutions that are related to the 
attitude of these entities towards users‘ complaints.  
To proxy for capital adequacy, we use the capitalization ratio (CAPRATIO) 
which is defined as total equity to total assets (Jin et al., 2013a, Jin et al., 
2013b; Jin et al., 2011). De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) distinguish between 
internal and external sources of capital. External capital is the outcome of 
issuances and/or repurchases of preference and/or common shares. Internal 
capital represents changes in retained earnings, minority interests, and other 
equity reserves and constitutes a cheaper source of bank financing. Following 
De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) that find that undercapitalized banks mainly use 
equity issuances to recapitalize, we predict a positive relationship between 
CAPRATIO and STI (a financial institution with a higher CAPRATIO will 
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have a less negative impact on the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio), a positive 
relationship with STD (a financial institution with a higher CAPRATIO will 
have a higher current Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
resulting from the stress test exercise) and a negative relationship between 
CAPRATIO and DÊV (a financial institution with a higher CAPRATIO will 
have a smaller gap between its target and current capital ratio). 
Provision for loan losses (PLL) is used to capture asset quality as this measure 
will capture the change in the allowance for loan losses in the current period 
(Jin et al., 2011; Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). The higher the PLL the lower 
the asset quality. It can also be the case that companies with higher PLL are 
conservative and record provision for doubtful debtors more timely than other 
financial institutions. The provision for loan losses will have an impact on the 
risk level of a bank because a bank with a higher level of loan losses has low 
quality loans, and hence, higher risk-adjusted assets. We predict a negative 
relationship between PLL and STI because banks with higher PLL will have a 
lower stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio resulting from the stress test exercise. We 
predict a positive relationship between PLL and STD because banks with 
higher LLP will show a lower stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio. The effect of PLL 
on DÊV is expected to be positive since banks with greater expected PLL can 
be assumed to raise their capital levels in order to comply with regulatory 
requirement and to mitigate solvency risk (Jokipii and Milne, 2011).  
We use the efficiency ratio (EFF) defined as cost to income ratio to proxy for 
management skills (De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015). The higher the efficiency 
ratio (i.e., the lower the efficiency for the bank), the more difficult it is for the 
bank to earn a profit and thus, to increase its capital. Considering this, we 
predict a positive relationship between EFF and DÊV because the gap between 
the target and the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio will be larger. A high efficiency 
ratio means a company needs to incur in high costs to get a certain income 
level. These costs are usually related to non-interest expenses such as 
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personnel, branches, and data processing expenses that are associated with 
large volumes of transactions accounts and with a geographically diverse 
branch system. Considering this, a high efficiency ratio could also be used as a 
proxy for the complexity of bank operations (Fields et al., 2004). We predict 
that banks with higher EFF will show a lower stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 
thus, the relationship of EFF with STI will be negative and the relationship 
with STD will be positive.  
We also include corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) as a proxy 
for management skills (European Commission, 2009), which is a dummy 
variable coded one if the financial institution issues a CSR report and zero 
otherwise. Corporate Social Responsibility reports are gathered from the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) database. The idea of the inclusion of  
corporate social responsibility in risk management programs in the financial 
sector has been taken into account by Bangladesh Bank (the Central Bank of 
Bangladesh) in recent policies issued (Bangladesh Bank, 2011). In this policy, 
the Bangladeshi authority requires the environmental risk to be incorporated in 
the Core Risk Management (CRM) that mandates considering environmental 
risk in the overall credit risk assessment methodology applied by banks. 
Additionally, this will have an impact in the computation of Risk-Adjusted 
Capital Ratio. van Gelder and Vander (2011) argue that “banks should be 
required to integrate social and environmental sustainability criteria in their 
credit risk assessment system. Banks using the internal rating based 
approaches should differentiate risk weighting factors for various categories of 
borrowers according to their level of sustainability. As sustainable borrowers 
have a lower probability of default, their risk weighting factor should be lower. 
Non-sustainable categories with a higher probability of default should have 
higher risk weighting factors”. Financial institutions that issue a CSR report 
tend to be involved in sustainable lending and this translates in loans with a 
lower risk weighting factor and hence, in a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio. We 
predict that banks with higher CSRR will show a higher stressed Tier 1 Capital 
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Ratio and thus, the relationship between CSRR with STI will be positive and 
the relationship with STD will be negative. Additionally, we predict a negative 
relationship between CSRR and DÊV because the gap between the target and 
the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio will be smaller for banks that issue a CSR 
report. 
To proxy for earnings and profitability we use the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (OPINC) (Fields et al., 2004). Operating profit captures the impact 
on net profit of the transactions that are closely related to the business of the 
firm. Following de Claro (2013) and Martínez-Campillo (2013) we also use the 
ratios Return on Assets (ROA) as a proxy for earnings and profitability. If the 
bank prefers to increase capital through retained earnings rather than through 
equity issues, bank profitability may have a positive effect on bank capital 
(Shim, 2013, Jokipii and Milne, 2011). The expected sign on the coefficient of 
both variables in STI is positive since the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio would 
be higher, moving in line with the level of bank profitability. The relationship 
between the profitability variables with STD and DÊV will be the opposite. 
We use total loans (LOANS) as a proxy for bank liquidity as the main factor in 
the financial crisis is a loss in liquidity and an increase in the default risk of 
loans from interest rate resets (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). We also use total 
liquid assets as a proxy for liquidity (LIQ). Banks that show higher level of 
liquid assets that can readily be converted into cash when necessary may have 
less incentive to engage in riskier lending activities making risk-weighted 
assets lower (Shim, 2013) and hence, the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio will be 
higher. The expected sign on this variable is positive (negative) in STI (STD) 
equations. The higher LIQ the lower DÊV we expect because banks will be 
able to reach the target capital ratio easier. We expect the opposite 
relationships in the case of LOANS.  
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Usually banks tend to grant loans for longer terms than the deposits they 
received from customers. As a consequence, interest rate resets will impact 
deposits in first instance and this will reduce the interest rate spread. To proxy 
for this risk we use the level of other interest bearing liabilities to total assets 
(INTBEAR) (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). According to de Claro (2013) a 
bank with liquidity problems will increase the interest rate to retain the level of 
deposits or to capture new deposits in the market. The higher this ratio the 
higher the sensitivity of the financial institutions to the impact of liquidity 
issues on interest expense and hence in the firm profitability. The expected sign 
on the coefficient of  INTBEAR in STI is negative since the higher INTBEAR 
the lower the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio would be. The relationship between 
INTBEAR with STD and DÊV will be the opposite. 
We use the control variable year (YEAR) to control for any specific year effect 
to test H1 and H2 and we use the control variable stress test (ST) to control for 
any stress test effect to test H3. We define YEAR as a dummy variable set to 
zero for 2011 and one for 2012. The adverse scenarios defined by EBA for 
2012 is more negative than the 2011 adverse scenario, so we expect a negative 
sign for YEAR in the STI model and a positive sign in STD. ST is a dummy 
variable set to one for the years following the stress test and zero otherwise. 
We expect a negative sign for ST in the DÊV model since the stress test will 
play a disciplinary role with the banks in closing the gap between the target and 
current Tier 1 Capital Ratio as they are used by regulators to monitor the bank 
strength.  
To test H2 we control for equity and assets variation using ΔEQUITY and 
ΔASSETS control variables. ΔEQUITY is defined as the equity variation 
between the current and the previous year while ΔASSETS is defined as the 
assets variation between the current and the previous year. We expect a 
positive relationship between ΔEQUITY and STD as an equity increase will 
imply a higher current Tier 1 Capital Ratio and we expect a negative 
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relationship between ΔASSETS and STD a an asset decrease will imply a 
higher current Tier 1 Capital Ratio (Admati et al., 2013). Additionally, we 
control for the EBA recapitalization plan using the variavle CEXERCISE. In 
December 2011, EBA launched a recapitalization plan of the European 
financial sector called the ―Capital exercise". This was a formal 
recommendation related to banks' recapitalization needs and it recommended 
building up an exceptional and temporary buffer by the end of June 2012. Of 
the 71 EEA banks involved in the EU 2011 capital exercise, 37 banks showed 
an initial shortfall. These 37 banks included 10 banks that were identified as 
undergoing a deep restructuring or the shortfall was already being monitored 
by the relevant local authority. The remaining 27 banks were required to 
recapitalize. CEXERCISE is defined as a dummy variable set to one if the bank 
showed a capital shortfall in the EBA Capital exercise and zero otherwise. We 
expect a positive relationship between CEXERCISE and STD as banks with 
shortfall were required to capitalize. 
2.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample to test H1.  
INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE 
The data reveal that the average impact of the stress test on current 2010 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio for the 61 banks in the sample was -0.81% points and -1.57% 
points for 2011 and 2012 respectively. This shows that the negative impact of 
the stress test on Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2012 doubled the negative impact for 
2011, what is consistent with the more negative adverse scenario defined by 
the EBA foe 2012. The bank that shows the highest negative impact in 2011 
was Commerzbank AG (-2.75% points) and in 2012 Allied Irish Banks Plc (-
5.17% points).  The banks that shows the strongest position in the stress test for 
both years is OTP Bank Plc (1.25% points in 2011 and 1.31% in 2012 points).  
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The average capital ratio (total equity to total assets) of the sample according to 
the 2010 year-end financial statements is 6.47%, the average ROA is 0.34% 
and the average cost to income ratio is 57.81%. The average total loans in the 
sample amounts to USD 241.154 million with an average loan loss provisions 
of USD 2.375 million. The average liquid assets of the sample represent a 
22.43% of the average total assets.  
Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample to test H2.  
INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE 
The data reveals that the average deviation of the 2011 current T1 Capital 
Ratio from the stressed ratio in 2011 is 2.85% points while the deviation is 
4.65% points in the case of 2012. This shows that the average current capital 
ratio in 2011 and 2012 are higher than the Tier 1 capital ratio resulting from the 
stress testing exercise. When we compare these results with the results in Table 
2, we see that the gap between the current Tier 1 Capital ratio in 2011 and 2012 
with the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio for each year is three times larger than 
the gap between the 2010 current Tier 1 Capital Ratio and the stressed Tier 1 
Capital Ratio for each year. This provides evidence that the disclosure of the 
stress test results paly an informational role to bank managers. 
The bank for which the current capital ratio was higher in both years is the 
Allied Irish Banks Plc, showing a deviation of 16.72% points and 16.56% 
points in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The bank for which the current capital 
ratio was lower in both years is the National Bank of Greece SA, showing a 
deviation of -13.84% points and -14.37% points in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
The data shows that the average capital ratio of the sample remains stable at 
5.20% in both years, the average ROA went up from -0.93% to -0.33% and the 
average cost to income ratio went up from 66.90% to 69.86% in 2012. The 
average total loans in the sample increased from USD 264.157 million to USD 
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281.335 million, showing a 6.5% increase, while the average loan loss 
provisions increased a 38.7%, going up from USD 2.569 million to USD 3.562 
million. Finally, the average total liquid assets proportion in total assets went 
up from 21.47% in 2011 to 22.78% in 2012. 
In Table 2.4 we show the distribution by country of the financial institutions 
included in the samples to test H1 (Panel A) and H2 (Panel B). Spain was the 
country that had the highest number of financial institutions in both samples 
followed by Italy. This is in line with the large amount of Spanish banks 
included in the EU-wide stress test exercise. 
INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE 
We discuss the descriptive statistics for the sample we use to test H3 in section 
2.5.2. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Stress test impact on and deviation from the current capital ratio 
We present in Table 2.5 the stress test impact (STI) regression model 
estimation results. The regression model has a significant F value. The adjusted 
R-square is 30.20%.  
Multicollinearity test show that the mean Tolerance level of the independent 
variables is less than 0.01 and the mean VIF value is below 5. Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a concern in our model (Cohen et al. ,2003). 
INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE 
The results indicate that the variable YEAR is negative and significant at 1% 
level, showing that the stress testing results had a more negative impact on the 
current 2010 Tier 1 Capital Ratio when the 2012 ratio was stressed, as 
compared to the stressed 2011 ratio. The sign is consistent with our prediction 
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
77 
 
as the 2012 adverse scenario is more negative than the 2011 scenario. 
Financial institutions that in 2010 showed higher loan loss provisions and 
higher efficiency ratio (cost to income ratio) show, as predicted, a more 
negative impact in the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio. The variables LLP and 
EFF are negative and significant at 5% level.  
On the contrary, the variables LIQ and INTBEAR are positively significant at 
the 5% and the 10% level respectively showing that financial institutions with 
higher level of liquid assets and with a higher ratio of other interest bearing 
liabilities to total assets receive a less negative impact on the stressed Tier 1 
Capital Ratio. The sign of LIQ is consistent with our prediction as banks with 
higher level of liquid assets show higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio and the effects of 
the stress test are less negative. The variable INTBEAR shows a positive sign 
as opposed to our prediction. This could imply that the adverse scenario does 
not contemplate the bank reaction to liquidity problems through deposits 
interest rate adjustment, so higher levels of interest bearing liabilities result in 
higher levels of loans granted and hence higher profitability.   
The results as a whole indicate that financial institutions that are inefficient or 
complex, with high loans loss provisions booked, with low level of liquid 
assets and low level of other interest bearing liabilities to total assets received a 
more negative impact in the 2011 EU stress test.   
In Table 5 we also report the regression model results for each individual 
stressed year. The sign of the independent variables is consistent with the sign 
we got in the pooled sample but for 2011 none of the independent variables is 
significant. For 2012, all the variables that are statistically significant in the 
pooled sample are also significant in 2012 except for INTBEAR. These results 
are consistent with the negative sign of YEAR in the pooled sample: banks 
with higher level of liquid assets, low levels of loan loss provisions and that are 
efficient get better results in the stress testing exercise in the more negative 
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2012 adverse scenario. These results provide evidence that banks with this risk 
profile are prepared to face severe scenarios and avoid negative impact on the 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio.   
We report in Table 2.6 the stress test deviation (STD) regression model 
estimation results. The regression model has a significant F value with an 
adjusted R-square is 45.46%.  
Multicollinearity test show that the mean Tolerance level of the independent 
variables is less than 0.01 and the mean VIF value is below 5. Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a concern in our model (Cohen et al , 2003). 
INSERT TABLE 2.6 HERE 
The results indicate that the variable YEAR has a positive and significant 
relationship at 1% level with STD, showing that the gap between the stress 
testing results and the current Tier 1 capital ratio was bigger for 2012 than for 
2011. The sign is consistent with our prediction and it is reasonable because the 
conditions of the adverse scenario simulated were registered neither in 2012 
nor in 2011 and, for 2012 the predicted scenario was more negative than the 
one predicted for 2011. Additionally, the EBA Capital exercise was concluded 
by June 2012. The variable CAPRATIO is positively significant at the 1% 
level showing that financial institutions with higher capital ratio (equity to total 
assets) have a better current Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the resulting in the stress 
test. The sign is also consistent with our prediction. 
The results also show that the variables ROA and EFF are positive and 
significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively, meaning that financial 
institutions with higher return on assets and higher efficiency ratio have a 
higher current Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the stressed ratio and this is also the 
case for companies that have a lower ratio of operating income to total assets 
(the variable OPINC is negative and significant at the 1% level). The variables 
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OPINC and EFF show the expected sign, but this is not the case with ROA. 
Banks with higher ROA are not able to show higher Tier 1 Capital Ratios as 
banks with higher OPINC do. This shows that only banks that are profitable in 
the banking business increase capital through total earnings. 
The variable LLP is positive and significant at the 10% level as predicted, 
implying that financial institutions with higher levels of loan loss provisions 
have a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the resulting from the stress test. This is 
because the stress test impact on the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio was highly 
negative in these banks. 
Finally, the variable ΔEQUITY is negative and significant at the 1% level 
while ΔASSETS is negative but not significant.  This result indicates that 
banks with an equity increase in the current year show a smaller gap between 
the current and the stressed Tier 1 Capital ratio, not being able to get a higher 
current Tier 1 Capital ratio even though they increase equity. The variable 
CEXERCISE shows, as predicted, a positive sign but it is not significant. This 
means that CEXERCISE has no impact on DEV.  
To further investigate this result and considering that YEAR is significant, we 
run our model separately for each individual year. Table 6 shows the results. 
OPINC, LLP and CAPRATIO are not significant in the individual years as 
they are in the pooled sample. ROA and EFF are also significant in each year 
as they are in the pooled sample and keep the same sign. The variable 
CEXERCISE shows a positive sign but it is not significant. This shows no 
effect of the EBA Capital Exercise in the capital ratio level, neither in 2011 nor 
in 2012. The variable ΔEQUITY is negative and significant in 2012 as it is in 
the pooled sample. But in 2011, ΔEQUITY is positive and significant and now 
ΔASSETS is negative and significant, while it was non-significant neither in 
the pooled sample nor in 2012. This result is interesting considering that stress 
tests produce valuable information for market participants and the velocity of 
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reaction may be influenced by the level and moment of disclosure of the 
results. The release of bad results may impact banks differently and lead bank 
managers to different actions to improve the quality of the risk management 
tools. Therefore, our results show that banks that in 2011 increase their equity 
and shrink their assets manage to increase their current Tier 1 Capital Ratio, 
while in 2012 banks that increase their equity decrease their current Tier 1 
Capital Ratio. As ΔASSETS is not significant in 2012, this means that banks 
decrease the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio by taking more risk and managing the 
risk-weight of their assets. Once the stress test results are announced, banks 
adjust their 2011 financial statements increasing equity and shrinking assets to 
get a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Banks revert in 2012 this potentially 
excessive adjustment, by shifting to riskier assets and increasing, as a result, 
the risk-weighted assets because they are not able to get higher current Tier 1 
Capital ratio even though they increase equity. This is evidence of risk-shifting 
moral hazard according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and shows 
recapitalization or assets reduction strategy to comply with capital 
requirements (Admati et al. 2013). These results give support to risk-weight 
manipulation theories. In a study about Basel risk-weights manipulation, 
Mariathasan and Marrouhe (2014) find that the decline in risk weights is 
particularly pronounced among weakly capitalized banks. Mariathasan and 
Marrouhe (2014) identify four mechanisms to reduce the average risk-weights: 
portfolio re-allocation (the bank changes resources from assets that require 
more capital to assets that require less capital), improved risk-measurement 
(more precise risk measurement can reduce capital requirements), faulty risk-
modeling (financial models with flawed assumptions) and strategic risk-
modeling (internal models that banks use are complex and difficult to 
supervise). Duran and Lozano-Vivas (2015) find risk shifting evidence in 
European banks in the 2002-2009 period and argue that incentives to shift risk 
seem to be weaker in banks with a capital buffer. 
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Hence, our results indicate that financial institutions with higher ROA but 
lower profitability in the banking business, with higher capital ratio, with 
higher level of loan loss provisions and with higher cost to income ratio 
manage to have a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio than the stressed Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio resulting from the stress test exercise. The variables that are consistently 
significant in the pooled and in each separate year are ROA and EFF showing 
that banks with higher ROA and that are complex manage to get higher current 
Tier 1 Capital Ratios. The results also provide evidence of capital structure 
adjustment through equity increase and assets decrease in the year the stress 
test results are disclosed and a reversion of this adjustment in the following 
year. These results provide additional evidence to the risk-shifting moral 
hazard theory and are in line with Archarya and Steffen (2015) findings. They 
find evidence for bank moral hazard in large and undercapitalized European 
banks and argue that this could lead undercapitalized banks to subsequent 
problems through excess risk taking. 
2.5.2 Target capital ratio and the speed of adjustment 
In Table 7 we report the descriptive statistics of the sample we use to test H3. 
We also use this sample to calculate the average speed of adjustment and the 
average target capital ratio following the methodology described in section 2.4.  
INSERT TABLE 2.7 HERE 
We obtained an annual average speed of adjustment of 64.16% and an average 
target Tier 1 capital ratio of 11.66% for all the banks included in the sample. 
With this speed of adjustment, banks need on average three years to close 95% 
of the gap between current Tier 1 capital ratio and the target Tier 1 capital ratio 
(1-(1-0.6416)
3
 = 0.95). When we compare our results with prior studies‘ 
findings we notice that the EU banks targeted by the stress test show a high 
speed of adjustment, a result which is consistent with financial markets with 
low adjustment costs. Some studies show that US banks close its gap at the rate 
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of more than 30% per year (Jokipii and Milne, 2011; Flannery and Ranjan, 
2006) and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) find a speed of adjustment of 29% 
for a sample of 64 countries during the 1994–2010 period. The study finds that 
the speed of capital structure adjustment is heterogeneous across countries and 
shows that banks make faster capital structure adjustments in countries with 
more stringent capital requirements, better supervisory monitoring, more 
developed capital markets, and high inflation. Additionally, in times of crises, 
banks adjust their capital structure significantly more quickly. Other studies 
find a speed of adjustment of 40% for large U.S. banks (Berger et al., 2008), 
47% for banks in the United States and 15 European countries (Gropp and 
Heider , 2010) and also in emerging markets banks in Panamá (74.6%), 
México (61.10%) and Paraguay (61.4%) (Carvallo et al., 2015). Banks that 
show highest capital adjustment have easier access to capital replenishment 
(Carvallo et al., 2015). The speed of adjustment we find in our sample of 
European banks is consistent with these previous findings. 
Using the average speed of adjustment and the set of β coefficients we got from 
the equation (3) described in section 2.4.3, we use equation (2) to calculate the 
target Tier 1capital ratio for each bank of the sample in each year and finally, 
using equation (4), we calculate the deviation of the current Tier 1capital ratio 
from the target Tier 1 capital ratio. We then form four quartiles in each year 
based on this average deviation and calculate the average variation between the 
current year Tier 1 Capital Ratio and previous year Capital Ratio for each 
quartile each year. We report the results in Figure 2.1.  
INSERT FIGURE 2.1 HERE 
In Figure 1 we include one graph for each year in the sample (2012-2009). 
Banks to the left on the horizontal axis have the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
higher than the target Tier 1 Capital Ratio and should be acting to reduce the 
former to meet the target. On the other hand, banks to the right have current 
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Tier 1 Capital Ratio lower than the target and should be acting to meet the 
target. Interestingly, the results reported in Figure 1 show that only in the year 
following the year subject to the stress test, the behavior of the banks is 
consistent with this expected course of action (see graph 2). Banks that in 2010 
were on average 9.13% points short of their target increase their Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio in 2.70% points in 2011 in order to close the gap (Q4) and banks that 
were on average 1.74% points short of the target increased their Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio in 0.52% points in 2011 in order to close the gap (Q3). On the other 
hand, banks that were high above their target (8.49% points, Q1) reduced their 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 0.23% points in 2011 and banks that were on average 
2.57% points above their target reduced their target in 1.31% points (Q2) in 
2011.  These results suggest that after the stress test results are released by the 
end of 2011, banks adjust their Tier 1 Capital Ratio in a more rational manner 
according to the cost-benefit trade-off. This also shows that stress testing plays 
a disciplinary role with banks and that the stress test results released provide 
useful information to banks that is incorporated in the decision making process 
(Petrella and Resti, 2013). These results are consistent with our findings of STI 
and STD models, providing additional support for the informational and 
disciplinary role of stress test results disclosure. In the results we provide for 
the STD model we also show risk-shifting moral hazard behavior.  
We also note that in the years prior to the stress test, the banks that have Tier 1 
Capital Ratio higher than the target tend to increase the Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 
the following year instead of reducing it (see graphs 3 and 4). This could imply 
that the banks with strong capital structure continue to increase the additional 
capital for the reasons described in Berger et al. (2008) and to face the 
regulatory stress test in a stronger position. This behavior is also seen in the 
year following the stress test (see graph 1).  
In order to analyze these results in the aggregate for each year, we report in 
Table 2.8 the average target Tier 1 Capital Ratio (Tier1CR*i,t), the average Tier 
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1 Capital Ratio for t and t-1 (Tier1CRi,t ,and Tier1CRi,t-1) and the deviation of 
average Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t-1 from the average target Tier 1 Capital ratio 
for the subsequent year (DÊV i,t).  
INSERT TABLE 2.8 HERE 
It is interesting to note the significant average deviation that 2008 current Tier 
1 Capital Ratio has from the average target Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2009 
(3.13% points) for all the banks included in the sample and the way in which 
this deviation almost disappear by 2012, remaining a gap of only 0.05% points. 
The deviation radically changed by 2010, the year in which the stress test 
targeted these banks. This is also consistent with the average speed of 
adjustment of 64.16% per year, showing that in 3 years the sample banks 
almost completely close the gap between target and current Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio (during the period 2010-2012). 
Finally, we report in Table 2.9 the deviation from target (DÊV) regression 
model estimation results. The regression model has a significant F value. The 
adjusted R-square is 86.21%.  
INSERT TABLE 2.9 HERE 
The results indicate that banks whose current Tier 1 capital ratio is lower than 
the target Tier 1 capital ratio tend to have large loan portfolios, are profitable in 
the banking business but get lower return on assets, have lower level of liquid 
assets, lower capital ratio and lower level of other interest bearing liabilities to 
total assets, are inefficient and are not involved in CSR reporting. The sign of 
the coefficients are consistent with our prediction except for INTBEAR and 
OPINC. The results also show that the quality of the loan portfolio is not 
related to the deviation the current capital ratio has from the target capital ratio. 
The explanatory variable ST is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that in the years following the stress tests, the deviation the current 
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Tier 1 capital ratio has from the target is lower. This is consistent with the 
speed of adjustment we find in our analysis.  
2.6 Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact that the 2011 EU Stress Test performed by 
the EBA had on the current 2010 Tier 1 Capital Ratio when it was stressed in 
the adverse scenario for 2011 and 2012 and how the magnitude of this impact 
relates to the risk profile of the targeted financial institutions. 
 Under the theory that individual banks and regulators use stress tests as a risk 
management tool, and moreover, that stress testing is a crucial component of 
the risk management system of financial institutions, we find that an efficient 
risk management system will help the financial institution to mitigate the 
impact of the stress testing performed by the regulator. The purpose of this 
paper is to look into the connection between the macro stress testing impact 
and bank risk factors under the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach.  
We also look into the gap between the stress testing results for 2011 and 2012 
and the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio of the targeted financial institutions and 
analyze the relationship with their risk profile, also using the CAMELS 
approach. We do this with the purpose of looking into the banks‘ risk 
management strategy to modify its capital structure after the stress test results 
are disclosed.  
Our findings show strong evidence that banks with higher level of liquid assets, 
low levels of loan loss provisions and that are efficient get better results in the 
stress testing exercise in the more negative 2012 adverse scenario. These 
results show that banks with this risk profile are prepared to face severe 
scenarios and avoid negative impact on the Tier 1 Capital Ratio.  
We also look into the gap between the current Tier 1 capital ratio and the 
stressed Tier 1 capital ratio resulting from the stress testing exercise for each 
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year. We find that the distance between the current with the stressed ratio in 
each year is on average three times bigger than the distance between the 
stressed ratio for each year and the current ratio in 2010 (the targeted year in 
the stress test exercise). The results provide evidence of capital structure 
adjustment through equity increase and assets decrease in the year the stress 
test results are disclosed (2011) and we also find evidence that banks revert in 
2012 this potentially excessive adjustment, by shifting to riskier assets and 
increasing, as a result, the risk-weighted assets because they do not show 
higher current Tier 1 Capital ratio even though they increase equity. The results 
also show that the EBA Capital Exercise has no impact on the difference 
between the current and the stressed Tier 1 capital ratio, meaning that banks 
that were required to capitalize by the EBA adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio 
similarly to banks that had surplus in the Capital Exercise. These results give 
support to the informational role of stress tests because all banks targeted by 
the EU-wide stress test adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio irrespective of the EBA 
capitalization requirement in the Capital Exercise.  
Finally, we find the risk profile of banks that tend to have the current Tier 1 
capital ratio with a lower deviation from the target Tier 1 capital ratio. 
Interestingly, this risk profile has some similarities to the profile of banks that 
manage to get higher capital ratios than the stress test result. We also show that 
banks align the current Tier 1 capital ratio to the target Tier 1 capital ratio after 
the stress test results are disclosed and that they almost completely close the 
gap between the current and the target capital ratio in three years which is, in 
fact, the window period between stress tests in the European Union. These 
results are consistent with the idea that banks align their target capital ratio 
with the regulatory requirements because they also use regulatory stress testing 
as part of their capital risk management strategy. This also shows that stress 
testing plays a disciplinary role with banks and that the stress test results 
released provide useful information to banks that is incorporated in the 
decision making process. 
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Our findings contribute to the literature and regulatory debate on the 
disciplinary role that macro stress testing play in the risk management of 
individual banks and also on the informational role that stress test results play 
to management. In fact, the results obtained shed some light on the relationship 
between the risk profile of a financial institution and the impact a macro stress 
testing has on Tier 1 Capital Ratio in an adverse scenario and how risk 
management can be used by individual banks to improve the capital ratio 
through risk-weighting shifting strategies after the stress test results are 
disclosed. Our findings also show that stress tests also play a disciplinary role 
in leading banks to meet their target capital ratio and we find the risk profile of 
banks that close the gap between the current and the target Tier 1 capital ratio 
faster. Our results also adds evidence to the debate about the weak severity of 
the adverse stress test scenario used by the EBA in the 2011 European stress 
test according to Archarya et  al. (2014), as we find that the gap between the 
current Tier 1 Capital ratio in 2011 and 2012 with the stressed Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio for each year is three times larger than the gap between the 2010 current 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio and the stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio for each year.   
This study helps regulators to focus their regulatory efforts on banks that show 
risk profiles that tend to receive more negative results in this type of stress 
testing exercise and also help to understand the risk profile of  banks that use 
risk management strategies to modify their capital structure after the stress test 
results are disclosed. The results also give support to stress tests as an effective 
regulatory tool and show that the target capital ratio of a bank is consistent with 
the stressed capital ratio derived from the stress test exercise.    
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Table 2.1 – Samples coverage of EU-wide stress test banks total assets (in million Euros) 
 
 
  AT BE CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR HU 
 EU-wide sample  
   
381,856  
      
824,858  
   
84,576  
   
4,872,189  
      
631,433  
   
3,354,365  
   
74,722  
   
5,553,796  
   
5,122,341  
   
377,200  
           
35,190  
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 H1 2011 - Sample  
   
381,856  
      
276,723  
   
41,996  
   
3,018,099  
      
631,433  
   
2,823,808  
   
74,722  
   
5,553,796  
   
5,122,341  
   
329,196  
           
35,190  
 100% 34% 50% 62% 100% 84% 100% 100% 100% 87% 100% 
 H1 2012 - Sample  
   
381,856  
      
276,723  
   
41,996  
   
3,018,099  
      
631,433  
   
2,823,808  
   
74,722  
   
5,553,796  
   
5,122,341  
   
329,196  
           
35,190  
 100% 34% 50% 62% 100% 84% 100% 100% 100% 87% 100% 
 H2 2011 - Sample  
   
250,683  
      
276,723  
            
-    
   
3,018,099  
      
631,433  
   
2,743,340  
   
74,722  
   
5,553,796  
   
5,122,341  
   
329,196  
           
35,190  
 66% 34% 0% 62% 100% 82% 100% 100% 100% 87% 100% 
 H2 2012  - 
Sample  
   
250,683  
      
276,723  
            
-    
   
3,018,099  
      
631,433  
   
2,690,068  
   
74,722  
   
5,553,796  
   
5,122,341  
   
204,717  
           
35,190  
 66% 34% 0% 62% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 54% 100% 
 H3 - Sample  
              
-    
      
276,723  
            
-    
   
2,676,831  
      
631,433  
   
2,232,954  
            
-    
   
3,049,480  
   
5,122,341  
   
204,717  
           
35,190  
  0% 34% 0% 55% 100% 67% 0% 55% 100% 54% 100% 
 
  
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a disciplinary and informational role to adjust  the 
capital ratio? 
96 
 
Table 2.1 (cont.) – Samples coverage of EU-wide stress test banks total assets (in million Euros) 
 
 
  IE IT LU MT NL NO PL PT SE SI Total 
 EU-wide sample  
   
334,766  
   
2,021,330  
            
-    
           
6,382  
   
1,999,073  
      
209,954  
   
35,540  
      
348,799  
   
1,186,659  
     
17,969  
   
27,472,998  
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 H1 2011 - Sample  
   
288,023  
   
2,021,330  
            
-    
                  
-    
   
1,619,474  
                  
-    
   
35,540  
      
304,972  
      
643,806  
       
4,830  
   
23,207,136  
 86% 100% 0% 0% 81% 0% 100% 87% 54% 27% 84% 
 H1 2012 - Sample  
   
288,023  
   
2,021,330  
            
-    
                  
-    
   
1,619,474  
                  
-    
   
35,540  
      
304,972  
      
643,806  
       
4,830  
   
23,207,136  
 86% 100% 0% 0% 81% 0% 100% 87% 54% 27% 84% 
 H2 2011 - Sample  
   
288,023  
   
2,021,330  
            
-    
                  
-    
   
1,619,474  
                  
-    
   
35,540  
      
304,972  
      
643,806  
       
4,830  
   
22,953,499  
 86% 100% 0% 0% 81% 0% 100% 87% 54% 27% 84% 
 H2 2012  - Sample  
   
288,023  
   
2,021,330  
            
-    
                  
-    
   
1,619,474  
                  
-    
   
35,540  
      
304,972  
      
643,806  
       
4,830  
   
22,775,749  
 86% 100% 0% 0% 81% 0% 100% 87% 54% 27% 83% 
 H3 - Sample  
   
288,023  
   
1,750,728  
            
-    
                  
-    
   
1,011,991  
                  
-    
   
35,540  
      
304,972  
      
643,806  
       
4,830  
   
18,269,560  
  86% 87% 0% 0% 51% 0% 100% 87% 54% 27% 67% 
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Table 2.2 – Sample descriptive statistics corresponding to 2010 year-end financial statements for H1 sample 
 
(N=61) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Stress Test Impact 2011 % -2.75% 1.25% -0.81% 0.98% 
Stress Test Impact 2012 % -5.17% 1.31% -1.57% 1.78% 
Loans th USD  375,935.84 959,876,907.82 241,154,205.83 282,198,464.71 
Total assets th USD  468,716.60 2,671,334,325.23 516,431,283.12 708,230,271.51 
Other Int bearing liabilities to total assets  0.00 0.69 0.25 0.15 
Liquid Assets th USD 8,689.84 863,178,400.46 115,881,546.40 203,299,273.77 
Operating income to total assets  0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Loan Loss Provisions th USD 1,203.21 16,787,167.39 2,375,844.69 3,664,913.88 
Equity / Total assets %  2.33 26.81 6.47 3.65 
ROA using P/L before tax %  -8.30 2.88 0.34 1.23 
Cost to Income Ratio %  29.65 77.68 57.81 9.09 
 
 Source: Orbis database 
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Table 2.3 – Sample descriptive statistics corresponding to 2011 and 2012 year-end financial statements for H2 sample 
 
Year  
Stress 
Test 
Deviation 
Loans 
th USD 
Total assets 
th USD 
Other Int 
bearing 
liabilities to 
total assets  
Liquid Assets 
th USD 
Operatin 
income to total 
assets  
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
th USD 
Equity / Total 
assets 
% 
ROA using 
P/L before tax 
% 
Cost to 
Income Ratio 
% 
2011 N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Mean 2.85% 264,157,230.67 594,759,073.38 0.28 127,723,649.42 0.01 2,569,574.69 5.20 -0.93 66.90 
Minimum -13.84% 4,973,882.41 7,521,572.24 0.01 374,454.66 -0.01 -247,397.54 -3.93 -15.15 -175.77 
Maximum 16.72% 964,832,773.87 2,800,133,673.71 0.69 849,128,587.71 0.02 14,284,656.14 13.90 2.51 346.19 
Std. Dev. 4.14% 281,272,182.41 758,132,989.35 0.14 200,139,705.19 0.00 3,315,168.18 2.88 3.22 54.51 
2012 N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Mean 4.65% 281,334,812.36 644,310,694.34 0.28 146,815,543.73 0.01 3,562,108.26 5.20 -0.33 69.86 
Minimum -14.37% 4,483,189.10 7,021,582.67 0.02 353,863.07 -0.01 2,111.04 -2.15 -7.86 33.52 
Maximum 16.56% 947,573,597.62 2,655,067,747.35 0.67 845,095,766.25 0.02 24,473,549.73 14.98 2.40 346.82 
Std. Dev. 4.03% 278,906,455.99 764,128,801.89 0.13 217,690,841.19 0.00 5,138,321.07 2.92 1.63 42.81 
Total N 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Mean 3.72% 272,409,206.19 618,563,283.45 0.28 136,895,245.71 0.01 3,046,380.03 5.20 -0.64 68.32 
Minimum -14.37% 4,483,189.10 7,021,582.67 0.01 353,863.07 -0.01 -247,397.54 -3.93 -15.15 -175.77 
Maximum 16.72% 964,832,773.87 2,800,133,673.71 0.69 849,128,587.71 0.02 24,473,549.73 14.98 2.51 346.82 
Std. Dev. 4.16% 278,882,241.10 757,648,680.63 0.14 207,933,582.83 0.00 4,295,855.90 2.89 2.59 49.02 
Source: Orbis database 
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Table 2.4 – Panel A : Banks per country in sample to test H1 
 
Country Banks 
AT 3 
BE 1 
CY 1 
DE 4 
DK 4 
ES 15 
FI 1 
FR 4 
GB 4 
GR 4 
HU 1 
IE 2 
IT 5 
LU 1 
NL 3 
PL 1 
PT 3 
SE 3 
SI 1 
Total 61 
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Table 2.4 – Panel B : Banks per country in sample to test H2 
Country 2011 Banks 2012 Banks Total 
AT 2 2 4 
BE 1 1 2 
DE 4 4 8 
DK 4 4 8 
ES 10 8 18 
FI 1 1 2 
FR 4 4 8 
GB 4 4 8 
GR 4 2 6 
HU 1 1 2 
IE 2 2 4 
IT 5 5 10 
NL 3 3 6 
PL 1 1 2 
PT 3 3 6 
SE 3 3 6 
SI 1 1 2 
Total 53 49 102 
Source: Orbis database
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Table 2.5 - Stress Test Impact (STI) model 
  Pooled Sample   2011 Sample   2012 Sample   
Variable 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
   
CSRR  0.028 0.335  0.038 0.289  0.027 0.219  
LOANS 0.043 0.15  0.090 0.205  0.021 0.052  
INTBEAR 0.176 1.738 
*
 0.133 0.848  0.222 1.527  
LIQ 0.451 2.056 
**
 0.273 0.805  0.603 1.921 
*
 
OPINC 0.18 1.368  0.076 0.375  0.257 1.366  
LLP -0.438 -2.314 
**
 -0.423 -1.446  -0.499 -1.840 
*
 
CAPRATIO 0.159 1.102  0.255 1.148  0.125 0.608  
ROA 0.1 0.955  0.121 0.748  0.101 0.671  
EFF -0.211 -2.229 
**
 -0.220 -1.499  -0.233 -1.715 
*
 
YEAR -0.257 -3.385 
***
     
 
     
 
 
N 122   61   61   
F Value 6.243 
***
  2.412 
***
  3.748 
***
  
Adjusted R
2
 30.20%   17.50%   29.20%   
Mean Tolerance 0.449   0.387   0.387   
Mean VIF 4.257     4.619     4.619     
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 Reported are the coefficients and t-stat of the regression on STI. 
  The dependent variable is STI defined as the difference between the  
  stressed Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012 with the current Tier 1  
  Capital Ratio in 2010 taken from 2010 year-end financial statements. 
  The independent variables are defined as follows: 
CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions  
issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
YEAR is set to zero for 2011 and one for 2012     
* Significant at 10% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
*** Significant at 1% level       
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Table 2.6 - Stress Test Deviation (STD) model 
 Pooled Sample  2011 Sample  2012 Sample  
Variable 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t-stat.   
   
CSRR -0.054 -0.680  -0.049 -0.590  0.124 1.270  
LOANS 0.005 0.020  0.198 0.690  -0.042 -0.170  
INTBEAR 0.143 1.420  0.173 1.410  0.118 1.050  
LIQ -0.088 -0.470  -0.286 -1.350  -0.132 -0.520  
OPINC -0.436 -3.940 
***
 -0.142 -0.960  -0.118 -0.790  
LLP 0.255 1.800 * 0.061 0.270  0.107 0.710  
CAPRATIO 0.378 3.060 
***
 -0.057 -0.310  -0.106 -0.600  
ROA 0.491 3.720 
***
 0.372 2.030 
*
 0.455 2.610 
**
 
EFF 0.178 2.090 
**
 0.169 1.740 
*
 0.586 4.150 
***
 
ΔASSETS -0.100 -1.170  -0.154 -1.510 * 0.043 0.420  
ΔEQUITY -0.316 -3.110 *** 0.674 5.100 *** -0.700 -7.180 *** 
CEXERCISE 0.506 0.590 
 
0.107 1.100 
 
0.095 0.960 
 
YEAR 0.250 3.110 
***
     
 
     
 
 
N 102     53     49     
F Value 7.350 
***
  9.960 
***
  8.840 
***
  
Adjusted R
2
 45.46%   68.25%   66.23%   
Mean Tolerance 0.526   0.367   0.401   
Mean VIF 2.906     4.588     3.68     
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Reported are the coefficients and t-stat of the regression on STD. 
  The dependent variable is STD defined as the difference between  
  the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in 2011 and 2012 taken from the  
  corresponding year-end financial statements with the   stressed  
  Tier 1 Capital Ratio for 2011 and 2012. 
  The independent variables are defined as follows: 
CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions  
issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
ΔASSETS is defined as the assets variation between the current and the previous year      
ΔEQUITY is defined as the equity variation between the current and the previous year     
CEXERCISE is defined as a dummy variable set to one if the bank showed a capital shortfall in the EBA 
Capital exercise and zero otherwise     
YEAR is set to zero for 2011 and one for 2012     
* Significant at 10% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
*** Significant at 1% level       
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Table 2.7 – Sample descriptive statistics corresponding to the sample of 37 
financial institutions targeted by 2010 stress test for period 2012-2009 
 
(N=148) Mean 
Speed of adjustment (λ) 0.641 
Target Capital Ratio (Tier1CR*i,t) 11.66% 
Loans th USD  169,881,212 
Operating income to total assets  0.017 
Other Int bearing liabilities to total assets  0.305 
Liquid Assets th USD 42.983.204 
Loan Loss Provisions th USD 1.228.679 
ROA using P/L before tax  10.70% 
Cost to Income Ratio  62.00% 
Equity / Total assets  5.47% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 10.37% 
                                                        
Source: Orbis database  
 
The first two rows of the table show the speed of adjustment  
we calculate using the equation Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1  
and the target capital ratio we calculate using the equation  
Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1.  
We estimate equation Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 following  
the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments estimator.  
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Table 2.8 – Deviation from target Tier 1 Capital Ratio and subsequent 
year’s adjustment 
 
 Average % 
t Tier1CR*i,t DÊV i,t Tier1CRi,t Tier1CRi,t-1 Tier1CRi,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 
2009 11.73 3.13 10.59 8.60 1.98 
2010 10.90 0.31 10.92 10.59 0.33 
2011 11.12 0.20 11.40 10.92 0.48 
2012 11.45 0.05 12.03 11.40 0.63 
 
We calculate the average distance from target Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t from the current Tier 1 
Capital Ratio in t-1 as follows: DÊV i,t = Tier1CR*i,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 , where Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. 
and Tier1CR*i,t, was estimated through the equation Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 
following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments estimator.  The 
change in Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t was calculated as Tier1CRi,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 
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Table 2.9 - Target Tier 1 Capital Ratio deviation (DÊV) model 
 
Variable 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-stat.   Beta 
CSRR -2.318 -5.71 
***
 
LOANS 7.292 17.59 
***
 
INTBEAR -6.281 -3.50 
***
 
LIQ -6.625 -23.03 
***
 
OPINC 55.620 2.08 
**
 
LLP -.139 -1.23  
CAPRATIO -.321 -2.44 
**
 
ROA -.659 -4.33 
***
 
EFF .032 2.52 
**
 
ST -1.614 -2.60 
***
 
N 148   
F Value 92.88 
***
 
 
Adjusted R
2
 86.21%     
Reported are the coefficients and t-stat of the regression. 
The dependent variable is DÊV defined as the difference between  
the target Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t and the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t-1. 
DÊV is calculated as follows: DÊV i,t = Tier1CR*i,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 ,  
where Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. and Tier1CR*i,t, was estimated through the equation  
Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator.  The change in Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t was calculated as 
Tier1CRi,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 
 The independent variables are defined as follows: 
CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions  
issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
ST is set to 1 for the years following the stress test and 0 
otherwise     
* Significant at 10% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
*** Significant at 1% level       
  
  
Chapter 2 - Stress test and bank risk profile: does stress testing play a 
disciplinary and informational role to adjust the capital ratio? 
108 
 
Figure 2.1 – Subsequent year’s change in Tier 1 Capital Ratio (figures in 
% points) 
 
We calculate the mean distance from target Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t from the current Tier 1 
Capital Ratio in t-1 as follows: DÊV i,t = Tier1CR*i,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 , where Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. 
and Tier1CR*i,t, was estimated through the equation Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 
following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments estimator.  The 
change in Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t was calculated as Tier1CRi,t - Tier1CRi,t-1 
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Chapter 3 - Capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral 
hazard: the bank opacity effect in emerging markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Setting an optimal capital requirement is the desire of every financial services 
sector regulator because it will help them to comply with their mandate of 
keeping financial stability. Banks finance themselves with households and 
business‘ deposits as well as with investors‘ equity capital that invest in risky 
assets (Allen et al., 2014). Depositors play a disciplinary role with bank 
management because if they suspect management is inefficient they can 
withdraw their deposits leading the bank to bankruptcy (Calomiris and Kahn, 
1991). Considering this, banks hold a positive amount of capital to reduce 
bankruptcy cost and because bank‘s leverage should be high enough to play a 
management disciplinary role but not too high to create risk shifting moral 
hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), risk that increases due to the opaqueness 
of banks‘ balance sheets (Morgan, 2001). A well-capitalized bank increases the 
bank‘s creditworthiness reducing costs of funding and lowering risk of 
bankruptcy, and also has more capability to develop business and deal with 
risks (Mirzaei et al., 2013). 
The capital structure theory suggests that the optimal capital requirement 
should have two components: a core capital requirement to limit bank leverage 
and a special capital account to act as a capital buffer (Archarya et al, 2014, 
Admati et al., 2013). Research has found that the capital buffer size depends on 
the economic cycle (Carvallo et al., 2015; Shim, 2013; Jokippi and Milne, 
2009) and whether the financial institution operates in a developed or emerging 
economy (Carvallo et al., 2015; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010). Regarding the 
optimal core capital requirement, a way to find it is to estimate assets quality 
and risk appropriately through regulatory tools such as risk-weighted assets 
schemes and stress testing (Archarya et al., 2014).  
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The use of stress testing after the financial crisis by the European Banking 
Authority is consistent with Basel III requirements that move towards a system 
of banking supervision more risk-oriented, especially generating measures or 
models that can anticipate or show vulnerabilities of financial institutions.  
In emerging markets, stress testing is not yet a common practice among 
regulators. This is due to the existence of severe deficiencies in the accounting 
and regulatory framework and lack of liquid markets for bank shares, 
subordinated debt and other bank liabilities and assets needed to validate the 
real worth of a bank as opposed to its accounting value (Rojas-Suarez, 2002a). 
It is also relevant to recall that although the Basel Accords state that its 
positions are not recommended for application in emerging markets, emerging 
markets financial institutions use the Accords as appropriate banking standards 
(Balin, 2008). This includes the Tier 1 Capital Ratio that it is not subject to a 
standard stress testing exercise throughout these emerging markets.   
Taking into account Petrella and Resti (2013) findings that show that stress 
tests results reduce bank opacity because they provide investors with relevant 
information, we investigate whether emerging markets adjust Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio (the risk-weighted capital ratio) differently from Total Capital Ratio (the 
book value capital ratio) taking advantage of higher bank opacity than in 
developed markets. We investigate also whether banks in emerging and 
developed markets adjust their risk level differently. This is of special interest 
because there is no consensus on the measure of capital that banks use 
internally to make decisions (Jokipii and Milne, 2011). Following Jokipii and 
Milne (2011) we proxy risk level as the risk-weighted assets to total assets 
ratio. The severe deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework, the 
lack of liquid markets for bank shares (Rojas-Suarez 2002a) and considering 
the Basel Accords are not recommended for application in emerging markets, 
contribute to increase financial statements opacity in emerging markets. We 
investigate whether banks in emerging and developed markets use total capital 
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ratio (based on accounting standards) or Tier 1 Capital Ratio (based on Basel 
Accords) to make decisions and the bank‘s characteristics that impact on the 
capital structure. We also look for evidence of higher risk shifting moral hazard 
in emerging markets than in developed markets as a consequence of higher 
emerging markets‘ bank opacity. The higher the capital requirement the more 
risk shareholders assume. The incentives of shareholders to engage in risk 
shifting are stronger when the capital is lower (Duran & Lozano-Vivas, 2015). 
The moral hazard conflict between shareholders and creditors increases when 
investments are riskier and the capital to assets ratio decreases (Duran & 
Lozano-Vivas, 2015). Additionally, we control for the role that state owned 
banks play on the risk shifting moral hazard and risk-weighting manipulation 
in emerging markets as this type of banks are more prevalent in poorer 
countries and in countries with less efficient governments (Barth et al., 2001), 
are linked to political objectives and have weaker risk management rules 
(Dong et. al., 2014).  
We also investigate whether emerging markets financial institutions align their 
actual Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratio to the corresponding targets and whether 
their risk profile over time is related to such deviation considering the higher 
market opacity than in developed markets. We also investigate the deviation 
between the current and the target risk level of banks in both markets. It is of 
special interest to know whether the 2008/09 financial crisis has an impact on 
such deviations (Teixeira et al., 2014). 
The objectives of this study are novel as we aim to investigate: a) whether 
Latin American (emerging markets) and European Union (developed markets) 
banks adjust differently Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Total Capital Ratio and their risk 
level due to the effect of bank opacity in emerging markets, b) what capital 
ratio banks use to make decisions in both markets, c) the existence of risk-
weighting manipulation and risk shifting moral hazard in emerging markets 
due to financial statements opacity and c) the deviation between target and 
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current Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Total Capital Ratio and Risk (risk-weighted assets 
to total assets ratio) in EU and LAC banks. We also investigate whether this 
behavior varies during the 2008/09 financial crisis in both markets.   
The results provide strong evidence that EU banks do not differentiate between 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio to adjust their capital structure. 
This provides strong evidence of no manipulation on risk-weighting in EU 
banks and low risk-shifting moral hazard. We also find strong evidence that 
banks in the Latin American emerging market adjust their Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
and Total Capital Ratio differently. The absence of stress testing performed by 
a regional regulatory body in Latin America, together with the state owned 
banks characteristics in the region, the lack of liquid markets for banks shares 
and deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework increase bank 
opacity, providing incentives to banks to manipulate risk-weighting.  The 
results also show that the speed of adjustment is almost the double in LAC 
banks (35.30%) than in EU banks (20.10%), showing that the funding access in 
the period under study (2008-2013) was easier in LAC than in EU. This is 
consistent with the more severe effect of the 2008/09 financial crisis in EU 
financial markets.  
Finally, we find that the deviation of current Tier 1 Capital Ratio from the 
Target Tier 1 Capital Ratio is larger than the deviation of current Total Capital 
Ratio from the Target Total Capital Ratio, especially during the 2008/09 
financial crisis. For both capital ratios, the target is larger than the current ratio 
in EU banks and smaller in LAC banks. In LAC banks the deviation of current 
Risk from Target Risk tend to zero after the financial crisis.  
This study helps to understand the emerging markets‘ bank opacity effect on 
capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral hazard and whether this 
behavior varies depending on the economic cycle. The findings will help 
regulators to identify risk-weighting manipulation in opaque markets and the 
risk profile of banks involved in such behavior.  
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After this introduction that highlights the interest of research, the remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the theoretical 
framework analyzing the bank capital structure theory and its relationship with 
bank funding cost, the bank capital buffer size and risk-weighted assets 
manipulation, the effect of the financial crisis on banks‘ capital structure, the 
information role of stress testing and bank opacity in emerging markets.  
In the third section we develop our hypotheses, in section four of this paper we 
explain the research design and in section five we analyze the results obtained. 
Finally, we present the conclusions of this research. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Bank capital structure 
One of the factors that distinguish the financing of banks with firms is that only 
the former use deposits. Allen et al. (2014) develop a model of bank financing 
and argue that while deposit financing is treated as another form of debt, the 
market for deposits is significantly segmented from other markets. Deposits, in 
the form of bank accounts, are not only held by households but also by 
businesses that use them for transaction purposes and reserves. In Allen et al. 
(2014)‘s model, banks finance themselves with deposits and equity capital and 
invest in risky assets. In this context, equity capital providers can directly 
invest in the risky assets but as this option has a lower expected return they do 
not do that. Additionally, equity capital has a higher expected return than 
deposits because their return is below the return of risky assets.   
Deposits play a disciplinary role with bank management. Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991) notice that uninsured depositors can withdraw their deposits if they 
suspect that management is inefficient or could commit fraud. Under the threat 
of possible bank liquidation, bank‘s management will behave properly. The 
downside of the disciplinary effect of high leverage is that bank managers 
could be tempted to invest on riskier assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
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risk shifting moral hazard acts as a limit to high leverage. The bank‘s leverage 
should be high enough to play a management disciplinary role but not too high 
to create risk shifting moral hazard. Archarya et al. (2014) show that ―leverage 
must be high enough to induce the discipline imposed by creditors, but low 
enough to ensure that the bank‘s risk taking is not excessive‖. They argue that 
this optimal capital structure can be broken by the presence of regulatory safety 
nets such as deposit insurance, bailouts or central banks acting as lender of last 
resort.  These safety nets are used by regulators to avoid the intermediation 
services collapse that could impact on the financial stability of the economy. 
But the safety nets could encourage banks to increase the leverage and at the 
same time, depositors face lower risk that could lead them to be less involved 
in the monitoring of bank‘s management performance. As a consequence the 
pricing of bank debt becomes insensitive to the leverage level, encouraging 
banks to take more risk that could generate systemic risk in the case the risk 
taken is highly correlated among banks. Archarya et al. (2014) propose two 
measures to deal with this tension: to set a core capital requirement to limit the 
bank leverage and to set a special capital account built up through retained 
earnings. This special capital account acts as a countercyclical capital 
requirement because it will be available to shareholders when the bank is 
solvent and to the regulators when the bank fails. Additionally, this capital 
must be invested in liquid securities, eliminating bank manager discretion on it 
and will be transferred to core capital, and dividends restrictions will also be 
imposed, when certain regulatory rules are met.  
Mehran and Thakor (2011) show that higher bank capital is good not only for 
the safety of the banking system but also for the bank itself. This is because 
banks will monitor borrowers and will develop long-term relationship with 
them which also generates economic value. Allen et al. (2014) argue that banks 
hold a positive amount of equity capital as a way to reduce bankruptcy cost 
when they finance risky investments. The rationale behind this is that when 
banks hold zero capital, their bankruptcy is aligned with those of firms because 
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there is no loans repayment to be transferred to depositors. On the other hand, 
when bankruptcy costs are insignificant, banks opt to finance themselves 
exclusively with deposits. 
3.2.2 Bank funding cost 
Van den Heuvel (2008) study the welfare cost of bank capital requirements. 
The paper argues that on the one hand, capital requirement impose a significant 
cost because it reduces the banks‘ ability to create liquidity by accepting 
deposits but on the other hand, it is useful to mitigate the moral hazard created 
by safety nets such as deposit insurance. As this must come together with 
supervision, it creates a trade-off between capital requirement and the cost of 
supervision. Using US data, Van den Heuvel (2008) find that the welfare cost 
of capital adequacy regulation represents a permanent loss in consumption of 
between 0.1% and 1%. But typically, banks hold a capital buffer above the 
minimum capital requirement in order to lower the risk of non-compliance and 
failure in the future.   
Equity has a higher required return than debt because it is riskier, but this does 
not necessarily mean that the use of more equity in the funding mix increases 
the funding cost of a bank (Admati et al., 2013). In fact, better capitalized 
banks incur in lower costs when issuing additional capital and also, as higher 
capital indicates lower default risk, it improves the liquidity of debt securities 
that the bank issues. 
Admati et al. (2013) notes that when the bank‘s capital ratio suffers a reduction 
in capital through losses, the bank must recapitalize or deleverage by selling 
assets. When banks sell assets, they put pressure on assets markets and prices 
fall. To avoid this, regulators increase capital requirements that will also imply 
the need of less support in case of a bailout.  
An increase in capital will lower the shareholders‘ risk because the bank will 
invest in safer assets and hence, the shareholders will require a lower return on 
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equity (Admati et al., 2013). An additional effect of a capital increase is a 
lower default risk that will translate in a lower interest rate of the bank‘s debt. 
As a whole, an increase in capital will lower the bank funding cost.  
Setting an optimal capital requirement is not an easy task. Regulatory capital 
requirements usually use the book value of equity that depends on the valuation 
of assets and liabilities that are accounted for using specific accounting 
principles and risk-weighted assets that follows the Basel rules. The rationale 
behind risk-weighted assets is in line with the idea that a better capitalized 
bank will invest in safer assets.  
Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010) note that equity issuance may be costly if 
investor think that the bank issue new equity so as to comply with capital 
requirement after a non-compliance event. Admati et al. (2013), in line with 
Archarya et al. (2014), recommend that regulators should prohibit banks from 
paying dividends to shareholders until they have a decent capital buffer.  
Finally, Admati et al. (2013) note that when different capital requirement 
coexist in different countries, banks operating in countries with higher capital 
requirements have a competitive disadvantage comparing to those that operate 
in countries with lower capital requirements.     
Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that even though it is true that banks that are 
required to hold sufficient capital tend to invest prudently, banks are forced to 
hold an inefficiently high amount of capital. They argue that capital 
requirements are not enough to avoid moral hazard because with freely 
determined deposits rates banks are tempted to offer high interest rates to 
compete for deposits, and competition tends to promote gambling in the 
banking sector. This is because in a competitive market banks earning from 
prudent investments are low. When capital requirements are high enough to 
raise banks‘ cost significantly, the banks‘ willingness to pay higher interest rate 
decreases. In this context, Hellmann et al. (2000) consider two potential 
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instruments of prudential regulation: deposit-rate controls and capital 
requirements.  
Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) present a framework which endogenizes the 
deposit volume of banks and its future adjustments. The findings of the study 
show that banks hold voluntary capital buffers and lower the deposits volume 
when the investment opportunities are less attractive. As a whole the results 
show that a capital-weighted regulation system is effective to discipline banks 
in regard to its incentive to take deposits.  
3.2.3 Bank capital buffer and risk-weighted assets manipulation 
Considering the high cost of capital, banks need to rationalize the size of the 
capital buffer they hold to make sure they do not run non-compliance risk 
during a financial turmoil. 
Capital buffers are capital that banks hold in excess of regulatory minimum 
capital requirements. Banks hold capital buffers to avoid costly intervention, to 
show the market an adequate financial position, to take advantage of good 
market opportunities and to create a cushion against recessions (Carvallo et al., 
2015). If banks do not accumulate capital buffers in times of economic boom, 
compliance with regulatory minimum capital requirements could be difficult in 
times of economic downturn, making it necessary to the bank to deleverage 
assets and reduce lending. This is because the cost of capital is higher when the 
bank is in a non-compliance position.   
Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies for the period between 1986 
and 2008, Jokipii and Milne (2011) study the relationship between short-run 
capital and risk adjustment and find that the management of short-term 
adjustments in capital and risk are dependent on the size of the buffer.  The 
study also finds that small-buffer banks adjust to their target capital level 
significantly faster than better capitalized banks. Jokipii and Milne (2011) 
proxy for the capital buffer as the difference between the capital the bank holds 
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in excess of that required by the regulators but acknowledge that the regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets ratio is not necessarily the ratio that banks use 
internally to make decisions. Other options that banks may consider are the 
market value of capital or an economic capital (targeting the level of either 
book or market equity the banks need to operate). 
In a study about Basel risk-weights manipulation, Mariathasan and Marrouhe 
(2014) find that the decline in risk weights is particularly pronounced among 
weakly capitalized banks where the legal framework of supervision is weak 
and in countries where the regulator supervises many internal-rating based 
banks. These results give support to risk-weight manipulation theories. 
Mariathasan and Marrouhe (2014) identify four mechanisms to reduce the 
average risk-weights: portfolio re-allocation (the bank changes resources from 
assets that require more capital to assets that require less capital), improved 
risk-measurement (more precise risk measurement can reduce capital 
requirements), faulty risk-modeling (financial models with flawed 
assumptions) and strategic risk-modeling (internal models that banks use are 
complex and difficult to supervise). In this line, Le Lesle and Avramova (2012) 
discuss driving forces behind risk-weights and find decreasing risk-weights 
among European banks who were allowed more flexibility than U.S. banks. 
Archaya et al. (2013) find that guarantees are structured so as to reduce 
regulatory capital requirements and Huizinga and Laeven (2012) report the 
abuse of discretionary accounting practices, showing that banks tend to 
overvalue real estate-related assets.  
Cathcart et al. (2015) analyse the impact of new regulation on capital ratios. 
After the introduction of Basel I (BCBS, 1988), banks found it difficult to meet 
the new risk-based requirements and shifted risky assets towards less risky 
assets, leading to credit contraction and to the 1990-1991 recession. On the 
contrary, with the introduction of Basel II (BCBS, 2006; BCBS, 2004), banks 
increased their capital ratio, as happened with the top 25 banks in Europe and 
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the U.S. in the early stages of the subprime crisis. The effect that capital 
requirement can have on credit growth and on risk incentives depends on the 
variable used to measure capital adequacy, either Tier 1 capital ratio or Total 
capital ratio (Demirguc-Kunt et. al., 2010).      
Recent studies investigate the cyclical behavior of capital buffer and show 
inconclusive results. Jokipii and Milne (2011) results show that capital buffers 
of larger banks fluctuate counter-cyclically and in smaller banks fluctuate pro-
cyclically while Shim (2013) find evidence of countercyclical fluctuation of 
capital buffers in developed economies. Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) find 
different levels of capital buffers among developed and developing countries.  
Using a sample of 13 Latin American and Caribbean banks for the period 
2001-2012, Carvallo et al. (2015) examine capital buffer fluctuations over the 
business cycle and find that macroeconomic and banks‘ specific variables are 
significant determinants of bank capital buffers and they provide evidence that 
capital buffers tend to fluctuate pro-cyclically in countries with lower cost of 
adjustment and where capital regulation is less rigorous.  The study also finds 
that the average adjustment cost of changing capital is higher for countries 
whose capital buffers fluctuate counter-cyclically compared to the countries 
with pro-cyclically behavior.  This means that the higher the speed of 
adjustment, the more likely are the capital buffers to fluctuate pro-cyclically. In 
markets where access to capital is easier, the speed of adjustment cost of 
changing capital is higher.  
Shim (2013) investigates, using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies for 
the period 1992 – 2011, whether banks‘ capital buffers behave anticyclically or 
procyclically over the business cycle. The study finds a negative relationship 
between the business cycle and capital buffer and reports that changes in 
capital buffer and risk are associated with certain bank characteristics such as 
size, liquidity, profitability, loan loss reserve and asset growth. They findings 
in Shim (2013) give support to the Basel III new rules that create a 
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―countercyclical capital buffer‖ in the range of 0 – 0.25% of common equity. 
The study uses risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio to proxy for risk. 
3.2.4 The effect of the financial crisis on banks’ capital structure 
Teixeira et al. (2014) investigate whether the determinants of banks‘ capital 
structure is only determined by regulation or by some bank-specific 
characteristics. Using a sample of US and European banks for the period 2004-
2010, the study finds that bank‘s characteristics affect the bank‘s capital 
structure, to be more specific, the capital in excess of the regulatory minimum 
or capital buffer. This findings show that regulation is not the only determinant 
of banks‘ capital structure and that banks hold capital buffers in order to avoid 
the high cost associated with issuing new equity capital at short notice. The 
study computes the capital in excess as the difference between the equity 
market capital ratio (the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of 
assets), the book equity capital ratio (the ratio of the book value of equity to 
book value of assets) or Tier 1 Capital Ratio with the regulatory minimum 
capital. The market value of equity is calculated as the number of shares times 
the year-end stock price and the market value of assets as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of liabilities.  The Tier 1 Capital Ratio is, from a 
regulatory point of view, a measure of the financial strength of a bank 
calculated as the ratio of book value of equity to risk-weighted assets.   
Shehzad and De Haan (2013) find that the recent crisis affected banks 
operating in industrial economies. Quijano (2013) points out that during the 
recent financial crisis banks injected in the balance sheet significant amounts of 
capital in order to lower their capital risk.   
Teixeira et al. (2014) findings show that macroeconomic factors as inflation, 
GDP growth, the stock market volatility and the term structure of interest rates 
also have an effect on banks‘ capital structure.  In relation to the location 
effect, the study finds that European banks are better capitalized and the effect 
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of banks‘ characteristics vary among European banks and US banks. Finally, 
the study finds that during the recent financial crisis, banks had less capital, the 
effect of banks‘ characteristics defer before and during the financial crisis and 
they show that regulation had a temporal effect on banks‘ excess capital with a 
more significant effect before the financial crisis (during 2007 and 2008).  
Duygun et al. (2012) study the costs of recapitalization on a sample of 22 
Turkish banks for the period 2006-2009 that includes the last financial crisis. 
The study models a cost function that includes banks‘ specific characteristics 
and macroeconomic variables among the explanatory variables. The results 
show that the macroeconomic variables are non-significant while banks‘ 
specific characteristics capture all of the relevant variance in short-run costs. 
The study finds that the banks‘ recapitalization that occurs in the post-financial 
crisis period has increased the banks‘ costs significantly, driving the return on 
equity to the negative field. Considering these results, Duygun et al. (2012) 
argue that there is a need to develop recapitalization models and the study 
measures the efficiency and productivity of the banks through the estimation of 
their cost function, where the equity capital is a fixed input requirement 
because it is regulated.  
Finding the optimal capital requirements is relevant to keep the financial 
system stability and to be well prepared for the negative effects of an economic 
downturn. A way to find it is to estimate assets quality and risk appropriately 
through regulatory tools such as Basel III risk-weighting schemes and stress 
testing (Archarya et al., 2014).  
3.2.5 The informational role of stress testing  
The banking business is highly regulated because depositary financial 
institutions capture public savings and have specific risks and complexities that 
make their financial statements opaque and difficult to analyze by the general 
public (Petrella and Resti, 2013, Morgan, 2001).  
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In order to address and monitor the banking business risks, regulators use risk 
management tools to achieve regulatory objectives. Such supervisory efforts 
increase during periods of financial turmoil because bank opacity tends to 
increase (Flannery et al., 2010) and hence, regulators use stress tests to assess 
not only the vulnerability of individual banks but also of the entire banking 
system (Drehmann et al., 2010; Sorge and Virolainen, 2006). As the main 
concerns of regulators is financial failure, they design a supervisory system that 
allows them to prevent institutional failure that could lead to the breakdown of 
the main financial functions in the economy such as the payment system, 
savings transformation and the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(Weber, 2014).   
The use of stress testing after the financial crisis by the EBA is consistent with 
Basel III requirements that move towards a system of banking supervision 
more risk-oriented, especially generating measures or models that can 
anticipate or show vulnerabilities of financial institutions.  
Goldstein and Sapra (2013) discuss whether the stress testing results should be 
disclosed or not. Based on the argument that stress tests are not able to tests 
scenarios that are extreme enough to simulate a true scenario, Das (2011) 
argues that the disclosure of stress testing results is inherently flawed.  
Notwithstanding that, the results of the 2011 EU stress test performed by EBA 
were released for the 91 participant financial institutions. The results suggest 
that by the end of 2010, twenty banks in the sample would fall below the 5% 
Core Tier 1 Ratio. 
In a recent study related to the disclosure of 2011 EU stress test results, Petrella 
and Resti (2013) find evidence of prices drop for tested banks on pre-results 
date (dilution effect) showing the concern of investors about the possibility that 
these banks could be under-capitalized. Their research shows that the stress 
tests produce ―valuable information for market participants‖. On the result 
publication date, they find price reaction for the tested banks. This shows the 
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relevance of disclosing the results and the informational role of the stress test, 
which contributes to reduce bank opacity. The release of bad results by 
regulators should call the industry attention and lead bank managers to improve 
the quality of the risk management tools used to assess the entity strength 
(D‘Cruz and Crippa, 2012). 
Following the growing literature on the role of regulators in reducing 
asymmetric information in the banking system, Quijano (2013) shows that 
bond returns of the banks that passed the Supervisory Capital Assesment 
Program in the US in 2009 (a stress test performed in the US banking system) 
react positively to the news, suggesting a downward in their default 
probability. This study provides evidence of the role of regulators in the 
banking system and how they help to reduce asymmetric information.  
3.2.6 Bank opacity in emerging markets 
In emerging markets, stress testing is not yet a common practice among 
regulators. A potential explanation to this is discussed by Rojas-Suarez 
(2002a). This study shows that the most commonly used indicator of banking 
problems in industrial countries, the capital-to-assets ratio has performed 
poorly as an indicator of banking problems in Latin America and East Asia. 
This is due to the existence of severe deficiencies in the accounting and 
regulatory framework and lack of liquid markets for bank shares, subordinated 
debt and other bank liabilities and assets needed to validate the real worth of a 
bank as opposed to its accounting value. However, Rojas-Suarez (2002b) 
indicates that the increasing participation of foreign banks in emerging markets 
has helped to improve the usefulness of capital ratios. Rojas-Suarez (2002a) 
also shows that low spreads in emerging markets have often reflected the high-
risk taking behavior of weak banks.   
In another study about the role that the capital ratio plays in emerging markets,  
Hassan and Hussain (2006) find that capital ratio and portfolio risk are 
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inversely related in developing countries, in contrast to the predictions of the 
―capital buffer theory‖, ―managerial risk aversion theory‖ and ―bankruptcy cost 
avoidance theory‖. In this line, Balin (2008) argues that although Basel I and II 
accords state that its positions are not recommended for application in 
emerging markets, the use of both accords by public and private organizations 
as banking standards predicates the inclusion of emerging markets in each 
accord.  
Ferri et al. (2001) examine the effect of linking banks‘ capital requirements 
with external credit ratings in non-high income countries, under the Basel II 
regime. They find that the capital requirements of banks in these countries 
would become more volatile since the bank ratings seem to be strongly 
correlated to sovereign ratings. 
Finally, the extant literature on government ownership of banks documents that 
this form of ownership is more prevalent in poorer countries (Barth et al., 
2001) and in countries with less efficient governments (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Prior studies suggest that government ownership is associated with poor bank 
performance (Berger et al., 2005; Micco et al., 2007) and higher risk taking 
(Dong et al., 2014). The strategies in state owned banks are more likely to be 
linked to political objectives, thus, the incentives to follow prudential risk 
management rules are weak (Dong et al., 2014). 
The literature review of this section is summarized in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 - The bank capital structure dilemma
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3.3 Theory development 
Although stress testing is not a common regulatory tool used by regulators and 
individual banks in emerging markets, Tier 1 Capital Ratio is monitored 
because the Basel Accords are generally adopted by regulators to set capital 
requirements. Considering this and taking into account Petrella and Resti 
(2013) findings that show that stress tests results reduce bank opacity because 
they provide investors with relevant information, we investigate whether 
emerging markets adjust Tier 1 Capital Ratio (the risk-weighted capital ratio) 
differently from Total Capital Ratio (the book value capital ratio) taking 
advantage of higher bank opacity than in developed markets. We investigate 
also whether banks in emerging and developed markets adjust their risk level 
differently. This is of special interest because there is no consensus on the 
measure of capital that banks use internally to make decisions (Jokipii and 
Milne, 2011). Following Jokipii and Milne (2011), we proxy for risk level as 
the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio. The severe deficiencies in the 
accounting and regulatory framework, the lack of liquid markets for bank 
shares (Rojas-Suarez 2002a) and considering the Basel Accords are not 
recommended for application in emerging markets, financial statements 
opacity increases in emerging markets. We investigate whether banks in 
emerging and developed markets use total capital ratio (based on accounting 
standards) or Tier 1 Capital Ratio (based on Basel Accords) to make decisions 
and which bank‘s characteristics impact on the capital structure. We also look 
for evidence of higher risk shifting moral hazard in emerging markets than in 
developed markets as a consequence of higher bank opacity in emerging 
markets. This will translate in bank management having more freedom to 
allocate resources in risky assets as depositors and investors count with opaque 
information to monitor management activity (Mariathasan and Marrouhe, 
2014). Risk shifting is particularly severe in the banking industry because 
leverage in the sector is higher than that in any other sector (Berger et al., 
2005). The higher the capital requirement is the more risk shareholders assume. 
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The incentives of shareholders to engage in risk shifting are stronger when the 
capital is lower (Duran & Lozano-Vivas, 2015). The moral hazard conflict 
between shareholders and creditors increases when investments are riskier and 
the capital to assets ratio decreases (Duran & Lozano-Vivas, 2015). We also 
investigate whether state owned banks, that are more prevalent in poorer 
countries and in countries with less efficient governments (Barth et al., 2001) 
impact on the risk shifting moral hazard and risk-weighting manipulation in 
emerging markets as this type of banks are linked to political objectives and 
have weaker risk management rules (Dong et. al., 2014).  
Additionally, we investigate whether emerging markets financial institutions 
align their actual Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratio to the corresponding targets, 
the speed of such adjustment, and whether their risk profile over time is related 
to such deviation considering the higher market opacity than in developed 
markets. We also look for the deviation between the current and the target risk 
level of banks in both markets. It is of special interest to know whether the 
2008/09 financial crisis has an impact on such deviations (Teixeira et al., 
2014). 
In the light of these potential effects of bank opacity in emerging markets 
compared to developed markets, we posit the following hypotheses: 
H1: Capital structure adjustment determinants in emerging markets are 
different from those in developed markets due to higher bank opacity.  
H2: Risk shifting moral hazard determinants in emerging markets are different 
from those in developed markets due to higher bank opacity.  
H3: The determinants of the gap between the current and the target capital 
structure in emerging markets are different from those in developed markets 
due to higher bank opacity. 
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H4: The determinants of the gap between the current and the target risk level 
in emerging markets are different from those in developed markets due to 
higher bank opacity. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Data sources and sample selection 
The sample includes emerging and developed markets banks with available 
financial data for the period 2008-2013. Our sample of emerging markets 
banks includes banks from Latin America (LAC) while the sample of 
developed markets banks includes banks from the European Union (EU). 
Banks financial data is gathered from BankScope - Bureau van Dijk database.  
For Latin America, the sample includes 30 banks from the major financial 
markets in the region (including Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Panama) and 134 
banks from the European Union (including banks from Italy, Great Britain, 
Austria, Germany, Spain, Denmark and Portugal among others). In total the 
sample includes 164 banks for a 6-year period.  
3.4.2 Methodology and empirical models 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 we model capital structure adjustment and risk 
shifting moral hazard using a variety of proxies used in prior studies (Jokipii 
and Milne, 2011). We use the book capital ratio (TCR, the book value of total 
capital to book value of assets ratio) and the Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1CR, the 
book value of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio) to proxy for capital 
structure and risk level (Risk, the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio) to 
proxy for risk shifting moral hazard (Shim, 2013). In the model we use 
explanatory variables that prior research finds as determinants of banks‘ capital 
structure: bank-specific characteristics (Teixeira et. al, 2014; Shim, 2013), the 
economic cycle (Jokippi and Milne, 2009; Shim, 2013; Carvallo et al., 2015) 
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and the balance sheet opacity (Petrella and Resti, 2013; Kurtzman et al., 2004; 
Morgan, 2001). 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 we follow the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator to estimate the average speed of 
adjustment for all banks and the set of coefficients that we use to estimate the 
target T1CR, TCR and Risk for each bank in each year. 
Following the extant literature (De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2010; Berger et at., 
2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006), we assume that at a certain point in time 
each bank has a Tier1 Capital Ratio, T1CRi,t,  that is a weighted average of the 
target Tier1 Capital Ratio, T1CR*i,t, and the lagged Tier1 Capital Ratio, 
T1CRi,t-1 : 
T1CRi,t = λT1CR*i,t, + (1-λ)T1CRi,t-1                                                           (1) 
The higher the lambda is, the higher the speed of capital-adjustment towards its 
target and the less rigid bank capital is. This variable speed of adjustment 
model estimates the bank´s characteristics that determine a specific target 
capital ratio. To proxy for these bank characteristics we use the different risk 
areas covered by the CAMELS rating system.  
We model T1CR*i,t, as a function of these bank‘s characteristics (X):  
T1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1                                                                                          (2) 
Substituting the equation of target Tier 1 Capital Ratio (2) in equation (1) we 
obtain the following equation: 
T1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)T1CRi,t-1                                                   (3)                                                            
We estimate equation (3) following the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator. From this equation we got an estimate of the 
average speed of adjustment (λ) for all banks and the set of coefficients β that 
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we use to estimate the target Tier1 Capital Ratio for each bank in each year 
using equation (2).  
To test H3 and H4 we calculate for each bank the deviation the current Tier 1 
capital ratio has from its target Tier1 Capital Ratio: 
DÊV T1CRi,t = T1CR*i,t - T1CRi,t-1                                                            (4) 
We use the same methodology to estimate TCR*, Risk*, DÊV TCR and DÊV 
Risk. 
Using a balanced panel data of Latin American and EU banks with available 
financial information in the BankScope - Bureau van Dijk database for the 
period 2008-2013, we ended up with a sample of 984 bank-year. In the first 
step, we run equation (3) using panel data from where we obtained the average 
λ for all banks and the set of coefficients β. In the second step, we calculate the 
target capital ratio for each bank in each year using equation (2) and finally, 
using equation (4), we calculate each bank deviation from its target capital 
ratio in each year.  
3.4.3 CAMELS measurement and variables selection 
In the models we use explanatory variables that prior research finds as 
determinants of banks‘ capital structure: bank-specific characteristics (Teixeira 
et. al, 2014; Shim, 2013), the economic cycle (Jokippi and Milne, 2009; Shim, 
2013; Carvallo et al., 2015) and the balance sheet opacity (Morgan, 2001; 
Kurtzman et al., 2004; Petrella and Resti, 2013). 
The experimental variables of the models related to banks‘ specific 
characteristics are taken from prior studies that have identified proxies for the 
different risk areas covered by the CAMELS rating system (Martínez-Campillo 
et al., 2013; de Claro, 2013; Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013; Jin et al., 2013a, Jin 
et al., 2013b; Jin et al., 2011 and Fields et al., 2004).  
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The CAMELS rating system is commonly used by regulators to assess the 
strength of financial institutions and to evaluate the level of bank risks (Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2013) 
Loan loss provisions (LLP) is used to capture asset quality as this measure will 
capture the change in the allowance for loan losses in the current period. The 
higher the LLP is the lower the asset quality. It can also be the case that 
companies with higher LLP are conservative and record provision for doubtful 
debtors more timely than other financial institutions (Jin et al., 2011; Kerstein 
and Kozberg, 2013).  
We use the efficiency ratio (EFF) defined as cost to income to proxy for 
management skills. The higher the efficiency ratio (i.e., the lower the 
efficiency for the bank), the more difficult it is for the bank to earn a profit and 
thus, to increase its capital. A high efficiency ratio means a company needs to 
incur in high costs to get a certain income level. These costs are usually related 
to non-interest expenses such as personnel, branches, and data processing 
expenses that are associated with large volumes of transactions accounts and 
with a geographically diverse branch system. Considering this, a high 
efficiency ratio could also be used as a proxy for the complexity of bank 
operations (Fields et al., 2004).  
To proxy for earnings and profitability we use the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (OPINC). Operating profit captures the impact on net profit of the 
transactions that are closely related to the business of the firm (Fields et al., 
2004). Following de Claro (2013) and Martínez-Campillo (2013) we also use 
the ratios Return on Assets (ROA) as a proxy for earnings and profitability.  
We use total loans (LOANS) as a proxy for bank liquidity as the main factor in 
the financial crisis is a loss in liquidity and an increase in the default risk of 
loans from interest rate resets (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). We also use total 
liquid assets as a proxy for liquidity (LIQ). 
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Usually banks tend to grant loans for longer terms than the deposits they 
received from customers. As a consequence, interest rate resets will impact 
deposits in first instance and this will reduce the interest rate spread. To proxy 
for this risk we use the total depostis to total assets ratio (DEP) (Kerstein and 
Kozberg, 2013). According to de Claro (2013) a bank with liquidity problems 
will increase the interest rate to retain the level of deposits or to capture new 
deposits in the market. The higher this ratio the higher the sensitivity of the 
financial institutions to the impact of liquidity issues on interest expense and 
hence in the firm profitability.  
We control for government ownership of banks (SOB) as prior studies suggest 
that government ownership is associated with poor bank performance (Berger 
et al., 2005; Micco et al., 2007) and higher risk taking (Dong et al., 2014). The 
strategies in state owned banks are more likely to be linked to political 
objectives, thus, the incentives to follow prudential risk management rules are 
weak (Dong et al., 2014). The extant literature on government ownership of 
banks documents that this form of ownership is more prevalent in poorer 
countries (Barth et al., 2001) and in countries with less efficient governments 
(La Porta et al., 2002).  
To proxy for the economic cycle we use the dummy variables CRISIS (2008 
and 2009) (Teixeira et al., 2014). Finally, to proxy for bank opacity we use the 
difference between the current GDP and the last 5-year average GDP 
(GDPA5D) (Teixeira et al., 2014), the adoption of Basel Accord II in emerging 
markets using the dummy variables (BII) (in EU all the banks have adopted 
Basel II policies), IFRS adoption (IFRS) (Rojas-Suarez (2002a) and we control 
for the EU banks that were targeted by the 2010 EU-wide stress test (ST) 
(Petrella and Resti, 2013, Gambetta et al., 2015). We also control for listed 
banks (Listed) and whether the bank belongs to a developed or emerging 
market using the dummy variable (EU).  
  
Chapter 3 - Capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral hazard: the 
bank opacity effect in emerging markets 
135 
 
GDP data was obtained from the World Bank database 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator), Basel II adoption per country was 
obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) progress reports on 
implementation of the Basel regulatory framework (http://www.bis.org), the 
EU banks targeted by the EU-wide stress test were taken from the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) website (http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-
and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing) and the IFRS adoption by country was taken 
from the IFRS website (http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-
world/Pages/Jurisdiction-profiles.aspx).  
Our models to test our four hypotheses are summarized in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 - The capital structure and risk shifting moral hazard determinants in emerging and developed markets 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
We report the descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table 3.1 – Panel A.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 – PANEL A HERE 
The average Tier 1 Capital Ratio for the full sample of banks is 11.75% and the 
average Total Capital Ratio is 14.25%. Regarding the risk measure, defined as 
the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio, the mean value is 68.80%. The 
average total assets is USD 268,000 million while the average total loans 
amounts to USD 120,000 million, representing the 45% of total assets. The 
average loan loss provisions amounts to USD 1,249 million, representing the 
1.04% of total loans. The average total liquid assets is USD 60,900 million, a 
23% of total assets. The mean deposits to assets ratio is 48.30%, the mean 
efficiency ratio for the sample is 60.47%, the mean ROA is 0.79% and the 
operating income to total assets ratio is 4.30%.  
In Table 3.1 – Panel B we report the descriptive statistics for the EU banks sub-
sample.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 – PANEL B HERE 
The average Tier 1 Capital Ratio for the EU sample of banks is 11.39% and the 
average Total Capital Ratio is 13.89%. Regarding the risk measure, the mean 
value is 64.10%. The average total assets is USD 319,000 million while the 
average total loans amounts to USD 143,000 million, representing the 45% of 
total assets. The average loan loss provisions amounts to USD 1,381 million, 
representing the 1% of total loans. The average total liquid assets is USD 
71,500 million, a 22.41% of total assets. The mean deposits to assets ratio is 
48.70%, the mean efficiency ratio for the sample is 61.36%, the mean ROA is 
0.49% and the operating income to total assets ratio is 3%.  
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In Table 3.1 – Panel C we report the descriptive statistics for the Latin 
American banks sub-sample.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 – PANEL C HERE 
The average Tier 1 Capital Ratio for the Latin American sample of banks is 
13.37% and the average Total Capital Ratio is 15.85%. Regarding the risk 
measure, the mean value is 90%. The average total assets is USD 42,900 
million while the average total loans amounts to USD 17,800 million, 
representing the 41.50% of total assets. The average loan loss provisions 
amounts to USD 0.66 million, representing the 3.70% of total loans. The 
average total liquid assets is USD 13,500 million, a 31.46% of total assets. The 
mean deposits to assets ratio is 46.70%, the mean efficiency ratio for the 
sample is 56.48%, the mean ROA is 2.08% and the operating income to total 
assets ratio is 10%.  
Both, the Tier 1 Capital Ratio and the Total Capital Ratio is 2 percentage 
points higher for Latin American banks while the Risk Ratio is 26 percentage 
points higher for Latin American banks. This show that even though they are 
better capitalized, on average a 16% more, the risk level is significantly higher 
than in the case of EU banks, 35% higher. The additional capital is half the 
additional risk in Latin American banks.  
The leverage is 2 percentage points lower for Latin American banks, implying 
that the disciplinary role that depositors play is less significant in this market. 
The loan loss provisions relative to assets are higher in Latin American banks 
but they show higher liquid assets relative to EU banks. The lower loans 
quality could explain the higher risk level in Latin American banks. Regarding 
efficiency and profitability, Latin American banks are more efficient than EU 
banks; their efficiency ratio is 5 percentage points lower, and they are also 
significantly more profitable, showing an operating income to total assets ratio 
7 percentage points higher and a ROA 1.6 percentage points higher.  
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In Table 3.1 – Panel D we show the sample distribution by country.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 – PANEL D HERE 
For Latin America, the sample includes 30 banks from the major financial 
markets in the region (including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Panama) for the 
period 2008-2013 and 134 banks from the European Union for the same period 
(including banks from Italy, Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Spain, Denmark 
and Portugal among others). In total the sample includes 164 banks for a 6-year 
period.  
In Table 3.1 – Panel E we show EU and LAC market characteristic that are 
related to market opacity.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 – PANEL D HERE 
The effect of the 2008-2009 financial crisis is more negative in Europe than in 
Latin America. The difference between the current GDP and the last 5-year 
average in 2008 and 2009 in EU is -1.82 and -5.51 percentage points 
respectively and -0.44 and -4.36 in LAC. Regarding IFRS and Basel II 
adoption, 71% of the banks in EUR use IFRS to prepare their financial 
statements and all the banks have adopted Basel II policies. In LAC the IFRS 
adoption went up from 7% in 2007 to 73% in 2012 while 77% of the banks 
used Basel II policies in the period. Only 5% of the banks in EU are state-
owned banks while the 13% are state-owned banks in LAC. Finally, the 47% 
of the banks in EU are listed while only the 33% are listed in LAC. All these 
indicators show that the LAC market has characteristics more related to opacity 
than the EU market.  
Finally, in Table 3.2 we report the correlation matrix for the independent 
variables and no significant collinearity issues are identified.  
INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE 
  
Chapter 3 - Capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral hazard: the 
bank opacity effect in emerging markets 
140 
 
 
3.5.2 Empirical results 
3.5.2.1 Empirical results on capital structure adjustment and risk shifting 
moral hazard  
We report the capital structure adjustment model (H1) and risk shifting moral 
hazard model (H2) results in Table 3.3. In panel A we report the regression 
results for the full sample of banks. 
INSERT TABLE 3.3 – PANEL A HERE 
In Model 1 we regress on Tier 1 Capital Ratio and in Model 2 we regress on 
Total Capital Ratio. 
The coefficients in both capital structure adjustment models are positive and 
significant on the lagged variable and as expected show a value between 0 and 
1 as their complement is the speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment of 
T1CR is 11% and for TCR is 55%. In the T1CR model the coefficient on 
LOANS and EFF is positive and significant. In the TCR model the coefficient 
on LIQ is negative and significant.   
The results show that the larger the loan portfolio and the efficiency ratio the 
higher the Tier 1 Capital Ratio in the following period and the lower the 
liquidity level the higher the Total Capital Ratio in the following period.  
The significant variables related to bank characteristics show different behavior 
in each model. These differences provide evidence of some degree of 
differentiation banks do between Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio 
to adjust their capital structure. This provides preliminary evidence of Tier 1 
Capital Ratio manipulation, and that banks differentiate between the risk-
adjusted capital ratio and the book value capital ratio to make decisions on 
their capital structure. There is some evidence of risk-weighting manipulation 
according with these results. 
  
Chapter 3 - Capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral hazard: the 
bank opacity effect in emerging markets 
141 
 
 
In Model 3 we regress on Risk (RWA/TA). The lagged Risk variable is 
positive and significant, showing a speed of adjustment of 26%. In this model, 
we expect an inverse coefficient for the significant variables than the 
coefficient showed in Model 1. This is because, for a certain capitalization 
level,  the higher the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio is, the lower the 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio. This stands true for LOANS. The variable LIQ shows a 
positive and significant coefficient but it is not significant in model 1. This 
means that banks with smaller loan portfolio and higher liquidity levels tend to 
invest on risky assets in the following year. The results for model 3 suggest 
that banks with certain risk profile tend to show higher level of risky assets. 
The variable EU is not significant in any model, showing that there is no 
significant difference in the level of T1CR, TCR and Risk between EU and 
LAC banks.   
To investigate whether both, EU and LAC banks, adjust their capital structure 
differently, we split the sample in EU banks sub-sample and in Latin American 
banks sub-sample. We run the three models in each sub-sample to investigate 
whether the capital structure adjustment and risk shifting moral hazard is 
different in them due to bank opacity in emerging markets. 
In Table 3.3 – Panel B we report the regression models results for the EU 
banks sub-sample.  
INSERT TABLE 3.3 – PANEL B HERE 
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in 
Model 1 and 2, and as expected between 0 and 1, showing a speed of 
adjustment of 20% for T1CR and 39% for TCR. In both models, the variable 
OPINC is positive and significant. The results are exactly the same in both 
models, showing that EU banks jointly adjust Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total 
Capital Ratio. In Model 3, LOANS and ROA show a negative and significant 
coefficient and LIQ show a positive and significant coefficient. The results as a 
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whole indicate that EU banks that are profitable in the banking business tend to 
show a lower T1CR and TCR in the following year. Additionally, EU banks 
with higher level of liquid assets, less profitable and with smaller loan portfolio 
show higher level of risky assets in the following year.  
The results provide evidence that EU banks do not differentiate between Tier 1 
Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio to adjust their capital structure, and 
hence, that they do not differentiate between these ratios to make decisions. 
This provides strong evidence of no manipulation of risk-weighting in EU 
banks and low risk-shifting moral hazard.  
In Table 3.3 – Panel C we report the results for the Latin American banks sub-
sample.  
INSERT TABLE 3.3 – PANEL C HERE 
Only two variables, DEP and LLP are negative and significant in both models. 
But in this case, contrary to the EU banks sub-sample results, Model 1 and 
Model 2 show different additional significant variables. This provides evidence 
that Latin American banks adjust Tier 1 and Total Capital ratio differently. In 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio model, the coefficient on EFF is positive and significant. 
In Total Capital Ratio model, the coefficient on LIQ is negative and significant 
and on LOANS is positive and significant. Banks with higher leverage, lower 
quality loan portfolio and low efficiency ratio show lower Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
in the following year. In model 3, the risk model, LIQ shows a positive and 
significant coefficient, showing that banks with higher liquidity level tend to 
invest on riskier assets the following year.  Banks with higher leverage, lower 
quality loan portfolio, with higher liquidity level and smaller loan portfolio 
show lower Total Capital Ratio in the subsequent year. 
In all, the results provide evidence that Latin American banks adjust Tier 1 
Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio differently. This is because the moral 
hazard conflict between shareholders and depositors increases when 
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investments are riskier and the capital to assets ratio decreases. The incentives 
of shareholders to engage in risk shifting moral hazard are stronger in Latin 
American banks due to bank opacity.  
The results from Models 1, 2 and 3 as a whole provide support to Hypotheses 1 
and 2 as we find evidence that banks in the Latin American emerging market 
adjust their capital structure differently from EU banks, which is a developed 
market. We also find strong evidence of risk shifting moral hazard in the 
emerging markets under study than in EU banks, because even though in both 
markets some banks‘ specific characteristics determine the risk level only in 
LAC the T1CR adjusts differently than TCR. This means that in EU banks, 
when the risk is adjusted, the capital level is adjusted accordingly and T1CR 
adjusts similarly to TCR. The absence of stress testing performed by a regional 
regulatory body in Latin America, the lack of liquid markets for banks shares 
and deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework increase bank 
opacity, providing incentives to banks to manipulate T1CR through risk-
weighting manipulation.    
3.5.2.2 Empirical results on the deviation of current capital ratio from target 
capital ratio  
In Table 3.4 we report the speed of adjustment and the target value of Tier 1 
Capital Ratio, Total Capital Ratio and Risk for EU and LAC banks. 
INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE 
The target Tier 1 Capital Ratio is 2.1 percentage points lower in LAC banks 
(12.43%) than in EU banks (14.57%), but the speed of it adjustment is higher 
in LAC banks (35.30%) than in EU banks (20.10%). The higher the speed of 
adjustment the easier the availability of funding, so the results show that in the 
period under study (2008-2013) funding access in LAC was easier than in the 
EU. This is consistent with the more severe effect of the 2008/09 financial 
crisis in EU financial markets. In the case of the target Total Capital Ratio, in 
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EU and LAC it is higher than the target Tier 1 Capital Ratio and the target 
Total Capital Ratio in LAC banks is 0.63 percentage points higher than in EU 
banks. The speed of adjustment is almost 50% higher in LAC banks (58.70%) 
than in EU banks (39.20%). The target risk is 65% higher in LAC banks 
(91.70%) than in EU banks (55.40%) but the speed of its adjustment in both 
markets is only 12 percentage points higher in LAC banks (43%) than in EU 
banks (31%).  
It is interesting to note that the gap between Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 
Capital Ratio is 0.42 percentage points in EU banks (14.99% vs. 14.57%) and 
3.2 percentage points in LAC banks (15.63% vs. 12.43%). The results provide 
additional evidence about differentiated levels and adjustments in Tier 1 and 
Total Capital ratios and also evidence of risk shifting moral hazard in LAC 
banks due to  higher risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (near to 1), lower 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio and larger gap between Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratios. 
In Table 3.5 we report the results for the deviation models for the EU and LAC 
sub-samples. 
INSERT TABLE 3.5 – PANEL A 
INSERT TABLE 3.5 – PANEL B 
INSERT TABLE 3.5 – PANEL C 
In model 4 we regress on DÊV T1CR (T1CR* - T1CRt-1), in Model 5 on DÊV 
TCR (TCR* - TCRt-1) and in Model 6 on DÊV Risk (Risk* - Riskt-1). These 
models explain the determinants of the deviation each current ratio has from its 
target ratio.  
The results in Model 4 show that listed banks and banks that have adopted 
IFRS in the EU tend to have larger DÊV T1CR than LAC banks. Additionally, 
banks that have adopted Basel II policies in LAC have smaller DÊV T1CR 
while banks targeted by the stress test in EUR tend to have larger DÊV T1CR.  
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Results in model 4 and 5 show that banks with larger OPINC in EU have 
smaller DÊV T1CR and DÊV TCR. In LAC is the opposite in the case of DÊV 
T1CR and it is not significant in DÊV TCR.  
Model 5 shows that SOBs in EU have smaller DÊV TCR while in LAC is the 
opposite. Listed banks in EUR and LAC have smaller DÊV TCR. Additionally, 
banks that have adopted IFRS in EUR have larger DÊV TCR while in LAC the 
coefficient on IFRS is not significant. Finally, results show that during the 
financial crisis, DÊV TCR is larger in LAC while it is not significant in EU.  
The results for Model 6 show that banks that have adopted IFRS and that are in 
countries in economic upturn in the EU tend to have lower DÊV Risk while in 
LAC is the opposite. Finally, results show that during the financial crisis, DÊV 
Risk tend to be larger in LAC than in EU.  
We analyze further the average DÊV T1CR, DÊV TCR and DÊV Risk for EU 
banks and LAC banks in each year under analysis.  
INSERT FIGURE 3.3 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3.4 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3.5 HERE 
In general, EU and LAC banks show a similar behavior in DÊV T1CR, DÊV 
TCR in each year (see Figure 3.3 and 3.4). DÊV Risk mainly shows the 
opposite behavior (see Figure 3.5).  
It is of special interest to note the following: 
- DÊV T1CR is larger than DÊV TCR in EU and LAC banks, especially 
during 2008/09 financial crisis.  
- In EU banks DÊV T1CR and DÊV TCR are positive (undercapitalized) 
and in LAC banks are negative (overcapitalized) (except DÊV T1CR in 
2013 and DÊV TCR in 2009 that are positive). 
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- DÊV T1CR and DÊV TCR diminish significantly in LAC banks after the 
financial crisis. In EU banks, even though both also diminish, they remain 
on average at 4 and 2 percentage points respectively.  
- In LAC banks, DÊV Risk tends to zero after the financial crisis 
- The higher speed of adjustment of T1CR and TCR is evident in LAC 
banks as the subsequent year´s change in T1CR and TCR is similar to the 
corresponding DÊV. In EU banks the adjustment speed is slower. 
3.6 Conclusions 
We find evidence of differentiated capital structure adjustment in EU and LAC 
banks: EU banks seem to adjust T1CR and TCR jointly while LAC banks 
adjust them differently.   
We also find that LAC banks adjust T1CR according to the DEP, LLP, EFF 
and the TCR according to LOANS, DEP, LLP, LIQ. EU banks adjust both 
capital ratios only according to OPINC. As T1CR and TCR are calculated 
following different policies, Basel policies and accounting standards 
respectively, these results imply that LAC banks strictly follow these rules and 
compute their capital ratios mainly based on accounting information because 
there is no other available information to consider in the calculation due to the 
higher opacity in the LAC market.  On the contrary, EU banks count with 
additional information in a more transparent market and adjust their capital 
ratios according to that additional information and not on accounting 
information. 
The fact that LAC banks adjust their Risk level, in other words, shift risk, 
according to LOANS, LIQ and ROA an EU banks only according to LIQ give 
support to the idea that LAC banks allocate assets following the risk-weighting 
policies while EU banks invest on assets using additional information other 
than accounting information. 
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Our results show that LAC banks are overcapitalized while EU banks are 
undercapitalized relative to their capital target (T1CR and TCR). Additionally, 
we find that the financial crisis did not impact on the capital structure 
adjustment (T1CR and TCR) in any market under study but did impact on the 
DÊV Risk in both markets: it was larger during the financial crisis. 
The DÊV T1CR, TCR and Risk are determined by different banks‘ and 
markets‘ specific characteristics in EU and in LAC 
The average DÊV T1CR in EU banks is 3.2 percentage points (22% 
undercapitalized) and in LAC banks is -0.94 percentage points (7.5% 
overcapitalized), but the Risk ratio (RWA/TA) is 55% in EU banks (below the 
target that is 64%) and 90% in LAC banks (above the target that is 90%). 
These results provide evidence that even though LAC banks have larger capital 
buffers, they are much riskier than EU banks. 
This study is novel in providing evidence that banks in developed markets 
(EU) and emerging markets (LAC) determine the risk-weighted and book 
capital ratios differently; while LAC banks mainly use a different set of 
accounting information to determine each capital ratio, EU banks determine 
both capital ratios mainly using market information and not accounting 
information. We also find stronger evidence of risk shifting moral hazard in 
LAC banks than in EU banks, because even though in both markets some 
banks‘ specific characteristics determine the risk level, only in LAC the T1CR 
adjusts differently than TCR.  
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A – Full Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 
            
984                        11.748                          4.211  
                
0.600                            40.040  
Total Capital Ratio % 
            
984                        14.253                          3.950  
                
0.900                            38.950  
RWA / TA 
            
984                          0.688                          0.288  
                
0.089                              1.913  
Loans thUSD 
            
984     120,000,000.000     231,000,000.000       51,962.720     1,660,000,000.000  
Total assets thUSD 
            
984     268,000,000.000     589,000,000.000     182,039.000     3,810,000,000.000  
Deposits / Total Assets 
            
984                          0.483                          0.176  
                
0.040                              0.917  
Liquid Assets thUSD 
            
984       60,900,000.000     159,000,000.000         1,583.769     1,150,000,000.000  
Loan Loss Provisions thUSD 
            
984          1,249,401.000          3,202,109.000             197.033           29,500,000.000  
Operating Income / Total Assets 
            
984                          0.043                          0.046  
                
0.002                              0.682  
ROA % 
            
984                          0.786                          1.275               (4.502)                           11.090  
Cost to Income Ratio % 
            
984                        60.466                        15.135               18.483                         184.391  
 
Note: RWA/TA and ROA represent risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio and return on assets ratio, respectively.  
Std. Dev., Min and Max denote standard deviation, minimum and maximum, respectively.   
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B – EU subsample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 
            
804                        11.386                          4.042  
                
0.600                            40.040  
Total Capital Ratio % 
            
804                        13.895                          3.967  
                
0.900                            38.950  
RWA / TA 
            
804                          0.641                          0.270  
                
0.089                              1.803  
Loans thUSD 
            
804     143,000,000.000     249,000,000.000     224,550.200     1,660,000,000.000  
Total assets thUSD 
            
804     319,000,000.000     639,000,000.000     346,757.800     3,810,000,000.000  
Deposits / Total Assets 
            
804                          0.487                          0.175  
                
0.040                              0.917  
Liquid Assets thUSD 
            
804       71,500,000.000     174,000,000.000       10,577.830     1,150,000,000.000  
Loan Loss Provisions thUSD 
            
804          1,381,194.000          3,470,374.000             197.033           29,500,000.000  
Operating Income / Total Assets 
            
804                          0.031                          0.016  
                
0.002                              0.097  
ROA % 
            
804                          0.495                          0.875               (4.502)                             3.254  
Cost to Income Ratio % 
            
804                        61.357                        14.885               18.483                         181.218  
 
Note: RWA/TA and ROA represent risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio and return on assets ratio, respectively.  
Std. Dev., Min and Max denote standard deviation, minimum and maximum, respectively.   
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel C – Latin America & The Caribbean subsample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 
            
180                        13.369                          4.568  
                
5.600                            28.700  
Total Capital Ratio % 
            
180                        15.853                          3.457               10.050                            28.700  
RWA / TA 
            
180                          0.901                          0.268  
                
0.364                              1.913  
Loans thUSD 
            
180       17,800,000.000       35,600,000.000       51,962.720         227,000,000.000  
Total assets thUSD 
            
180       42,900,000.000       94,400,000.000     182,039.000         528,000,000.000  
Deposits / Total Assets 
            
180                          0.467                          0.179  
                
0.098                              0.873  
Liquid Assets thUSD 
            
180       13,500,000.000       34,100,000.000         1,583.769         228,000,000.000  
Loan Loss Provisions thUSD 
            
180             660,722.500          1,361,735.000             437.159             8,883,659.000  
Operating Income / Total Assets 
            
180                          0.100                          0.081  
                
0.019                              0.682  
ROA % 
            
180                          2.084                          1.849               (4.440)                           11.090  
Cost to Income Ratio % 
            
180                        56.484                        15.636               22.954                         184.391  
 
Note: RWA/TA and ROA represent risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio and return on assets ratio, respectively.  
Std. Dev., Min and Max denote standard deviation, minimum and maximum, respectively.   
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel D – Sample by region and country 
Country Number 
LAC 180 
BR 102 
CL 18 
CO 6 
MX 36 
PA 12 
SR 6 
EUR 804 
AT 60 
BE 12 
BG 12 
CY 12 
CZ 6 
DE 66 
DK 36 
ES 54 
FI 12 
FR 48 
GB 114 
HR 6 
HU 12 
IE 12 
IT 216 
NL 30 
PL 12 
PT 36 
RO 12 
SE 6 
SI 18 
SK 12 
TOTAL 984 
 
Note: Region and country codes denote the following: Latin America and The Caribbean (LAC), Europe 
(EUR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Mexico (MX), Panama (PA), Surinam (SR), Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic  (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark 
(DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Croatia (HR),  Hungary (HU), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), 
Switzerland (SI), Slovakia (SK). 
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel E – Market profile per region per year 
Market 
Avg 
GDPA-
5D 
IFRS 
banks 
IFRS 
banks % SOB SOB % 
BII 
banks 
BII 
banks % 
Listed 
banks 
Listed 
banks % 
LAC                   
2007 1.452 2 6.67% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
2008 -0.444 2 6.67% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
2009 -4.358 5 16.67% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
2010 2.448 22 73.33% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
2011 0.051 22 73.33% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
2012 -0.572 22 73.33% 4 13.33% 23 76.67% 10 33.33% 
EU                   
2007 0.467 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
2008 -1.819 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
2009 -5.515 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
2010 1.024 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
2011 0.967 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
2012 -0.525 95 70.90% 7 5.22% 134 100.00% 63 47.01% 
 
Note: Avg GDPA-5D, IFRS banks, SOB, BII and Listed banks represent the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average gross 
domestic product, banks that have adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards, state-owned banks, banks that have adopted Basel II policies and listed banks, 
respectively. LAC and EUR denote Latin America and The Caribbean and Europe.  
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Table 3.2 – Variables correlation matrix 
 
  ST Listed EU SOB IFRS GDPA5D LOANS DEP LIQ LLP OPINC ROA EFF Crisis 
ST 1.000                           
Listed 0.240 1.000             
EU 0.233 0.106 1.000            
SOB -0.009 0.103 -0.125 1.000           
IFRS 0.130 0.499 0.238 0.015 1.000          
GDPA5D -0.016 -0.022 -0.099 -0.037 -0.038 1.000         
LOANS 0.522 0.229 0.381 -0.092 0.068 -0.001 1.000        
DEP -0.184 -0.066 0.044 -0.029 -0.016 -0.029 -0.285 1.000       
LIQ 0.512 0.248 0.236 -0.048 0.032 0.016 0.708 -0.357 1.000      
LLP 0.482 0.272 0.129 -0.020 0.069 -0.080 0.760 -0.317 0.718 1.000     
OPINC -0.198 -0.103 -0.585 0.042 -0.110 0.038 -0.496 0.056 -0.418 -0.226 1.000    
ROA -0.168 -0.040 -0.482 -0.045 -0.108 0.122 -0.271 0.028 -0.161 -0.243 0.539 1.000   
EFF 0.022 -0.038 0.125 0.076 0.038 0.026 -0.006 -0.009 -0.014 -0.053 0.007 -0.381 1.000  
Crisis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.036 -0.420 -0.002 -0.027 -0.008 0.050 0.015 0.017 -0.001 1.000 
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Table 3.3 – GMM estimation results (H1 & H2) 
Panel A – Full sample 
    
Model 1: 
T1CR       
Model 2:  
TCR     
Model 3: 
Risk   
Full Sample Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.  
Dep Var L1 0.894 0.157 ***   0.446 0.138 ***   0.738 0.107 *** 
EU -0.078 4.002   0.104 9.260   -0.097 0.130  
ST -5.402 7.122   -4.908 18.804   -0.239 0.671  
Listed 2.904 6.894   2.672 6.450   -0.062 0.459  
GDPA5D -0.007 0.028   -0.012 0.032   0.000 0.002  
SOB 9.683 16.086   -15.065 39.841   -0.184 0.681  
IFRS 0.406 0.601   0.107 0.579   0.028 0.027  
LOANS 1.718 0.925 *  1.376 1.014   -0.113 0.038 *** 
DEP -3.549 2.169   -3.326 3.000   -0.051 0.108  
LIQ -0.270 0.329   -0.671 0.310 **  0.074 0.014 *** 
LLP 0.080 0.254   0.390 0.243   0.021 0.019  
OPINC 19.952 18.809   -8.290 15.743   -0.985 0.973  
ROA -0.248 0.248   -0.035 0.257   0.003 0.017  
EFF 0.023 0.013 *  0.010 0.010   0.001 0.001  
Crisis -0.091 0.146   -0.121 0.140   0.013 0.009  
Intercept -25.578 15.523 *   -7.489 16.256    0.848 0.643  
Wald Chi2   128.04      83.39      215.57  
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000    0.000  
AR1 (p-value)  0.016    0.030    0.000  
AR2 (p-value)  0.743    0.863    0.489  
Banks  164    164    164  
Observations   984      984      984  
 
The dependent variable is T1CR (Model 1), TCR (Model 2) and Risk. (Model 3) defined as the book 
value of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the book value of total capital to book value of assets 
ratio and the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio, respectively. The independent variables are defined 
as follows: 
DepVarL1, the lagged dependent variable 
EU, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is from Europe and to zero if it is from Latin 
America or The Caribbean  
ST, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution was targeted by the EU-wide stress test and to 
zero otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.3 – GMM estimation results (H1 & H2) 
Panel B – EU subsample 
    
Model 1: 
T1CR       
Model 2: 
 TCR     
Model 3: 
Risk   
EU Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.  
Dep Var L1 0.799 0.091 ***   0.608 0.116 ***   0.690 0.129 *** 
ST 3.420 13.612   17.193 59.798   -0.392 1.414  
Listed 11.471 51.419   -1.621 13.004   1.487 4.157  
GDPA5D -0.029 0.032   -0.035 0.043   -0.002 0.002  
SOB 2.665 42.502   -44.779 78.293   -0.435 0.942  
IFRS 5.126 7.971   0.340 7.541   -0.452 0.984  
LOANS -0.073 0.943   0.316 2.772   -0.115 0.066 * 
DEP -1.154 2.697   0.693 8.238   -0.168 0.199  
LIQ -0.137 0.413   -0.333 0.347   0.054 0.026 ** 
LLP 0.212 0.221   0.377 0.229   -0.009 0.023  
OPINC -99.124 50.519 **  -118.859 57.682 **  1.897 3.959  
ROA -0.397 0.381   -0.239 0.332   -0.038 0.022 * 
EFF -0.004 0.011   -0.013 0.012   0.000 0.000  
Crisis -0.072 0.181   -0.172 0.192   0.014 0.012  
Intercept -2.184 34.619    4.064 33.737    1.173 1.300  
Wald Chi2   460.4      216.63      222.85  
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000    0.000  
AR1 (p-value)  0.038    0.054    0.000  
AR2 (p-value)  0.993    0.369    0.138  
Banks  134    134    134  
Observations   804      804      804  
 
The dependent variable is T1CR (Model 1), TCR (Model 2) and Risk. (Model 3) defined as the book 
value of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the book value of total capital to book value of assets 
ratio and the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio, respectively. The independent variables are defined 
as follows: 
DepVarL1, the lagged dependent variable 
ST, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution was targeted by the EU-wide stress test and to 
zero otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.3 – GMM estimation results (H1 & H2) 
Panel C – LAC subsample 
    
Model 1: 
T1CR       
Model 2:  
TCR     
Model 3: 
Risk   
LAC Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.  
Dep Var L1 0.647 0.175 ***   0.413 0.220 *   0.571 0.312 * 
BII -12.622 13.280   -1.330 4.445   0.722 2.048  
Listed 12.550 12.355   0.021 5.805   0.662 1.591  
GDPA5D -0.054 0.062   -0.037 0.059   0.004 0.004  
SOB 4.273 11.327   8.244 9.843   -0.873 2.143  
IFRS 0.101 0.614   -0.504 0.547   0.020 0.045  
LOANS 2.139 2.110   2.289 1.106 **  -0.103 0.108  
DEP -6.397 3.644 *  -8.356 3.488 **  -0.187 0.212  
LIQ -1.012 0.631   -1.667 0.721 **  0.114 0.040 *** 
LLP -0.835 0.467 *  -0.884 0.456 *  0.026 0.055  
OPINC 20.067 17.720   1.473 13.224   -1.043 1.014  
ROA 0.031 0.296   0.174 0.275   0.022 0.026  
EFF 0.035 0.020 *  0.015 0.013   0.000 0.003  
Crisis 0.022 0.349   0.475 0.319   0.023 0.033  
Intercept -0.268 35.275    10.805 12.838    -0.517 2.651  
Wald Chi2   236.91      55.97      71.41  
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000    0.000  
AR1 (p-
value)  0.006    0.048    0.030  
AR2 (p-
value)  0.744    0.273    0.442  
Banks  30    30    30  
Observations   180      180      180  
 
The dependent variable is T1CR (Model 1), TCR (Model 2) and Risk. (Model 3) defined as the book 
value of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the book value of total capital to book value of assets 
ratio and the risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio, respectively. The independent variables are defined 
as follows: 
DepVarL1, the lagged dependent variable 
BII, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the Basel II policies and to zero 
otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.4 – Targets and Speed of Adjustment 
  Mean EUR Mean LAC 
Speed of adjustment T1CR (λ T1CR) 0.201 0.353 
Target T1 Capital Ratio (Tier1CR*i,t) % 14.574 12.429 
Speed of adjustment TCR (λ TCR) 0.392 0.587 
Target Total Capital Ratio (CR*i,t) % 14.995 15.626 
Speed of adjustment Risk (λ Risk) 0.310 0.429 
Target Risk (Risk*i,t) % 0.554 0.917 
 
The table shows the Tier 1 capital ratio (T1CR) speed of adjustment we calculate using the equation  
Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 and the target Tier 1 capital ratio we calculate using the 
equation  
Tier1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. We estimate equation Tier1CRi,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Tier1CRi,t-1 following  the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM). We also report the speed 
of adjustment and target value for the total capital ratio (TCR) and the risk-weighted assets to total assets 
ratio (Risk) also using GMM. 
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Table 3.5 – Logistic models estimation results (H3 & H4) 
Panel A – Model 4: DÊV T1CR Model for EU and LAC subsamples 
 
    EU       LAC   
DÊV T1CR Coef. 
Robust 
 Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err.  
ST / BII 17.364 0.277 ***  -37.817 1.308 *** 
Listed 57.620 0.360 ***  33.437 0.831 *** 
GDPA5D -0.141 0.057 **  -0.383 0.118 *** 
SOB 14.280 0.523 ***  14.751 1.194 *** 
IFRS 25.531 0.372 ***  1.500 0.660 ** 
LOANS 0.083 0.258   8.540 0.800 *** 
DEP -10.793 0.961 ***  -13.126 2.352 *** 
LIQ -0.820 0.152 ***  -2.585 0.377 *** 
LLP 0.799 0.237 ***  -3.518 0.681 *** 
OPINC -467.714 13.110 ***  73.645 10.477 *** 
ROA -2.448 0.285 ***  -0.349 0.330  
EFF -0.033 0.012 ***  0.200 0.046 *** 
Crisis 0.293 0.297   0.069 0.634  
Intercept -21.917 1.605 ***   -50.584 6.066 *** 
R2   0.99      0.97  
Banks  134    30  
Observations   804      180  
 
The dependent variable is DÊV T1CR defined the average distance from target Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t 
from the current Tier 1 Capital Ratio in t-1. We calculate DÊV T1CR as follows: DÊV i,t = T1CR*i,t - 
T1CRi,t-1 , where T1CR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. and T1CR*i,t, was estimated through the equation T1CRi,t = 
λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)T1CRi,t-1 following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments 
estimator. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
ST, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution was targeted by the EU-wide stress test and to 
zero otherwise 
BII, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the Basel II policies and to zero 
otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.5 – Logistic models estimation results (H3 & H4) 
Panel B – Model 5: DÊV TCR Model for EU and LAC subsamples 
 
    EU       LAC   
DÊV TCR Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err.  
ST / BII 44.465 0.290 ***  -3.737 1.115 *** 
Listed -3.766 0.355 ***  -1.745 0.719 ** 
GDPA5D -0.116 0.057 **  -0.199 0.104 * 
SOB -113.168 0.461 ***  14.770 0.969 *** 
IFRS 0.906 0.380 **  -0.198 0.544  
LOANS 1.268 0.260 ***  5.672 0.649 *** 
DEP -3.538 0.951 ***  -11.769 2.006 *** 
LIQ -1.101 0.149 ***  -3.143 0.355 *** 
LLP 0.696 0.239 ***  -1.954 0.551 *** 
OPINC -289.276 13.734 ***  4.739 8.594  
ROA -0.835 0.324 **  0.155 0.286  
EFF -0.054 0.013 ***  0.111 0.043 ** 
Crisis -0.104 0.290   1.012 0.523 * 
Intercept -0.688 1.693    -20.003 5.167 *** 
R2   0.99      0.76  
Banks  134    30  
Observations   804      180  
 
The dependent variable is DÊV TCR defined the average distance from target Total Capital Ratio in t 
from the current Total Capital Ratio in t-1. We calculate DÊV TCR as follows: DÊV i,t = TCR*i,t - 
TCRi,t-1 , where TCR*i,t, = βX i,t-1. and TCR*i,t, was estimated through the equation TCRi,t = λβX i,t-1 
+ (1-λ)TCRi,t-1 following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments estimator. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
ST, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution was targeted by the EU-wide stress test and to 
zero otherwise 
BII, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the Basel II policies and to zero 
otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.5 – Logistic models estimation results (H3 & H4) 
Panel C – Model 6: DÊV Risk Model for EU and LAC subsamples 
 
    EU       LAC   
DÊV Risk Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err.    Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err.  
ST / BII -1.170 0.018 ***  1.580 0.063 *** 
Listed 4.773 0.022 ***  1.577 0.032 *** 
GDPA5D -0.007 0.003 *  0.017 0.006 *** 
SOB -1.494 0.039 ***  -2.149 0.054 *** 
IFRS -1.515 0.025 ***  0.060 0.034 * 
LOANS -0.436 0.015 ***  -0.283 0.038 *** 
DEP -0.271 0.060 ***  -0.676 0.122 *** 
LIQ 0.254 0.009 ***  0.408 0.022 *** 
LLP -0.029 0.014 **  -0.028 0.029  
OPINC -2.981 1.052 ***  -1.731 0.442 *** 
ROA -0.155 0.025 ***  -0.028 0.016 * 
EFF 0.001 0.001   -0.004 0.001 ** 
Crisis 0.034 0.017 *  0.103 0.031 *** 
Intercept 3.200 0.120 ***   -1.939 0.296 *** 
R2   0.99      0.98  
Banks  134    30  
Observations   804      180  
 
The dependent variable is DÊV Risk defined the average distance from target Risk Ratio (the risk-
weighted assets to total assets ratio) in t from the current Risk Ratio in t-1. We calculate DÊV Risk as 
follows: DÊV i,t = Risk*i,t - Riski,t-1 , where Risk*i,t, = βX i,t-1. and Risk*i,t, was estimated through the 
equation Riski,t = λβX i,t-1 + (1-λ)Riski,t-1 following  the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
ST, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution was targeted by the EU-wide stress test and to 
zero otherwise 
BII, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the Basel II policies and to zero 
otherwise 
Listed, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is listed and to zero otherwise 
GDPA5D, the average difference between the current gross domestic product and the last 5-year average 
gross domestic product 
SOB, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution is state-owned and to zero otherwise 
IFRS, a dummy variable set to one if the financial institution has adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards and to zero otherwise 
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
DEP is the financial institution's total deposits to total assets ratio 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets 
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio 
Crisis, a dummy variable set to one if the year is 2008 or 2009 and to zero otherwise 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Figure 3.3 – Subsequent year’s change in Tier 1 Capital Ratio (figures in % 
points) 
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Figure 3.4 – Subsequent year’s change in Total Capital Ratio (figures in % 
points) 
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Figure 3.5 – Subsequent year’s change in Risk (figures in % points) 
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Chapter 4 - Corporate social responsibility and bank risk profile: 
Evidence from Europe 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports are tools that companies use to 
highlight their contribution to society. Considering the singularities of financial 
institutions (FI) and the role they play in the economy, CSR  is closely related 
to this type of companies in two specific ways: a) they are important agents in 
the financial inclusion process in the economy (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2015) 
which is viewed as a social function of FI – note that this could be a win-win 
situation for commercial banks because as participating in this process gives 
them the opportunity to do more business, the cost of the financial services 
provided decreases (Mukherjee, 2012) and b) they incorporate environmental 
and social considerations in the design of the products, in the credit policies 
and investment strategies (de la Cuesta-González et al., 2006).   
When the FI extend credit to economic agents, they facilitate economic growth. 
However, the last global financial crisis brought a reduction in the volume of 
loans in European banks, excluding more people from the financial system 
(Jurek, 2014). In this context, FI were viewed by the society as profit 
maximizing companies (Dow, 2011). FI need to regain their stakeholders‘ trust 
and CSR aims to achieve this goal. In fact, the FI business model as well as the 
products they offer should consider CSR issues and sustainability reporting is 
the appropriate vehicle to communicate this initiative to stakeholders. 
CSR is then not only a credit risk factor that should be considered in the risk 
management system of the institutions when they grant loans to their clients 
but also could be used to increase the volume of business, according to the 
instrumental theory (Garriga and Melé, 2004). 
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FI incorporate environmental and social consideration into their bank lending 
products and services such as loans and project finance (Thompson and 
Cowton, 2004; White 1996) which is in line with the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) Financial Services Sector (FSS) disclosures requirements. 
Hence, the development of environmental credit risk management (ECRM), 
integrating environmental risk assessment procedures into the credit 
assessment process, is a key element for banks risk management (Mengze and 
Wei, 2013).  
The aim of this paper is to draw a connection between FI risk profile and the 
propensity to issue a sustainability report as well as the propensity to publish a 
sustainability report containing high quality CSR FSS specific information. We 
contribute to extant literature by finding a relationship between the type of risk 
and complexity of FI and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting (CSRR) 
and GRI Financial Services Sector disclosures, using a Financial Services 
Sector disclosure Index (FSSI) we developed. 
We argue that the FI‘s risk profile will influence the propensity to issue a CSR 
report and also the propensity to publish a sustainability report containing high 
quality CSR FSS specific information. We use the CAMELS approach to 
identify the FI‘s risk profile. CAMELS is a rating system that assesses Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management skills, Earnings and profitability, 
Liquidity risk and Sensitivity to market risk (Kerstein and Kozbeg, 2013; 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2013; Jin et al., 2011). We also 
control for the type of assuror of the firm‘s CSR report.  
Our empirical research is conducted on a sample of 2014 EU-wide stress test 
sample of FI with available public information from 2011 through 2013 (212 
FI-year observations). The period under study is the window period between 
the 2010 and 2014 EU-wise stress test.  
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We find empirical evidence that FI with higher capital ratio, significant 
amounts of loans granted (that results in having a large number of customers), 
higher profitability in the banking business and higher level of interest bearing 
liabilities booked tend to issue a CSR report. Among the FI that issue a CSR, 
the ones with lower profitability in the banking business disclose higher quality 
CSR financial services sector specific information while the ones that do not 
submit the CSR report to external assurance or get it assured by PwC and EY 
disclose lower quality CSR information related to the financial services sector. 
Our findings are unique and valuable. First, our study contributes to the 
literature that tries to better understand the motivations behind CSR reporting 
in the EU FSS key players. Second, by providing a deeper understanding of the 
intertwining nature of risk profile and CSR reporting in the banking industry, 
we fill an important gap in the literature to contribute to the framework to 
understanding aspects of complex decision making process related to CSR 
reporting and disclosure quality. Third, our study is innovative in many 
aspects: a) in using the CAMELS risk approach to identify the risk profile of FI 
involved in sustainability reporting. Prior studies in the banking industry 
mainly use corporate governance characteristics (Jizi et al., 2012; Khan, 2010), 
profitability (Martinez-Campillo et al., 2013) and earning management 
strategies (Prior et al., 2008) to explain the propensity to issue a CSR report, b) 
in explaining the role that FI sustainability reporting plays in the financial 
inclusion process and c) to raise awareness that FI could use higher quality 
CSR reporting not only to communicate social sensitivity but also to improve 
their reputation and to increase business opportunities and increase 
profitability.  
The structure of this article is organized as follows. After this introduction that 
highlights the interest of the paper, the second section addresses the literature 
review related to CSR reporting role and determinants, the social role of FI in 
the financial inclusion process, CSR and risk management in the FSS and the 
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hypothesis development. Next, we describe the sample and the methodological 
approach of our empirical study. The fourth section presents the results 
obtained. The article concludes with a section on the contribution and main 
conclusions of this study. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 CSR reporting role and determinants 
CSR reporting has become an increasing trend among companies all over the 
world. Indeed, in 2014 more than 3,000 companies filed a sustainability report 
with the GRI, including 183 companies from the European FSS (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2014). This could be showing the response of companies 
to the fact that consumer preferences shift toward products and services that are 
more environmentally responsible (Lucas and Wilson, 2008). 
 Sustainability reporting is defined as ―public reports issued by companies to 
provide internal and external stakeholders with a picture of the corporate 
position and activities on economic, environmental and social dimensions. In 
short, such reports attempt to describe the company‘s contribution towards 
sustainable development‖ (World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2002). According to the stakeholder theory, the company 
discloses sustainability matters to keep a sustainable relationship with its 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1994). Companies are encouraged to adopt CSR 
because of the benefits to both macro and micro-performances. Macro 
performance is related to environmental improvements and reduction in social 
inequality, while micro-performance includes reputational matters that allow 
companies to charge a premium price and retain high quality workers (Wu and 
Shen, 2013). The major purpose of corporate disclosure practices is the 
reduction of information asymmetry among stakeholders. This helps to reduce 
the stakeholders‘ perceived uncertainty about the consequences of the 
decisions made by the organization (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014).  
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To understand the CSR reporting incentives, a large body of research attempts 
to explain the determinants of CSR voluntary disclosure (Cornier and Ledoux, 
2011; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Other studies investigate the type of 
information and extent of social disclosures included in the CSR reports 
(Newson and Deegan, 2002; Adams et al. 1995) finding significant 
relationships between companies CSR disclosures and companies 
characteristics or financial attributes such as size, industry membership, market 
reaction, external influences, firm reputation, country of origin or proximity to 
individual consumers (Chih et al., 2010; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Tilt, 1994 
and Herremans et al., 1993) . Zorio et al. (2013) find that the type of industry 
and the type of external auditor are determinants for CSR reporting and CSR 
assurance.  
Some studies investigate on the determinants of CSR reporting quality. Guidry 
and Patten (2010) investigate whether market participants see value in 
publishing a sustainability report and whether this reaction depends on the 
quality of the report. They find that companies with high quality reports show 
more positive market reactions than companies issuing lower quality reports.   
Surprisingly, only a few studies have analyzed the determinants of CSR 
reporting in the financial sector. This little attention to CSR reporting in the 
financial services sector could be explained by the indirect impact FI have on 
the environment through financial intermediation.  
Prior studies in the banking industry mainly use corporate governance 
characteristics, profitability and earning management strategies to explain the 
propensity to issue a CSR report. Jizi et al. (2013) investigate the corporate 
governance related determinants of CSR reporting in a sample of large US 
commercial banks for the period 2009–2011 and find that board independence 
and board size are positively related to CSR disclosure. Khan (2010) look into 
CSR information of Bangladesh listed commercial banks and explores the 
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potential effects of corporate governance elements on CSR disclosures. The 
study finds that non-executive directors and the existence of foreign 
nationalities in the board have a significant impact on CSR reporting. 
Martínez-Campillo et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between 
profitability level and CSR expenditure in the Spanish savings institutions. 
Nobanee and Ellili (2015) find that the degree of sustainability disclosure in 
conventional banks is higher than in Islamic banks. They argue that higher 
leverage and more financial constraints lead conventional banks to be more 
responsive to the environmental disclosure demands of stakeholders. Mallin et 
al. (2014) analyze the CSR disclosures in a sample of Islamic banks using a 
CSR disclosure index covering ten dimensions. Their results show a positive 
association between CSR disclosure and financial performance. Prior research 
shows that managers who pursue private benefits by earning management 
strategies are more motivated to engage in CSR activities to protect their 
positions (Prior et al., 2008) and to divert attention from questionable financial 
reporting processes (Hahn and Kuhnen, 2013). Pérez et al. (2013) develop a 
scale to evaluate customer‘s perceptions of CSR performance in the banking 
industry and analyze the attitude of Spanish savings banks towards charitable 
activities and the inclusion of CSR in their business policies. 
In sum, the singularities of the financial services sector and the role that FI play 
in the economy define a different role of CSR reporting in this sector when 
compared to the role it plays in other industries because: a) FI are important 
agents in the financial inclusion process in the economy which is viewed as a 
social function of FI but also as an opportunity to do more business and create 
new products (Mukherjee, 2012) and b) FI incorporate environmental and 
social considerations in the design of the products, in the credit policies and in 
their investment strategies (de la Cuesta-González et al., 2006). 
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4.2.2 FI social role in the financial inclusion process  
―Financial exclusion‖ is the incapacity to gain access to financial services 
needed due to high prices, strict entry requirements, lack of offer, social 
discrimination and auto-exclusion (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2015; Carbó et al., 
2005), for instance those who lack trust in formal FI because they experienced 
bank failure or fear fraud.  The magnitude of the financial exclusion problem is 
considerable even in higher rent economies where a 10% of the population is 
financially excluded and CSR is a crucial concept that is considered by the FI 
initiatives to reduce it (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2015).  
 
FI play an important social role in the financial inclusion process, which is 
considered in recent years a global policy objective to improve the lives of the 
poor (Anzoategui et al., 2014; Swamy, 2014; The World Bank, 2011). 
Financial inclusion can be defined as ensuring access to financial services at an 
affordable cost in a fair and transparent manner (FATF, 2011). Multilateral 
agencies promote financial inclusion initiatives that aim at expanding formal 
financial services to those who are not currently using such services (CGAP, 
2009). 
 
Financial inclusion is also viewed as a tool to monitor financial transactions 
and to expand the surveillance of regulators (de Koker and Jentzsch, 2013).   
The EU banking sector regulated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) is 
dominated by domestic credit institutions that control more than 70% of total 
assets. Only the remaining 30% is controlled by non-domestic subsidiaries. 
Larger countries in the EU such as Germany and Italy have more fragmented 
markets and show strong savings and cooperative banking sectors, whereas 
smaller countries show a concentrated banking sector. This concentration 
allows large institutions to obtain significant market power (Jurek, 2014).  
European commercial banks are a crucial part of the European economy yet 
credit cooperatives and saving banks offer similar commercial banking services 
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tending to operate more locally. The latter institutions are especially important 
in Spain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Haq and Heaney, 2012). 
Cooperative banks are different from the other two types of FI as regards 
control, ownership and benefits (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). 
 
These FI extend credit to economic agents and facilitate economic growth. 
However, the volume of loans granted by European FI dramatically decreased 
with the last global financial crisis, excluding more people from the financial 
system (Jurek, 2014).  CSR is a crucial concept within the FI‘s initiatives to 
reduce financial exclusion (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2015).  
 
In the recent financial crisis, financial institutions were viewed by the society 
as profit maximizing companies that did not look after their clients‘ interests 
but for their own managers‘ interests (Dow, 2011). Moral hazard in the 
financial sector has been analyzed in relation to loans granted to clients that 
were not creditworthy, high risk sophisticated financial products offered to 
financially unsophisticated clients and also because the states provided 
unlimited support to banks in the form of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-
resort (Dow, 2011). 
FI need to regain their stakeholders‘ trust and CSR is a good tool to achieve 
this goal. CSR seeks to fulfill the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic 
expectations of a firm‘s stakeholders and these expectations define the type of 
responsibilities firms have for their stakeholders (Hinson et al., 2010). CSR can 
also be viewed from the legitimacy theory perspective as firms engage in 
socially responsible activities in order to gain, improve or maintain legitimacy 
(Moir, 2001).  
This brings not only an opportunity for depositary financial institutions to show 
their social role by fulfilling their stakeholders‘ expectations and legitimate 
their existence but also constitutes a business opportunity. Promoting financial 
  
Chapter 4 - Corporate social responsibility and bank risk profile: Evidence 
from Europe 
183 
 
 
inclusion is a win-win situation for commercial banks because they improve 
their global corporate image and, at the same time, as the number of customers 
grows through active engagement in financial inclusion the cost of banking 
services decrease in these deprived areas (Mukherjee, 2012). The FI business 
model as well as the products offered to its customers should consider CSR 
issues if the financial institution aims to regain the customers‘ trust. 
Sustainability reporting is the appropriate vehicle to communicate this concern. 
4.2.3 CSR and risk management in the financial services sector  
In the current financial services sector context, CSR has a distinctive and 
increasing significance (Bravo et al., 2012; Scholtens, 2009).  
The concept of CSR in the financial sector not only refers to firms‘ 
responsibility for the impact that their actions have on their stakeholders, but 
also to their role as financial intermediaries (Prior and Argandoña, 2009). De la 
Cuesta-González et al. (2006) argue that the CSR concept affects the financial 
sector from a two-pronged perspective: a) in the internal dimension which 
implies the implementation of environmental and socially responsible 
initiatives within the entity‘s internal management procedures and b) in the 
external dimension, which implies the incorporation of CSR into the entity‘s 
business of financial intermediation and investment in the financial markets.  
The internal dimension should lead to incorporating environmental and social 
considerations in the design of the financial products, in the credit policies and 
investment strategies. Consequently, the business strategy and the risk 
management should take CSR into account. Considering this, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) has issued the GRI Financial Services Sector (FSS) 
disclosures, a sector supplement that addresses specific industry issues that are 
not contemplated in the general GRI guidelines. The GRI FSS disclosures aim 
to provide FI stakeholders with higher quality information because the 
disclosure requirements are linked to the specific risks and complexities of the 
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industry. The internal dimension of CSR in FI is contemplated in the ―Product 
and service impact‖ section of the GRI FSS supplement (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2013). It requires the firm to design and implement procedures for 
assessing and screening environmental and social risks in business lines, 
process and monitor clients‘ implementation of and compliance with 
environmental and social requirements included in agreements, transactions 
and initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and services 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2013).  
The external dimension of CSR in the financial sector is particularly relevant 
because the impact that financial intermediation has in the society does not 
only depend on FI sustainable performance, but also on the behaviour of loan-
receivers and investment projects‘ managers that receive funds from them. This 
singularity requires FI to perform a complex assessment and measurement of 
present and future social impact of third-parties behaviour (de la Cuesta-
González et al., 2006).  In the case of FI, the limit of CSR is not set at the 
environmental credit risk assessment of the FI themselves as the poor 
environmental performance of the project they finance to a third-party could 
impact on their social image (Mengze and Wei, 2013).  
The development of environmental credit risk management (ECRM), which 
integrates environmental risk assessment procedures into the credit assessment 
process, is important for the risk management of banks (Mengze and Wei, 
2013). The idea of the inclusion of CSR in risk management programs in the 
financial sector has been taken into account by Bangladesh Bank (the Central 
Bank of Bangladesh) in recent policies issued (Bangladesh Bank, 2011). In this 
policy, the Bangladeshi authority requires the environmental risk to be 
incorporated in the Core Risk Management (CRM) that mandates considering 
environmental risk in the overall credit risk assessment methodology applied 
by banks. Additionally, this will have an impact in the computation of Risk-
Adjusted Capital Ratio (a measure of FI that compares total adjusted capital to 
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the institutions risk-weighted assets) and the CAMELS rating of the institution 
(a banks‘ composite rating that integrates ratings from six different areas: 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management skills, Earnings and profitability, 
Liquidity risk and Sensitivity to market risk).  
This suggests the following null hypotheses about a FI risk profile and its 
propensity to issue a sustainability report and a FI risk profile and its 
propensity to publish a sustainability report containing high quality CSR FSS 
specific information: 
H1: The bank propensity to issue a sustainability report does not depend on 
bank risk factors such as capital risk, the quality of assets, managerial skills, 
the level of earnings and profitability, the level of liquidity risk and the 
sensitivity to market risk. 
H2: High quality financial sector specific information on sustainability does 
not depend on bank risk factors such as capital risk, the quality of assets, 
managerial skills, the level of earnings and profitability, the level of liquidity 
risk, the sensitivity to market risk and on the type of assuror. 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Empirical model 
Our H1 is tested using a logistic regression model on sustainability reports 
issued from 2011 to 2013 using the dummy variable Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report (CSRR) which is coded one if the financial institution 
has issued a CSR report and zero otherwise. H2 is tested using a linear 
regression model on the Financial Service Sector disclosures Index (FSSI). To 
develop the FSSI we use content analysis, an approach commonly used in CSR 
reporting (Guidry and Patten, 20110). The FSSI is developed using the sixteen 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Financial Services Sector disclosures 
indicators.  The Financial Services Sector disclosures contains a set of 
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disclosures for use by all financial institutions that cover key aspects of 
sustainability performance that are relevant to the Financial Services Sector 
and which are not sufficiently covered in the general GRI guidelines (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2013). Using content analysis, we analyze each CSR 
report included in the sample to identify disclosure of each of the sixteen 
indicators included in the GRI Financial Services Sector supplement. We 
coded each indicator with 1 if it is fully disclosed, 0.5 if partially disclosed and 
0 if not disclosed: 
 
where FSSIi is the financial service sector disclosure index 0≤FSSIi≤1 and Xt,i  
is each of the sixteen Financial Services disclosure indicators t for each bank i. 
The coding was reviewed by two members of the research team and 
discrepancies were discussed and reconciled. 
4.3.2 CAMELS measurement and variables selection 
The experimental variables of the models are taken from prior studies that have 
identified proxies for the different risk areas covered by the CAMELS rating 
system (Martínez-Campillo et al., 2013; de Claro, 2013; Kerstein and Kozberg, 
2013; Jin et al., 2011; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006 and Fields et al., 2004). These 
variables capture strategic choices that bank managers do and may affect the 
risk profile of the bank (De Jonghe, 2010).  
To capture the capital adequacy we use the capitalization ratio (T1RATIO) 
which is defined as Tier 1 Capital Ratio, the ratio of a bank's core equity 
capital to its total risk-weighted assets which is stressed in the EU-wide stress 
test carried out by the EBA. 
The natural logarithm of provision for loan losses (PLL) is used to capture 
asset quality as this measure will capture the change in the allowance for loan 
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losses in the current period. The higher the PLL the lower the asset quality. It 
can also be the case that companies with higher PLL are conservative and 
record provision for doubtful debtors more timely than other financial 
institutions (Jin et al. 2011; Kerstein and Kozberg 2013).  
We use the efficiency ratio (EFF) defined as cost to income to proxy for 
management skills. The higher the efficiency ratio (i.e., the lower the 
efficiency for the bank), the more difficult it is for the bank to earn a profit and 
thus, to increase its capital (Yeh, 2011). A high efficiency ratio means a 
company needs to incur in high cost to get a certain income level. These costs 
are usually related to non-interest expenses such as personnel, branches, and 
data processing expenses that are associated with large volumes of transactions 
accounts and with a geographically diverse branch system. Considering this, a 
high efficiency ratio could also be used as a proxy for the complexity of bank 
operations (Fields et al., 2004).  
To proxy for earnings and profitability we use the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (OPINC). Operating profit captures the impact on net profit of the 
transactions that are closely related to the business of the firm (Fields et al., 
2004). Following de Claro (2013) and Martínez-Campillo (2013) we also use 
the ratios Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for earnings and profitability.  
We use natural logarithm of total loans (LOANS) as a proxy for bank liquidity 
as the main factor in the financial crisis is a loss in liquidity and an increase in 
the default risk of loans from interest rate resets (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). 
LOANS is also a proxy for bank size as it is an asset‘s component that 
represent the main business of a commercial bank (Paravisini et al., 2014; 
Nissim, 2003).  We use natural logarithm of total liquid assets as a proxy for 
liquidity (LIQ) (Chen et al., 2011).  
Usually banks tend to grant loans for longer terms than the deposits they 
receive from customers. As a consequence, interest rate resets (either rise/fall) 
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will impact deposits in first instance and this will in turn reduce/increase the 
interest rate spread. To proxy for this risk we use the level of other interest 
bearing liabilities to total assets (INTBEAR) (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). 
According to de Claro (2013) a bank with liquidity problems will increase the 
interest rate to retain the level of deposits or to capture new deposits in the 
market and also to pay higher interest rate for borrowings from other financial 
institutions. The higher this ratio the higher the sensitivity of the financial 
institutions to the impact of liquidity issues on interest expense and hence in 
firm‘s profitability.  
Following Zorio et al. (2013) we control for the type of auditor of the firm‘s 
CSR report using the following dummy variables: EY, DT, KPMG, PwC and 
OTHER to identify the assuror of the CSR report and the dummy variable 
NONE when the CSR report is not assured. 
4.3.3 Data sources and sample selection 
Our sample includes the 2014 EU-wide stress test sample of banks with 
available public information from 2011 through 2013. Consequently, the 
sample includes the major banks in the EU and the period under study is the 
window period between the 2010 and 2014 EU-wide stress test.   
Financial data were collected from the Orbis Database. CSRR data and the data 
we use to develop the FSSI index was gathered from the CSR reports we find 
in the GRI database and in the banks‘ websites. Departing from the 2014 EU-
wide sample of banks, we search the GRI database for CSR reports of these 
FIs. When the report of a FI was not available in the GRI database for all or 
any of the years considered in the sample, we search the FI website for the 
corresponding CSR report. A total of 212 bank-year are included in the full 
sample.  
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Table 4.1 – Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample for the 
period 2011-2013, which is used to test H1. 
 INSERT TABLE 4.1 – PANEL A HERE 
Data reveal that the average Tier 1 capital ratio of the sample is 12%. 
Considering that the sample banks were targeted by the EU-wide stress test that 
requires a minimum Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 8% in the baseline scenario, the 
sample average Tier 1 Capital Ratio is well above that minimum. The mean 
ROA is -0.192%, with a minimum of -9.173% and a maximum of 2.849%. The 
banks with lower ROA are the Banque Internationale a Luxemburg (-9.17% in 
2011) and two Greek banks, Eurobank Ergasias (-9.05% in 2011) and Alpha 
Bank (-8% in 2011) while the banks with higher ROA are from Poland, the 
Bank Handlowy W Warszawie (2.85% in 2012 and 2.68% in 2013) and the 
PKO BP (2.51% in 2012). The average total loans is EUR 134,234 million, 
while the average loan loss provisions is EUR 1,489 million. The mean 
efficiency ratio is 64.99%,the mean operating income to total assets ratio is 
2.32% and the mean other interest bearing-liabilities is EUR 90,824 million.  
Table 4.1 – Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of CSR 
issuers in the period 2011-2013, which is used to test H2. The quality of CSR 
disclosure and assurance testing is supplemental to the issuance analysis and 
needs to include only those firms having issued reports (see, e.g., Simnett et al. 
2009). Therefore, the subsample to test H2 includes only the CSR issuers- i.e. 
93 bank-year. 
 INSERT TABLE 4.1 – PANEL B HERE 
Data reveal that the average Tier 1 capital ratio of the sample is also 12%. The 
mean ROA is –1.48%, with a minimum of -8% and a maximum of 1.9%. The 
average total loans is EUR 195,922 million, while the average loan loss 
provisions is EUR 20,856 million (the bank with higher loan loss provisions is 
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Banco Santander in the three years included in  the sample). The mean 
efficiency ratio is 64.95%,the mean operating income to total assets ratio is 
2.347% and the mean other interest-bearing liabilities is EUR 144,625 million. 
The FSSI descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.2. In Panel A we show 
the FSSI and each of the sixteen GRI Financial Services Sector disclosure 
indicators by country. The countries with more CSR reports in the sample are 
Spain (22), Italy (19) and Germany (10).  
INSERT TABLE 4.2 – PANEL A HERE 
The two countries with higher mean FSSI are The Netherlands (99%) and 
Spain (88%) while the two countries with lower mean FSSI are Denmark 
(22%) and Sweden (23%). The indicators with higher disclosure quality are 
F16 (88%) and F1 (83%). FS16 are disclosures related to the initiatives to 
enhance financial literacy by type of beneficiary and FS1 shows policies with 
specific environmental and social components applied to business lines. The 
indicators with lower disclosure quality are F12 (60%) and F10 (61%). FS12 
are disclosures related to voting policies applied to environmental or social 
issues for shares over which the reporting organization holds the right to vote 
shares or advises on voting and FS10 is an indicator that shows the percentage 
and number of companies held in the institution‘s portfolio with which the 
reporting organization has interacted on environmental or social issues. 
In Panel B we show the FSSI and each of the sixteen GRI Financial Services 
Sector disclosure indicators by auditor. The auditors with more CSR reports 
assured are Deloitte and PwC with 18 reports each. 
 INSERT TABLE 4.2 – PANEL A HERE 
Within the Big 4, KPMG (98%) and Deloitte (77%) assure the CSR report of 
banks with higher mean FSSI while PwC (75%) and EY (74%) assure the CSR 
reports of banks with lower mean FSSI. It is important to note that the banks 
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that do not get the CSR report  assured show a very low mean FSSI (30%) 
compared with the banks that get the CSR report assured.  
4.4 Results 
In Table 4.3 Panel A and Panel B we report the correlation matrix of the 
covariates used in the models to test H1 and H2 respectively.  
INSERT TABLE 4.3 – PANEL A HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4.3 – PANEL B HERE 
There are no significant correlation coefficients greater than 50%, showing that 
our models are not subject to multicollinearity problems.  
The corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) logistic model estimation 
results are presented in Table 4.4.  
INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE 
The regression model has a significant Chi-square. Note that the goodness of 
fit of our model is adequate, as the R-square Nagelkerke shows that the model 
explains 35.4% of the variability. The global classification is 73% which is 
high. 
The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
other interest bearing liabilities and the propensity to issue a CSR report among 
the banks that were targeted by the EU-wide stress test. The results also 
indicate that financial institutions with larger loan portfolios tend to issue a 
CSR report. Following de Claro (2013), these two results together suggest that 
the larger loan portfolios the higher the liquidity risk, so if they want to capture 
deposits from customers or receive loans from other financial institutions to 
increase liquidity, they will have to pay higher interest rates to become 
attractive among depositors and lenders. The higher INTBEAR suggest a 
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higher the sensitivity of the financial institution to market risk and hence the 
higher the impact on the banks‘ profitability. Table 4 also reports that OPINC 
and the propensity to issue a CSR report have a positive and significant 
relationship. This, in fact, mitigates the negative impact of liquidity issues on 
profitability because these are large banks with a diverse profit-generating 
product portfolio. Interestingly, we find a positive and significant association 
between T1RATIO and CSRR. This means that among the banks that were 
targeted by the EU-wide stress test, the capital risk is lower in the case of the 
banks that issue a CSR report. From a regulator perspective, this shows that 
banks with a strong capital position tend to be involved in CSR reporting 
activities. 
The results as a whole indicate that financial institutions with a significant loan 
portfolio booked, with adequate capital level, with high sensitivity to market 
risk and that are highly profitable in the banking business tend to issue a CSR 
report.  
Table 4.5 presents the results of H2 on the relationship between bank risk 
profile and type of assuror with the Financial Services Sector disclosure Index 
(FSSI).  
INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE 
The results presented in Table 4.5 show that LOANS and INTBEAR have a 
positive and significant association with FSSI. This result shows that among 
the reporting banks, the banks with higher liquidity risk (due to the higher loan 
portfolio) and with higher sensitivity to market risk (due to the higher interest 
bearing liabilities to total assets ratio) tend to disclose higher quality CSR 
information that is closely related to the financial services sector. The negative 
and significant relationship we find between LIQ and FSSI also provides 
support to the presence of higher liquidity risk among these banks. An 
interesting result is the negative and significant association between OPINC 
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and FSSI, showing that the banks that disclose higher quality financial services 
sector CSR information are not the most profitable in the banking business 
among the financial institutions that issue a sustainability report. This suggest 
that as these banks are highly sensitive to the impact of liquidity issues on 
interest expense, they are interested in showing the market their involvement in 
CSR activities and that they take into account sustainability issues when doing 
business in the financial services sector.   
Finally, Table 4.5 shows interesting results in relation to the type of auditor 
that provide assurance to the CSR report. We find a negative and significant 
association between PWC, EY and NONE with FSSI. This shows that the 
banks that get the CSR report assured by PwC and EY and the banks that do 
not get their CSR reports assured disclose lower quality specific financial 
services sector CSR information. The only auditor with a positive coefficient is 
KPMG, but the association with FSSI is not significant. 
4.5 Conclusions 
CSR initiatives are considered by companies as an opportunity to make a 
contribution to society. As a consequence, an increasing amount of 
sustainability reports are issued every year. Due to the specific characteristics 
that FI have regarding risk management and the role that these type of 
institutions play in the financial inclusion process and the economy stability 
(Liang and Reichert, 2012) CSR has a distinctive effect on them.  
This study investigates the impact that the bank‘s risk profile has on CSR 
reporting in the European FSS.  
Under a theory that FI play an important social function in the financial 
inclusion process in the economy and that CSR is considered in the product 
design process and the credit policy, FI incorporate social and environmental 
risk management in their risk management system. The risk management 
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system of the FI will then impact on the propensity of the company to issue a 
sustainability report and on the propensity to publish a sustainability report 
containing high quality CSR FSS specific information. The purpose of this 
paper is to look into the connections between the risk profile and CSR 
reporting and the CSR reporting quality under the CAMELS multifaceted risk 
approach.  
Our sample includes all the available CSR reports and financial information of 
the FI included in the 2014 EU-wide stress tests, covering the period 2011-
2013. Our results indicate that FI which are in a strong position regarding 
capital adequacy, that have a significant loan portfolio, that have a high level of 
other interest bearing liabilities booked and that manage to get higher 
profitability in the banking business have a propensity to issue a sustainability 
report. As total loans is an appropriate proxy of bank size because it is an 
asset‘s component that represent the main business of a commercial bank 
(Paravisini et al., 2014; Nissim, 2003), our findings show that the largest banks 
tend to issue a CSR report. This result is in line with prior studies of CSR 
reporting in industries different from the financial sector that find a positive 
and significant relationship between total assets and CSR reporting (Zorio et. 
al., 2013; Sierra-García et. al., 2013). According to our findings using a 
CAMELS-risk-approach, the institutions with lower capital risk, higher 
liquidity risk, higher profitability in the banking business and higher sensitivity 
to market risk tend to issue a CSR report.  
An interesting finding is that the risk profile of the FI that publish a 
sustainability report containing higher quality CSR FSS specific information 
has some particularities. Our results show that among the banks that issue a 
CSR report, the ones with a larger loan portfolio, a lower liquid assets level, 
higher other interest bearing liabilities booked, and lower profitability in the 
banking business, publish a sustainability report containing high quality CSR 
FSS specific information.  Regarding the effect of the type of assurance of the 
  
Chapter 4 - Corporate social responsibility and bank risk profile: Evidence 
from Europe 
195 
 
 
CSR report, when PwC and EY provide assurance to the report and when no 
assurance is provided, the quality of the CSR FSS specific information 
disclosed is lower. In summary, if we link these findings with the CAMELS 
risk approach we see that the institutions with higher liquidity risk, lower 
profitability in the banking business and higher sensitivity to market risk tend 
to disclose higher quality CSR FSS specific information in the CSR report. 
While previous CSR studies in the banking industry mainly provide evidence 
from the US, UK and emerging markets, this study is unique as it focuses on 
the EU banking sector, and more specifically, in the larger EU banks targeted 
by the EBA 2014 stress testing exercise, which are the FI that have a 
significant impact on the EU financial sector stability. Moreover, the study is 
novel in using the CAMELS risk approach to identify the risk profile of FI 
involved in sustainability reporting. Prior studies in the banking industry 
mainly use corporate governance characteristics and earning management 
strategies to explain the propensity to issue a CSR report. 
Our findings contribute to the extant literature by providing insight into the 
reporting strategy of an important sector in the EU economy – the financial 
services sector. We find that FI with larger amounts of creditors and depositors 
that manage to get higher rent from them tend to issue a CSR report. This 
means that FI of greater visibility that are more profitable are more likely to 
face higher demands from stakeholders to be socially responsible.   
Our findings have important implications for shareholders, investors and 
analysts who may consider CSR reporting as a vehicle that FI use to express 
ethical behavior and higher quality of financial reporting. Stakeholders should 
be aware that FI could use CSR reporting to improve reputation and as an 
opportunity to do more business, especially in a period following a financial 
crisis. Our results show that among the FI that issue a CSR report, the ones that 
are less profitable in the banking business and that get their CSR assured by 
  
Chapter 4 - Corporate social responsibility and bank risk profile: Evidence 
from Europe 
196 
 
 
non-Big 4 auditors disclose higher quality CSR information. Hiring a higher 
quality assuror like PwC and EY to carry out the CSR external assurance could 
be a strategy to lower transaction costs and serves as a protection to disclose 
lower quality CSR information. In line with legitimacy theory, these practices 
may threaten the banks‘ credibility and may lead to see CSR reporting as a 
strategy employed by banks‘ managers to divert attention from their risk level 
by creating a social responsible profile to attract more customers. 
Lastly, regulators should take into account, from a regulatory perspective, the 
risk profile of FI that tend to issue a sustainability report and the risk profile of 
FI that disclose higher quality CSR FSS specific information. This paper is 
valuable for regulators to consider whether CSR related activities should be 
somehow included in the CAMELS rating system as it is in the pioneer 
countries in this field (see Ullah, 2013; Weber et al., 2015). 
Future work on CSR reporting in the EU FSS should explore whether a 
financial crisis impacts on the risk profile of FI involved in sustainability 
reporting and on the disclosure quality. This could shed some light on the use 
of CSR reporting by FI to create a social responsible profile. Another 
interesting research question to explore is whether the business volume and 
profitability increase among the FI that issue a CSR report after the financial 
crisis and more specially, among the FI that disclose higher quality CSR FSS 
specific information. 
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Table 4.1 – Panel A - Descriptive statistics for the full sample of FI (H1) 
 
 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
      
Loan Loss Provisions th EUR 212 -191,203 18,523,000 1,489,560.630 2,649,951.863 
Cost to Income Ratio % 212 -175.769 289.223 64.999 32.908 
Operating Income / Total assets % 212 -5.135 8.423 2.317 1.416 
ROA using P/L before tax % 212 -9.173 2.849 -.1920 1.657 
Loans th EUR 212 190,400 745,678,000 134,234,694.560 175,468,713.258 
Liquid Assets th EUR 212 12,900 656,255,000 66,622,574.060 124,444,042.540 
Other Int bearing liabilities th EUR 212 2,200 1,110,798,000 90,824,501.830 165,530,196.210 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 212 -1.300 21.300 12.039 3.2833 
Source: Orbis database      
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Table 4.1 – Panel B - Descriptive statistics of FI which are CSR issuers (H2) 
 
 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
      
Financial Service Sector Index 93 0.000 1.000 0.725 0.296 
Loan Loss Provisions th EUR 93 -19.343.000 18,523,000.000 20,856,229.470 3,118,011.207 
Cost to Income Ratio % 93 38.597 195.348 64.955 21.537 
Operating Income / Total assets % 93 0.36 8.422 2.347 1.290 
ROA using P/L before tax % 93 -8.000 1.900 -1.480 1.324 
Loans th EUR 93 6,299,555.000 731,662,000.000 195,922,541.980 193,673,197.645 
Liquid Assets th EUR 93 705,900 656,255,000 101,664,213.830 147,258,531.029 
Other Int bearing liabilities th EUR 93 891,500.000 1,110,798,000.000 144,624,709.750 204,706,087.637 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio % 93 4.200 21.300 12.027 2.887 
Source: Orbis database      
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Table 4.2 – Panel A –  Mean FSSI by country 
 
  Mean 
Country 
# CSR 
reports FSSI  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6  F7  F8  F9  F10  F11  F12  F13  F14  F15  F16 
BE 3 0.625 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.333 0.667 0.667 1.000 0.667 1.000 
DE 10 0.863 1.000 1.000 0.850 1.000 0.900 0.700 0.850 0.850 1.000 0.750 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 1.000 
DK 6 0.219 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 
ES 22 0.881 1.000 0.773 0.750 1.000 0.955 0.932 0.932 0.818 0.705 0.727 0.727 0.909 0.864 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FI 3 0.875 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 1.000 0.667 1.000 0.667 1.000 0.667 0.667 1.000 1.000 
FR 6 0.490 0.667 0.833 0.500 0.167 0.333 0.167 0.667 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.833 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.833 0.667 
GB 4 0.563 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.875 0.125 0.125 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.875 1.000 0.750 0.750 
GR 4 0.672 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.000 0.500 0.750 0.750 0.500 
HU 3 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.500 1.000 
IT 19 0.834 0.868 0.842 0.737 0.842 0.842 0.895 0.921 0.816 0.737 0.816 0.842 0.789 0.842 0.763 0.868 0.921 
NL 6 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.833 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NO 3 0.385 1.000 0.333 0.833 0.167 0.167 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.833 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.167 0.833 
PT 2 0.656 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SE 2 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 
 93 0.725 0.828 0.758 0.726 0.763 0.720 0.704 0.742 0.726 0.608 0.608 0.656 0.597 0.683 0.806 0.801 0.882 
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GRI Financial Services Sector Disclosure Indictors: 
FS1 Policies with specific environmental and social components applied to business lines. 
FS2 Procedures for assessing and screening environmental and social risks in business lines. 
FS3 Processes for monitoring clients‘ implementation of and compliance with environmental and social requirements included in agreements or transactions. 
FS4 Processes for improving staff competency to implement the environmental and social policies and procedures as applied to business lines. 
FS5 Interactions with clients/investees/business partners regarding environmental and social risks and opportunities. 
FS6 Percentage of the portfolio for business lines by specific region, size (e.g. micro/SME/large) and by sector. 
FS7 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a specific social benefit for each business line broken down by purpose. 
FS8 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a specific environmental benefit for each business line broken down by purpose. 
FS9 Coverage and frequency of audits to assess implementation of environmental and social policies and risk assessment procedures. 
FS10 Percentage and number of companies held in the institution‘s portfolio with which the reporting organization has interacted on environmental or social issues. 
FS11 Percentage of assets subject to positive and negative environmental or social screening. 
FS12 Voting policies applied to environmental or social issues for shares over which the reporting organization holds the right to vote shares or advises on voting. 
FS13 Access points in low-populated or economically disadvantaged areas by type. 
FS14 Initiatives to improve access to financial services for disadvantaged people. 
FS15 Policies for the fair design and sale of financial products and services. 
FS16 Initiatives to enhance financial literacy by type of beneficiary. 
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Table 4.2 – Panel B  –  Mean FSSI by auditor 
  Mean 
Assuror 
# CSR 
reports FSSI  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6  F7  F8  F9  F10  F11  F12  F13  F14  F15  F16 
EY 9 0.743 1.000 0.778 0.889 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.667 0.667 0.778 0.778 0.556 0.444 0.722 0.667 0.833 
Deloitte 18 0.766 0.778 0.778 0.833 0.778 0.778 0.750 0.861 0.806 0.667 0.500 0.556 0.722 0.778 1.000 0.833 0.833 
KPMG 12 0.977 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.875 0.917 0.917 0.917 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PwC 18 0.753 0.972 0.694 0.694 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.639 0.611 0.472 0.583 0.722 0.528 0.889 0.889 0.917 0.944 
None 14 0.299 0.464 0.357 0.179 0.357 0.286 0.321 0.429 0.286 0.179 0.250 0.214 0.071 0.143 0.250 0.321 0.679 
Other 22 0.797 0.818 0.909 0.795 0.818 0.682 0.614 0.773 0.909 0.773 0.705 0.773 0.727 0.705 0.864 0.932 0.955 
 93 0.725 0.828 0.758 0.726 0.763 0.720 0.704 0.742 0.726 0.608 0.608 0.656 0.597 0.683 0.806 0.801 0.882 
 
GRI Financial Services Sector Disclosure Indictors: 
FS1 Policies with specific environmental and social components applied to business lines. 
FS2 Procedures for assessing and screening environmental and social risks in business lines. 
FS3 Processes for monitoring clients‘ implementation of and compliance with environmental and social requirements included in agreements or transactions. 
FS4 Processes for improving staff competency to implement the environmental and social policies and procedures as applied to business lines. 
FS5 Interactions with clients/investees/business partners regarding environmental and social risks and opportunities. 
FS6 Percentage of the portfolio for business lines by specific region, size (e.g. micro/SME/large) and by sector. 
FS7 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a specific social benefit for each business line broken down by purpose. 
FS8 Monetary value of products and services designed to deliver a specific environmental benefit for each business line broken down by purpose. 
FS9 Coverage and frequency of audits to assess implementation of environmental and social policies and risk assessment procedures. 
FS10 Percentage and number of companies held in the institution‘s portfolio with which the reporting organization has interacted on environmental or social issues. 
FS11 Percentage of assets subject to positive and negative environmental or social screening. 
FS12 Voting policies applied to environmental or social issues for shares over which the reporting organization holds the right to vote shares or advises on voting. 
FS13 Access points in low-populated or economically disadvantaged areas by type. 
FS14 Initiatives to improve access to financial services for disadvantaged people. 
FS15 Policies for the fair design and sale of financial products and services. 
FS16 Initiatives to enhance financial literacy by type of beneficiary. 
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Table 4.3 – Panel A  – Correlation matrix of the covariates used to test H1 
 
 
  EFF OPINC INTBEAR T1RATIO ROA LLP LIQ LOANS 
         
EFF     1.000        
OPINC -0.193***    1.000       
INTBEAR 0.152***   -0.218***      1.000      
T1RATIO     0.036   -0.196*** -0.116**    1.000     
ROA    -0.326***    0.150***    -0.085* 0.136***     1.000    
LLP     0.059    0.035      0.162   -0.038 -0.264***  1.000   
LIQ     0.077*  -0.192***     0.332***    0.123***     0.000 0.397***  1.000  
LOANS     0.030  -0.135***     0.365***   -0.003    -0.041 0.468*** 0.452*** 1.000 
                                 The table presents the correlation matrix for the covariates used to test H1: 
  EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
  OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio    
  INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing liabilities  to total assets ratio   
  T1RATIO is the financial institution's Tier 1 capital  ratio    
  ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio     
  LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions    
  LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets    
  LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans    
  * Significant at 10% level       
  ** Significant at 5% level       
  *** Significant at 1% level       
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Table 4.3 – Panel B  – Correlation matrix of the covariates used to test H2 
  EY DT PWC KPMG OTHER NONE EFF OPINC INTBEAR T1RATIO LLP LIQ LOANS ROA 
EY    1.000              
DT -0.160   1.000             
PWC -0.160 -0.240**  1.000            
KPMG -0.126 -0.189* -0.188*  1.000           
OTHER -0.120 -0.179* -0.179* -0.141  1.000          
NONE -0.138 -0.206** -0.206** -0.162 -0.154  1.000         
EFF -0.022 -0.152* -0.118 -0.069  0.125  0.203**  1.000        
OPINC  0.095  0.393*** -0.148*  0.041 -0.095 -0.265*** -0.188***  1.000       
INTBEAR -0.101 -0.052 -0.017 -0.009  0.073  0.272***  0.249*** -0.217***  1.000      
T1RATIO -0.171** -0.047 -0.003 -0.078  0.071  0.008 -0.049 -0.230*** -0.051  1.000     
LLP  0.036  0.229*** -0.068  0.103 -0.093 -0.140 -0.018  0.267***  0.073 -0.085  1.000    
LIQ -0.080  0.042 -0.042  0.026  0.034 -0.020  0.131* -0.206***  0.310***  0.159**  0.346*** 1.000   
LOANS -0.011  0.089 -0.012  0.095  0.000 -0.164*  0.014 -0.045  0.247***  0.053  0.503*** 0.501*** 1.000  
ROA  0.012  0.084  0.080 -0.112  0.011 -0.155* -0.353*** -0.033 -0.149**  0.309*** -0.112 0.104 0.123* 1.000 
  The table presents the correlation matrix for the covariates used to test H2: 
  EY is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is EY and zero otherwise,  DT is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is Deloitte and zero otherwise 
  PWC is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is PwC and zero otherwise,  KPMG is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is KPMG and zero therwise 
  OTHER  is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is a non-Big4 and zero otherwise,  
  NONE is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is not audited and zero otherwise 
  EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio /  OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio 
  INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing liabilities to total assets ratio 
  T1RATIO is the financial institution's Tier 1 capital ratio /  LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions 
  LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets  /  LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
  ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio    
   * Significant at 10% level   ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.4 - Logistic regression on Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting (CSRR) – 
H1 
 
 B S.E. 
Wald 
Statistics 
ρ- values 
EFF -.332 .560 .353 .553 
OPINC 39.656 16.703 5.637 .018** 
ROA -8.571 13.581 .398 .528 
INTBEAR 6.874 1.856 13.717 .000*** 
T1RATIO 10.931 6.455 2.868 .090* 
LLP .112 .180 .384 .536 
LOANS .612 .332 3.408 .065* 
LIQ -.113 .175 .418 .518 
Constant -14.456 3.433 17.734 .000*** 
Goodness of  fit test statistics: 
 Χ2 (ρ- value) 
 -2 log likelihood 
 R2 Cox and Snell 
 R2 Nagelkerke 
 Global Classification 
 
60.760 (.000***) 
220.080 
.258 
.345 
73.000 
Reported are the coefficients and p-values of the logistic regression.  
The dependent variable is CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one 
if the financial institutions issues a sustainability report, and zero  
otherwise. The independent variables are defined as follows: 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio   
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio  
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio  
INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing liabilities  to total assets ratio 
T1RATIO is the financial institution's Tier 1 capital ratio  
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions  
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans  
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets  
* Significant at 10% level     
** Significant at 5% level     
*** Significant at 1% level     
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Table 4.5 - Determinants of Financial Services Sector disclosure Index (FSSI)- H2 
 
 B t- values 
EFF .098 .364 
OPINC -5.097 .021** 
ROA 1.978 .361 
INTBEAR .801 .001*** 
T1RATIO -.862 .377 
LLP .042 .126 
LOANS .114 .030** 
LIQ -.126 .000*** 
EY -.130 .098* 
DT -.035 .602 
PWC -.125 .047** 
KPMG .103 .153 
NONE -.521 .000*** 
Constant .230 .675 
   
 
 F stat. 
 R2  
 Mean Tolerance  
 Mean VIF 
  
 
10.937 (.000***) 
.646 
.485 
2.820 
 
 Reported are the coefficients and p-values of the logistic regression.  
 The dependent variable is FSSI, Financial Services sector disclosure index.  
 The FSSI is developed using the sixteen Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)  
 Financial Services Sector disclosures indicators.      
 The independent variables are defined as follows: 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio    
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio    
INTBEAR is the financial institution's other interest bearing liabilities to total assets ratio   
T1RATIO is the financial institution's Tier 1 capital ratio    
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions    
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans 
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets    
EY is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is EY and zero otherwise    
DT is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is Deloitte and zero otherwise       
PWC is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is PwC and zero otherwise       
KPMG is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is KPMG and zero therwise       
NONE is a dummy variable set to one when the CSR report is not audited and zero otherwise       
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Chapter 5 - Complaints management and bank risk profile 
5.1 Introduction 
Complaints management is essential for successful businesses as it may affect 
the company‘s relationship with customers, showing the level of a company‘s 
customer orientation (Chebat et al., 2011; Estelami, 2003). If companies 
respond satisfactorily to customers, the complaining customer may become 
loyal. Conversely, an ineffective response can frustrate customers and drive 
them to leave (Hultén, 2012). 
The banking industry must appropriately manage customer complaints for 
achieving customer satisfaction and retention. Manrai and Manrai (2007) 
suggest that dissatisfaction is one of the main reasons why customers switch 
banks. When customers feel banks do not properly address their complaints, 
they file complaints with the regulatory body, constituting a third-party 
complaint according to Singh‘s (1988) classification.  
Baker et al. (2013) find that customers experiencing negative emotions with a 
service failure usually respond non-verbally and may file a third party 
complaint. Then, the FI can appear in a public complaint report that the agency 
issues. This fact will affect future profits of the FI because reputation will 
decrease (Rose & Thomsen, 2004).  
This study contributes to literature by investigating complaints management in 
the Spanish FI and by analyzing the link between responsiveness to customers‘ 
complaints and FI‘s risk profile. The study also provides a novel insight into 
Spanish FI motivations to react proactively or reactively to customers‘ 
complaints.  
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5.2 Theoretical framework 
5.2.1 The Bank of Spain´s Complaints Service 
The Bank of Spain (Banco de España, BE), the Spanish banking regulator 
protecting FI customers, publishes information on customers‘ complaints to 
increase financial sector transparency.  Users must file the complaint directly 
with the FI‘s Complaints Service (CS) or Ombudsman. If FI does not reply 
within two months or replies negatively, the user can file the complaint with 
the BE‘s CS.  
Reports of the BE‘s CS are not binding for FIs, so they can: a) Ignore the 
decision; b) be proactive and amend the error before the BE issues the report; 
or c) be reactive and rectify after the report issuance.  If the FI takes remedial 
actions during that process, the BE closes the file.    
5.2.2 Company risk profile and corporate reputation 
Reputation risk management, including managing costumers‘ complaints, is 
inseparable from other organizational processes management (Hutton et al., 
2001). This study main contribution is the connection between the 
responsiveness to customer complaints and FIs‘ risk profile. The risk areas that 
CAMELS rating (OCC, 2013) covers, namely capital risk level, assets quality, 
managerial skills, earnings and profitability level, liquidity risk level, and 
sensitivity to market risk highly determine FIs attitude towards customer 
complaints.  
The BE supervisory objective is to determine and monitor the risk profile of 
each FI, and adopts corrective measures if necessary. The BE uses Supervision 
of the Banking Activity by Risk Approach methodology, which follows the 
CAMELS rating system. In Bangladesh, supervising financial sector risk 
management also comprises corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Bangladesh 
Bank, 2011). 
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The level of exposure to reputational risk depends on the adequacy of the 
internal risk management process (BIS, 2009). Thus, this study poses the 
following hypotheses the FI attitude towards customer complaints and its risk 
profile: 
H1: The FI proactive attitude towards error amendment does not depend on 
bank risk factors. 
H2: The FI reactive attitude towards error rectification does not depend on 
bank risk factors. 
5.3 Empirical Research Design 
5.3.1 Data sources, sample selection and methodology 
The sample includes the Spanish depositary institutions that the BE regulates 
with available public information from 2005 to 2012 receiving more than 
fifteen reports in favor of its customers in the yearly report that the BE‘s CS 
issues (the cut-off number that regulator uses to include a FI in the report). The 
years of booming economy and the deep financial crisis starting in 2008 in 
Spain make this period especially interesting (Suarez, 2011).  
Financial statements data comes from Orbis database. The sample comprises 
79 firm-years, including 63 commercial banks and 16 savings institutions.  
This study tests H1 and H2 using a multiple regression model. For H1, the 
dependent variable AMEND is the ratio of the number of amendments (before 
the CS‘s report issuance) to the number of total reports and amendments. This 
ratio shows the FI‘s proactive attitude towards customers‘ complaints.  
For H2, the dependent variable RECTIF is the ratio of the number of 
rectifications (done after the CS‘s report issuance) to the number of total 
reports favoring customers. This ratio shows FI‘s reactive attitude towards 
customers‘ complaints.  
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5.3.2 CAMELS measurement and variables selection 
Models‘ experimental variables come from prior studies that identify proxies 
for the different risk areas that CAMELS rating system covers (Jin et al., 2013, 
Kerstein & Kozberg, 2013).  
To proxy for capital adequacy, this study uses the capitalization ratio consisting 
of total equity to total assets (CAPRATIO). Provision for loan losses (PLL) 
captures asset quality by measuring the change in the allowance for loan losses 
on each period. The efficiency ratio (EFF) (cost to income) proxies for 
management skills and for bank operations complexity (Fields et al., 2004). 
This study also includes corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) as a 
management skills proxy. The ratio of operating income to total assets serves 
as an earnings and profitability proxy (OPINC). Operating profit captures the 
effect of the transactions close to the firm‘s business on the net profit (Fields et 
al., 2004). Following de Claro (2013) the ratio return on equity (ROE) is a 
proxy for earnings and profitability. This study uses total loans (LOANS) as a 
proxy for bank liquidity since the main factors in the financial crisis are a loss 
in liquidity and an increase in loans‘ default risk from interest rate resets. Total 
liquid assets serve as a proxy for liquidity (LIQ). Banks usually grant loans for 
longer terms than the deposits they receive from customers. Consequently, 
interest rate resets affect deposits and this effect reduces the interest rate 
spread. To proxy for this risk, this study uses the level of other interest bearing 
liabilities to total assets (INTBEAR). 
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
The final sample comprises 79 FIs. Data reveal that the mean rectification ratio 
is 25.66% and the mean amendment ratio is 22.01%. Figure 1 shows mean 
ratios‘ decline during the period. The amendment ratio decreases from 26.13% 
in 2005 to 20.27% in 2012 while the rectification ratio decreases from 49.90% 
in 2005 to 17.25% in 2012.  
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INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE 
The number of FIs in the CS‘s yearly report increase from 4 in 2005 to 15 in 
2012. These figures show that the number of FIs receiving more BE‘s 
complaints reports increased during the financial crisis, but as the CS‘s reports 
are not binding, FIs‘ responsiveness is in sharp decline.  
5.4 Results 
Multicollinearity tests show that none of the tolerance levels of the independent 
variables is less than or equal to 0.01 and all VIF values are below 10 (most 
below 5). Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in these models. Table 1 
contains regression models estimation results.  
INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE 
The regression model for H1 has a significant F value. The adjusted R-square 
is 49.30%.  Results indicate that explanatory variables LIQ and CSRR are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Variables EFF and OPINC are positive 
and significant at the 5% level while INTBEAR is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. 
Results reject H1 and indicate that FIs with high efficiency ratio, which are 
highly profitable at the operating level, with high level of liquid assets and 
other interest-bearing liabilities, and that issue a sustainability report are 
usually more proactive and amend its errors before the regulator issues the 
report.  
The regression model for H2 has a significant F value and an adjusted R-square 
of 24.70%. LOANS and CSRR are positive and significant at the 5% level 
while LLP is negative and significant at the 5% level.  
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Results reject H2 and show that FIs with larger credit portfolios, with low loan 
loss provisions booked, or that issue a CSR report are usually more reactive 
and rectify errors after the regulator issues a favorable report for the customer. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This study finds that FIs that usually amend errors have a different risk profile 
from the FIs that usually rectify errors.  
Regarding amendments (AMEND), results show that FIs with higher 
amendment ratio usually issue a CSR report, are inefficient (have large and 
complex structures), have high liquidity, are highly profitable in the banking 
business (charge high fees and interest to clients), and are sensitive to market 
risk. Results reveal a positive relationship of the amendment ratio with 
earnings quality and liquidity. Moreover, sensitivity to market risk of these 
institutions also appears.    
Regarding rectifications (RECTIF), results show that FIs with higher 
rectification ratio usually issue a CSR report, have lower loan loss provisions 
booked, and have larger loan portfolios. These results suggest that FIs‘ reactive 
attitude towards error amendment has a relationship with high quality assets, 
good managerial skills, and concentration of funds in less liquid assets (loans).    
When comparing the risk profile of proactive FIs with those reactive to BE‘s 
reports favoring customers, the results are:  
 Both usually issue a CSR report showing some kind of customer 
orientation.  
 Those amending usually invest funds in more liquid assets than those 
rectifying, suggesting that FIs with larger loan portfolios (less liquid 
assets) give the reason to customers only after the regulator favors 
them. This fact may suggest that a FI with a larger number of customers 
decides not to be proactive to error amendment. 
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 Those amending are profitable and show sensitivity to market risk 
while those rectifying have high quality assets. This result suggests that 
since proactive institutions towards error amendment are profitable, 
they have resources to face potential customer error compensation. 
Additionally, proactive FIs are more dependent on other interest 
bearing liabilities making them more customer-oriented that those less 
leveraged. Finally, FIs with good credit customers usually take care of 
them rectifying their errors. 
 Capital adequacy is not related to neither with error amendment nor 
with error rectification  
Findings shed light on the relationship between FI‘s risk profile and the 
propensity to amend or rectify errors. These results may help regulators to 
understand FIs‘ characteristics that consider the reports that regulators issue 
regarding FIs customers‘ claims and complaints. Results are also useful for 
customers to identify FIs with a higher customer orientation.  
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Figure 5.1 - Evolution of rectifications and amendments in the period 
2005-2012 
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Table 5.1 - Descriptive statistics and hypotheses testing results  
                                 Descriptive statistics  H1: Multiple regression on Amendments (AMEND)  H2: Multiple regression on Rectifications (RECTIF) 
Variable 
#CSRR / Std. Drv.  Beta Std. Error p-value 
 
 Beta Std. Error p-value 
 
Mean                
CSRR  30 -  7.47 2.26 0.00 ***  11.19 4.46 0.01 
**   
EFF 0.60 0.17  0.19 0.08 0.02 **  -0.18 0.16 0.25  
OPINC 0.02 0.01  322.29 120.93 0.01 **  348.96 238.76 0.15  
ROE -0.08 0.78  -0.01 0.02 0.45   -0.02 0.04 0.49  
INTBEAR 0.90 0.04  70.79 36.27 0.05 *  86.55 71.61 0.23  
CAPRATIO 0.06 0.02  1.03 0.67 0.13   -1.40 1.33 0.30  
LLP 13.19 1.79  -0.30 1.56 0.85   -6.94 3.07 0.03 
** 
LOANS 17.99 1.59  0.14 1.68 0.93   6.94 3.31 0.04 
** 
LIQ  15.81 1.84  3.92 0.91 0.00 ***  1.66 1.80 0.36  
Constant  - -  -131.09 42.11 0.00 ***  -106.07 83.14 0.21   
N    79     79    
F Value    9.44 ***    3.85 
***   
Adjusted R2    49.30%        24.70%       
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 Reported are the coefficients and t-stat of the multiple regressions. 
  The dependent variable to test H1 is AMEND or ratio of the number of amendments (done before the Banco de España  
   yearly report issuance)  to the number of total reports and amendments. The dependent variable to test H2 is RECTIF or  
  ratio of the number of rectifications (done after the Banco de España yearly report issuance) to  the number of reports in  
  favor of the claimant. 
  The independent variables definitions are: 
CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise, 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio, OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio, 
ROE is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total equity ratio, INTBEAR is the financial institution's interest bearing  
deposits to total assets ratio, CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio, LLP is the financial institution's natural  
log of loan loss provisions, LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans, LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of 
total liquid assets 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level     
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Chapter 6 - Reputation loss and risk management in the banking 
industry 
6.1 Introduction 
Corporate reputation is an intangible that companies need to maintain because 
it helps them to do business in more favorable terms (Bebbington et al., 2008) 
and has a significant impact on the company value (Casado-Díaz et al, 2009). 
By providing a high quality service to the clients and showing proximity to 
them, companies meet their clients‘ needs and expectations keeping them 
satisfied. The immediate effect of customer satisfaction is a high level of 
corporate reputation (McDonald and Rundle-Thiele, 2008). Recent studies 
have analyzed the effect that corporate social responsibility (CSR) has on 
corporate reputation and find that CSR is used to mitigate reputation risk and 
also that companies with bad reputation tend to get involved in CSR activities 
to improve their public image (Esen, 2013). De la Cuesta-González et al. 
(2006) and Mengze and Wei (2013) argue that CSR is contemplated in the 
bank‘s credit policies and in managing environmental credit risk, so it is part of 
the risk management system of the company. Additionally, reputation levels 
are controlled by the companies through reputation risk management which is 
also part of the risk management system (Bebbington et al., 2008).  This 
concept is also taken by The Bank for International Settlements who argues 
that reputational risk depends on the adequacy of the financial institution‘s 
internal risk management process (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009). 
Under a modern integrated risk management approach, one should expect no 
reputation damage derived from an adequate risk management policy. Hence, 
in this paper we argue that an appropriate risk management system (following 
the CAMELS approach) (see Kerstein and Kozbeg, 2013; Jin et al, 2011, Jin et 
al., 2013a, Jin et al., 2013b) and also sustainability reporting as a tool for 
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reputation risk management of the company (McDonald et Rundle-Thiele, 
2008; Bebbington et al.,2008; Sierra-García et al, 2013) will imply lower 
reputation loss, or in other words, lower propensity to be signaled by the 
banking regulator as one of the top-ten complaint-receivers. Our empirical 
research is conducted on a sample of Spanish banks supervised by the Banco 
de España (BE) between 2005 and 2012. The period under study is of special 
interest because it covers years of a booming economy and a sudden change in 
2008 to a deep financial crisis in Spain (McAleer et al., 2009; Climent, 2013). 
The total sample of 685 firm-years includes banks, saving institutions and 
credit unions. 
Our results indicate that financial institutions that are inefficient and issue a 
CSR report will probably be included in the group of financial institutions that 
receive the higher number of claims and complaints in the system. We also find 
that high profitable companies in the banking-related business and with higher 
return on equity will be included in the same group. This is not the case for the 
financial institutions with higher level of return on assets. Finally, our results 
show that companies with higher amount of loans granted, higher level of 
liquid assets and lower capital ratio will receive a larger number of claims and 
complaints.   
Our research explains the link between risk management and customer 
dissatisfaction. Note that greater attention is increasingly being paid by 
consumers to this kind of ―watch lists‖ and reputation loss might be regained if 
a better risk management methodology is implemented by the institution. 
Our study is pioneer in this area of research in the banking industry and opens 
up new directions for future research. For instance, it could be interesting to 
find out how the different type of risks relate to the type of claims and 
complaints customers file against a financial institution and how the change in 
the level of each type of risks through time impacts on the reputation a 
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company has in the market. 
After this introduction that highlights the interests of research, the remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the theoretical 
framework analyzing customer satisfaction, risk management and corporate 
reputation. The third section of this paper explains the empirical research, the 
sample, the methodology and the analysis of the results obtained. Finally, we 
present the conclusions of this research.  
6.2 Theoretical Framework 
6.2.1 Customer satisfaction and corporate reputation 
Prior studies suggest that customer dissatisfaction is one of the main reasons 
why customers switch banks (Manrai and Manrai, 2007). Considering that 
banks provide services to a wide range and number of customers, the 
probability of customer dissatisfaction is relatively high so banks make a 
significant effort to manage clients‘ complaints through an efficient customer 
affairs department (Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1988). When customers feel like 
their complaints are not properly addressed by the banking institution, they file 
complaints to the regulatory body and this constitutes a third-party complaint 
according to Singh‘s (1988) classification. These types of complaints are not 
desirable for financial institutions as they could result in significant legal costs, 
regulatory intervention and reputation loss (Tipper, 1997).  
In a study by Chakrabarty (2006), four factors that determine customer 
satisfaction were identified amongst more than 12.000 UK retail banking 
customers and they were, in order of importance: in-branch satisfaction 
(quality of in-branch service), economic satisfaction (related to interest and 
fees charged by the bank), remote satisfaction (related to the efficiency of the 
bank in dealing with remote enquiries) and ATM satisfaction (quality of the 
ATM network). Another UK study by Zhao et al. (2013) finds that financial 
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market concentration in the post-2000 period increases the number of bank 
customer complaints to the Financial Ombudsman. Similar factors to the ones 
identified by Chakrabarty (2006) are identified by Manrai and Manrai (2007) 
and Pomering and Dolnicar (2006), reinforcing the idea that customer-centric 
initiatives are important to achieve customer satisfaction. This approach links 
customer satisfaction and corporate reputation to the stakeholder theory 
because an efficient management of customer complaints help companies to 
stand closer to their stakeholders and many of the determinants of corporate 
reputation are related to the ability of the company to satisfy the customers‘ 
needs and expectations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
 If companies fail to do that, customers will file a third-party complaint with a 
regulatory agency and the financial institution runs the risk of being included in 
a complaint report issued by the agency. This fact will impact on future profits 
of the financial institution because its reputation will be impaired (Rose and 
Thomsen, 2004).  
Considering the findings of the studies mentioned above, customer 
dissatisfaction leads to reputation loss. Fombrun et al. (2000) argues that 
reputational capital is at risk every day because the interaction of the 
organization and the stakeholders are exposed to many risks such as financial, 
compliance, strategic and operational risks. Additionaly, other risks related to 
social and environmental issues could also impact on company reputation 
(Rayner, 2001). Following this rationale, there are a few models that 
summarize the determinants of corporate reputation and the most used are the 
Most Admired Companies List (MACL) prepared by the Fortune Magazine, 
the Reputation Quotient (RQ) (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004), Corporate 
Personality Scale (Davies et al., 2003) and the Stakeholder Performance 
Indicator and Relationship Improvement Tool (SPIRIT) (MacMillan et al., 
2004).  
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Amongst the determinants of reputation included in these models, the 
following can be considered more related to the banking sector:  financial 
performance, use of corporate assets, long-term investment value, social 
responsibility, quality of products and services, quality of management and 
advocacy and retention of stakeholders towards a business.  
In the light of prior research in the corporate reputation field and under a 
modern integrated risk management approach, reputation damage should be 
avoided by means of an adequate risk management policy. 
6.2.2 Risk management and Corporate Reputation 
Reputation risk management cannot be separated from the management of 
other organizational processes (Hutton et al., 2001) and as stated by Power 
(2004, p. 61), “while organizations can do much themselves to mitigate 
reputational risks, they remain hostage to the institutional environment in 
which they operate”.  Therefore, customer satisfaction and reputation issues 
should be included in the risk management programs in the financial sector. 
The side effects of reputation loss are analyzed by Gillet et al. (2010) and they 
argue that financial scandals do not only impact on the financial institution‘s 
profit and loss account but also put the business continuity at risk.  
Recent studies have explained the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate reputation (Esen, 2013). Due to the fact that 
CSR activities have a positive effect on the company image and reputation, 
companies are increasingly getting involved in CSR activities (Lai et al., 2010). 
Moreover, Yoon et al. (2006) argue that companies with bad reputation engage 
in CSR activities in order to improve it.  
The novelty of our study is the connection we draw between the level of risk a 
financial institution has and its reputation. We argue that the risk areas covered 
by the CAMELS rating, namely the level of capital risk, the quality of assets, 
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managerial skills, the level of earnings and profitability, the level of liquidity 
risk and the sensitivity to market risk are determinants of customer satisfaction 
and corporate reputation. The CAMELS rating system is commonly used by 
regulators to assess the strength of financial institutions and to evaluate the 
level of the risks mentioned above (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
2013). 
The link between corporate risk and reputation can also be seen from the 
marketing perspective through the concept of perceived risk. This concept 
refers to the uncertainty that customers have about the services provided by the 
companies and it is also viewed as the composite of several risks such as 
financial risk, time risk, performance risk, psychological risk and social risk 
(Johnson et al., 2008). Satisfaction and perceived risk share the common 
influence of consumption emotions as it is shown in Chaudhuri (1997) where a 
strong relationship between risk perceptions and negative consumption 
emotions was found.  
In the document ―Enhancements to the Basel II framework‖ issued by The 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) it is clearly stated that the level of 
exposure to reputational risk depends on the adequacy of the internal risk 
management process (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009, p.19) 
Additionally, the BIS recommends in the document mentioned above that “in 
order to avoid reputational damages and to maintain market confidence, a 
bank should develop methodologies to measure as precisely as possible the 
effect of reputational risk in terms of other risk types (eg credit, liquidity, 
market or operational risk) to which it may be exposed” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2009, p.20). 
This suggests the following null hypothesis about the bank reputation and its 
risk level: 
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H1: The bank reputation does not depend on bank risk factors such as capital 
risk, the quality of assets, managerial skills, the level of earnings and 
profitability, the level of liquidity risk, the sensitivity to market risk and also, 
on the issuance of a sustainability report. 
6.3 Research Design 
6.3.1 Empirical model 
Our hypothesis is tested using a logistic regression model on corporate 
reputation which is estimated on Spanish depositary institutions regulated by 
the Banco de España (the Spanish regulator) with available public information 
from 2005 through 2012.  
In order to classify the banks according to their reputation, we use the Annual 
Complaints Service Report issued by the Banco de España through its 
Complaints Services. This report includes statistical data related to the 
complaints the financial services customers file against the financial 
institutions annually. These reports are available in the website of Banco de 
España (Banco de España, 2012). Kerstein and Kozberg (2013) use 
enforcement actions taken by the US Federal Reserve, the US Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the US Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
to proxy for managerial skills that can also be related to corporate reputation.  
Based on the information published by the Banco de España regarding claims 
and complaints filed by financial institutions‘ customers, we test the hypothesis 
using the dummy variable reputation loss (RL) which is coded one if the 
financial institution is among the top ten companies that received the largest 
number of claims and complaint during the year and zero otherwise. 
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6.3.2 CAMELS measurement and variables selection 
The experimental variables of the models are taken from prior studies that have 
identified proxies for the different risk areas covered by the CAMELS rating 
system (Martínez-Campillo et al., 2013; de Claro, 2013; Kerstein and Kozberg, 
2013; Jin et al., 2013a, Jin et al., 2013b; Jin et al., 2011 and Fields et al., 2004).  
To capture the capital adequacy we use the capitalization ratio (CAPRATIO) 
which is defined as total equity to total assets (Jin et al., 2013a, Jin et al., 
2013b; Jin et al., 2011).  
Provision for loan losses (PLL) is used to capture asset quality as this measure 
will capture the change in the allowance for loan losses in the current period. 
The higher the PLL the lower the asset quality. It can also be the case that 
companies with higher PLL are conservative and record provision for doubtful 
debtors more timely than other financial institutions (Jin et al., 2011; Kerstein 
and Kozberg, 2013).  
We use the efficiency ratio (EFF) defined as cost to income to proxy for 
management skills. The higher the efficiency ratio (i.e., the lower the 
efficiency for the bank), the more difficult it is for the bank to earn a profit and 
thus, to increase its capital. A high efficiency ratio means a company needs to 
incur in high cost to get a certain income level. These costs are usually related 
to non-interest expenses such as personnel, branches, and data processing 
expenses that are associated with large volumes of transactions accounts and 
with a geographically diverse branch system. Considering this, a high 
efficiency ratio could also be used as a proxy for the complexity of bank 
operations (Fields et al., 2004). To capture the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and corporate reputation (Esen, 2013) we use the dummy 
variable (CSRR) which is set to one when the financial institution issues a CSR 
report and zero otherwise. 
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To proxy for earnings and profitability we use the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (OPINC). Operating profit captures the impact on net profit of the 
transactions that are closely related to the business of the firm (Fields et al., 
2004). Following de Claro (2013) and Martínez-Campillo (2013) we also use 
the ratios Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) as proxies for 
earnings and profitability.  
We use total loans (LOANS) as a proxy for bank liquidity as the main factor in 
the financial crisis is a loss in liquidity and an increase in the default risk of 
loans from interest rate resets (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). We also use total 
liquid assets as a proxy for liquidity (LIQ). 
Usually banks tend to grant loans for longer terms than the deposits they 
received from customers. As a consequence, interest rate resets will impact 
deposits in first instance and this will reduce the interest rate spread. To proxy 
for this risk we use the level of interest bearing liabilities to total assets 
(INTBEAR) (Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). According to de Claro (2013) a 
bank with liquidity problems will increase the interest rate to retain the level of 
deposits or to capture new deposits in the market. The higher this ratio the 
higher the sensitivity of the financial institutions to the impact of liquidity 
issues on interest expense and hence in the firm profitability.  
Finally, we use total assets (SIZE) to proxy for the company size (Roberts, 
1992; Khan, 2010; Sierra et al., 2013). 
6.3.3 Data sources and sample selection 
The sample includes the Spanish depositary institutions regulated by the Banco 
de España (the Spanish regulator) with available public information from 2005 
through 2012.  
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The period under study is of special interest because it covers years of a 
booming economy and a sudden change in 2008 to a deep financial crisis in 
Spain (see, for instance, Álvarez, 2008; Alonso y Furio, 2011; Maudos, 2011).  
Data are collected from the Orbis Database. A total of 685 firm-years are 
included in the sample- of which 202 belong to commercial banks and 483 to 
savings institutions.  
 
Table 6.1 provides the distribution of sample firms by year. The sample by 
year consists of 80 financial institutions (FI) for 2005, 84 FI for 2006, 80 FI for 
2007, 84 FI for 2008, 97 FI for 2009, 93 FI for 2010, 92 FI for 2011 and 75 FI 
for 2012.  
INSERT TABLE 6.1 HERE 
The data reveal that the average capital ratio of the sample went down from 9.9 
in 2005 to 7.74 in 2012, the ROE down from 10.23 to -28.84 and ROA from 
0.94 to -0.72. The average total loans in the sample increased from USD 
15.482 million to USD 34.028, showing a 120% increase, while the average 
loan loss provisions increased a 1.850%, going up from USD 59 million to 
USD 1.150 million. The main reason for the increase in the average loan loss 
provision during 2012 is the significant loan loss provision booked by Banco 
Santander and Banco Financiero y de Ahorros SA. While the first recorded on 
average USD 9.000 million and the second USD 2.770 million annually for the 
period 2005-2011, they booked USD 24.473 million and USD 23.257 million 
respectively in 2012. 
Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample for the period 
2005-2012. 
INSERT TABLE 6.2 HERE 
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6.4 Results 
In Table 6.3 we present the results of the T-test of equality of means and the 
contingency table on the key attributes of the financial institutions that have 
good and bad reputation. Significant differences were found among both 
groups of institutions. This is the case for OPINC, INTBEAR, CAPRATIO, 
LLP, SIZE, LOANS and LIQ. We did not find a significant difference between 
the groups with good and bad reputation in the case of EFF, ROE and ROA. 
For the CSRR variable we run a contingency table to illustrate whether being a 
CSR report issuer explains the reputation of the financial institutions and the 
result is significant at 1% level.  
INSERT TABLE 6.3 HERE 
The reputation loss (RL) logistic model estimation results are presented in 
Table 6.4. The regression model has a significant Chi-square. Note that the 
goodness of fit of our model is adequate, as the R-square Nagelkerke shows 
that the model explains 80.2% of the variability. The global classification is 
96.6% which is very high. 
The results indicate that financial institutions that issue a CSR report will 
probably be included in the group of financial institutions that receive the 
higher number of claims and complaints in the system. These results show, in 
line with Esen (2013), that depositary institutions with bad reputation tend to 
issue a CSR report in an attempt to improve their public image among the 
stakeholders. We also find that companies with higher level of liquid assets, 
higher amount of loans granted and lower capital ratio (meaning that higher 
volume of deposits are financing the financial institution‘s assets) will receive 
a larger number of claims and complaints. Finally, our results show that high 
profitable companies in the banking-related business, with high efficiency ratio 
(meaning low efficiency indeed as per ratio construction- i.e. cost to income) 
and with higher return on equity will be included in the same group. This is not 
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the case for the financial institutions with higher level of return on assets. 
Regarding size, the results show that not necessarily the big financial 
institutions are the ones with bad reputation.  
The results as a whole indicate that financial institutions with large and 
complex business structures, with significant amounts of loans and liquid 
assets booked  and that are highly profitable in the banking business are at risk 
of losing reputation if they are not able to have an appropriate risk management 
system. 
INSERT TABLE 6.4 HERE 
Considering that our sample includes a period of a booming economy (from 
2005 to 2008) and a period of financial crisis (from 2009 to 2012), we run the 
regression model in these two subsamples. The untabulated results indicate that 
in the period of healthy economy the findings are in line with the results for the 
full sample for the variables CSRR, LIQ, OPINC, SIZE, CAPRATIO. All the 
variables are significant at 5% level. For the period of crisis, only the variables 
CSRR and LIQ are significant at 5% and 10% level respectively. Both 
variables keep the sign identified in the full sample. These results imply that 
the ratio of operating income to total assets (OPINC), total assets (SIZE) and 
the capital ratio (CAPRATIO) are not related to the reputation level of 
financial institutions in the financial crisis period. Total loans (LOANS), the 
efficiency ratio (EFF) and the profitability ratios ROA and ROE explain the 
reputation level of financial institutions only for the full sample.  
6.5 Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact that risk management has on corporate 
reputation in the Spanish financial sector. The Spanish market is of special 
interest in the years under study because it covers a period that went from a 
healthy economy to a deep financial crisis (2005-2012). In addition, Spain is a 
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leading country regarding CSR reporting (see Garcia-Benau et al, 2013; Sierra-
García et al., 2013, Zorio et al, 2012). 
Under the theory that customer dissatisfaction could lead the client to file a 
complaint with a regulatory agency against the financial institution, banks 
incorporate reputation risk management in their risk management system. An 
efficient risk management system and the involvement of the institutions in 
CSR activities will help the company to improve corporate reputation. The 
purpose of this paper is to look into their connections with bank risk 
management under the CAMELS multifaceted risk approach.  
Our results, based on disclosures available for a sample of Spanish depositary 
financial institutions for the period 2005-2012, show that institutions that are in 
a weak position regarding capital adequacy have lower reputation than 
institutions with higher capitalization levels.  Regarding assets quality, the 
results show no significant relationship between the provision for loan losses 
and reputation. As a high loan loss provision impacts on the capital ratio, this 
could imply that low quality loans lead to customer dissatisfaction through a 
low capital ratio, but assets quality per se is not a determinant of customer 
satisfaction.   
The efficiency ratio (cost to income ratio) and the involvement of the 
institutions in CSR reporting were used to find the relationship between 
management skills with reputation and the results show that financial 
institutions that are inefficient and that issue a CSR report tend to have lower 
reputation. Institutions with high efficiency ratio have a complex structure and 
need to incur in high costs to get a certain income level. This large and 
complex structure, if not managed efficiently to cope with clients‘ 
expectations, may lead to customer dissatisfaction. It seems that if this is the 
case, companies will then get involved in CSR activities to improve their 
public image through sustainability reporting. 
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An interesting result is that institutions that are highly profitable in the banking 
business (measured by the ratio operating income to total assets) have low 
reputation. This could imply that financial institutions that get significant rent 
from their clients through high fees, commissions and interest rates provoke 
dissatisfaction among their clients, and this could result in the customer 
switching bank. Our results also show that banks with smaller assets and lower 
return on assets have lower reputation. This shows that smaller financial 
institutions tend to have bad reputation and the same happens when the 
institution gets low ROA. Smaller institutions usually have smaller structures 
that make it difficult to satisfy a large number of clients and this creates 
dissatisfaction. Also, smaller institutions find it difficult to be profitable. 
Finally financial institutions with higher levels of capital and lower return on 
equity show higher reputation, implying that institutions with higher capital 
adequacy are regarded by customers as stable and trustworthy, and when there 
are two institutions with the same level of net income, the one with higher 
capital and better reputation gets a lower return on equity (ROE).  
Finally, the results also show that financial institutions with larger credit 
portfolios and that have higher amounts of liquid assets booked have lower 
reputation. A possible explanation is that the larger the credit portfolio, the 
larger the number of customers, making it more probable to get some kind of 
customer dissatisfaction. An intriguing result is that a higher volume of liquid 
assets leads to a lower reputation. From the depositors‘ point of view, this 
should be seen as a positive signal because the bank will have the sufficient 
liquidity to refund the deposits and from the borrower point of view this could 
be seen as the bank being risk averse and granting lower loans that the loans 
they are able to grant, causing dissatisfaction in the borrower. Our results show 
no significant connection between sensitivity to market risk and reputation 
loss. 
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Our findings contribute to the literature and regulatory debate on the 
relationship between client satisfaction, corporate reputation, CSR and risk 
management in the financial sector. In fact, the results obtained shed some light 
on the risk profile of the financial institutions that have lower reputation in the 
Spanish financial sector.  
We also add to the extant literature on corporate reputation because we find 
reputation determinants related to the risk profile of a company and not to the 
service or product quality it commercialize in the market. 
Finally, we consider our results could help regulators to understand the role 
that reputation has in the financial sector and could be useful to evaluate 
whether customer satisfaction and financial institution reputation should be 
assessed in the CAMELS rating system. 
Our study is pioneer in this area of research in the banking industry and opens 
up new directions for future research. For instance, it could be most interesting 
to find out how the different type of risks relate to the type of claims and 
complaints (e.g., related to active or passive products) customers file against a 
financial institution and how the change in the level of each type of risk 
through time impacts on the reputation a financial institution has in the market. 
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Table 6.1 – Sample descriptive statistics for the sample by year 
Year Observations Descriptive 
Capital/Total 
Assets 
Cost to 
Income 
Ratio % 
Operating 
Income / 
Total assets 
ROE using 
P/L before 
tax % 
ROA using 
P/L before 
tax %  
Loans 
Million 
USD 
Liquid Assets 
Million USD 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
Million USD  
Int bearing 
deposits / 
Total assets 
Total assets 
Million 
USD 
2005 80 Min 1.88 5.39 0.00 -31.79 -2.54 12.50 1.65 0.12 0.67 29.61 
  Max 32.78 192.28 0.10 30.52 5.49 514,149.11 192,587.55 2,062.01 0.98 954,506.90 
  Media 9.90 62.03 0.03 10.23 0.94 15,482.30 4,358.76 59.23 0.88 26,048.38 
2006 84 Min 1.05 1.91 0.00 1.46 0.11 13.04 5.79 0.13 0.71 38.59 
  Max 26.33 90.37 0.09 153.04 8.85 689,247.88 216,564.47 3,271.30 0.99 1,098,212.46 
  Media 8.66 55.71 0.03 14.41 1.12 20,130.59 5,188.88 91.30 0.89 30,684.55 
2007 80 Min 1.48 18.81 0.00 -5.70 -0.30 15.02 2.80 0.15 0.69 39.89 
  Max 26.66 90.63 0.07 31.90 4.37 832,410.33 228,537.23 5,146.61 0.98 1,343,901.54 
  Media 8.88 52.88 0.03 13.16 1.08 27,403.99 6,437.13 141.55 0.89 41,749.35 
2008 84 Min 2.34 10.67 0.00 -2.65 -0.70 32.43 2.51 0.14 0.70 41.19 
  Max 26.47 111.00 0.06 25.93 3.56 865,164.35 261,503.08 8,300.65 0.97 1,460,771.58 
  Media 8.83 54.53 0.03 9.99 0.81 31,843.97 6,167.78 250.28 0.89 48,370.48 
2009 97 Min 1.21 1.87 0.00 -234.71 -2.85 17.72 0.43 0.14 0.69 50.13 
  Max 27.28 111.20 0.09 23.94 3.37 963,175.34 289,697.54 15,973.38 0.97 1,599,829.24 
  Media 9.14 53.20 0.03 3.61 0.51 29,479.10 5,946.78 395.98 0.89 45,864.72 
2010 93 Min 1.80 7.97 0.00 -2.20 -0.18 16.84 1.07 0.13 0.64 46.39 
  Max 26.81 100.00 0.10 25.43 2.88 959,876.91 325,401.08 13,725.80 0.98 1,627,674.79 
  Media 8.50 61.43 0.03 5.85 0.49 33,428.11 6,071.73 359.08 0.89 51,758.88 
2011 92 Min 0.88 22.35 0.00 -179.07 -3.65 4.92 0.13 0.13 0.65 35.45 
  Max 25.56 111.26 0.06 14.10 3.26 946,697.47 294,038.78 14,284.66 0.98 1,619,349.51 
  Media 8.42 64.27 0.02 -0.26 0.22 33,421.31 5,946.19 410.51 0.90 53,467.07 
2012 75 Min 1.01 -15.71 0.00 -804.07 -13.43 16.36 1.58 0.13 0.83 47.50 
  Max 16.04 320.00 0.04 10.12 1.10 924,905.96 349,121.14 24,473.55 0.98 1,675,147.12 
  Media 7.74 67.09 0.02 -28.84 -0.72 34,028.37 7,959.94 1,149.77 0.90 59,875.96 
Total 685                       
Source: Orbis database 
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Table 6.2 – Sample descriptive statistics for the full sample 
 
 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Loan Loss Provisions th USD 685 117.97 24,473,549.73 351,180.07 1,833,519.37 
Cost to Income Ratio % 685 -15.71 320.00 58.79 21.58 
Total assets th USD 685 29,610.58 1,675,147,123.39 44,870,893.63 180,505,585.79 
Operating Income / Total assets  685 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.01 
ROE using P/L before tax % 685 -804.07 153.04 3.84 44.00 
ROA using P/L before tax % 685 -13.43 8.85 0.56 1.20 
Loans th USD 685 4,916.82 963,175,340.03 28,309,404.06 107,624,304.47 
Liquid Assets th USD 685 129.39 349,121,143.93 5,990,049.78 31,860,702.30 
Int bearing deposits / Total assets  685 0.64 0.99 0.89 0.05 
Equity / Total assets % 685 0.88 32.78 8.77 4.07 
Source: Orbis database      
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Table 6.3 –T-test for equality of means and contingency table – RL 
 
 % RL=1 RL=0 RL=1 Total 
Pearson Chi- square Fisher´s Exact Test 
Value 
Asym. Sig.  
 (2- sided) 
Exact. Sig.  
 (2- sided) 
Exact. Sig.   
(1- sided) 
CSRR 
0 3.15% 614 20 634 
161.779 .000*** .000*** .000*** 
1 49.02% 26 25 51 
 
    RL=0 RL=1 t-Statistics a Sig. (2-tailed) t-Statistics b Sig. (2-tailed) 
EFF Mean 58.981 56.088 .869 .385 1.074 .288 
Std. Deviation 21.861 17.119     
OPINC Mean .028 .031 -1.902 .058* -1.406 .166 
Std. Deviation .010 .014     
ROE Mean 4.282 -2.488 .998 .319 .480 .633 
Std. Deviation 38.217 94.000     
ROA Mean .582 .291 1.570 .117 .850 .400 
Std. Deviation 1.088 2.275     
INTBEAR Mean .889 .910 -2.989 .003*** -4.497 .000*** 
Std. Deviation .047 .029     
CAPRATIO Mean 8.993 5.528 5.646 .000*** 11.956 .000*** 
Std. Deviation 4.092 1.613     
LLP Mean 8.503 13.619 -13.650 .000*** -14.653 .000*** 
Std. Deviation 2.442 2.251     
SIZE Mean 14.158 18.890 -13778.000 .000*** -17.544 .000*** 
Std. Deviation 2.258 1.707     
LOANS Mean 13.726 18.392 -13.211 .000*** -15.714 .000*** 
Std. Deviation 2.315 1.895     
LIQ Mean 11.881 16.856 -15.862 .000*** -18.511 .000*** 
Std. Deviation 2.054 1.719         
Source: Orbis database       
RL is a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions is included in the top ten complaints receiver in the  
Banco de España yearly report, and zero otherwise     
CSSR is a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio    
ROE is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total equity ratio    
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio    
INTBEAR is the financial institution's interest bearing depostis to total assets ratio   
CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio    
LLP is the financial institution's natutral log of loan loss provisions    
SIZE is the financial institution's natutral log of total assets     
LOANS is the financial institution's natutral log of total loans    
LIQ is the financial institution's natutral log of total liquid assets    
a Equal variances assumed       
b Equal variances not assumed       
* Significant at 10% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
*** Significant at 1% level       
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Table 6.4 - Logistic regression on Reputation Loss (RL) 
 
 B S.E. 
Wald 
Statistics 
ρ- values 
CSR 3.119 .823 14.368 .000*** 
EFF .024 .013 3.390 .066* 
OPINC 155.600 45.857 11.513  .001*** 
ROE .022 .012 3.220  .073* 
ROA -1.523 .626 5.915 .015** 
INTBEAR 1.102 12.619 .008 .930 
CAPRATIO -.582 .305 3.638  .056* 
LLP -.443 .448 .980 .322 
SIZE -2.753 1.329 4.294 .038** 
LOANS 1.834 .785 5.466 .019** 
LIQ 3.173 .807 15.460 .000*** 
Goodness of  fit test statistics: 
 Χ2 (ρ- value) 
 -2 log likelihood 
 R2 Cox and Snell 
 R2 Nagelkerke 
 Global Classification 
 
252.261 (.000***) 
79.764 
.308 
.802 
96.6 
Reported are the coefficients and p-values of the logistic regression.  
 The dependent variable is RL is a dummy variable that equals one if  
  the financial institutions is  included in the top ten complaints receiver  
  in the Banco de España yearly report, and zero otherwise  
 The independent variables are defined as follows: 
CSRR, a dummy variable that equals one if the financial institutions  
issues a sustainability report, and zero otherwise 
EFF is the financial institution's cost to income ratio     
OPINC is the financial institution's operating income to total assets ratio    
ROE is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total equity ratio    
ROA is the financial institution's profit and loss before tax to total assets ratio    
INTBEAR is the financial institution's interest bearing deposits to total assets ratio   
CAPRATIO is the financial institution's equity to total assets ratio    
LLP is the financial institution's natural log of loan loss provisions    
SIZE is the financial institution's natural log of total assets     
LOANS is the financial institution's natural log of total loans    
LIQ is the financial institution's natural log of total liquid assets    
* Significant at 10% level       
** Significant at 5% level       
*** Significant at 1% level       
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
The recent global financial crisis revealed that regulators were not addressing 
properly financial services sector risks and complexities. The post-financial 
crisis era brought changes in the monitoring tools used by regulators 
worldwide, and specifically EU-wide stress testing exercises were performed, 
and this translated into changes in the FI risk management systems. As a result 
of the crisis, financial institutions‘ reputation was impaired. So, in order to 
regain customers‘ confidence and improve their reputation, FI got involved in 
socially responsible activities.  
The general objective of this thesis is to analyze how the risk profile of a FI 
relates to: a) the impact regulatory stress test results have on its capital ratio 
and how the FI uses these results to adjust it, b) the propensity a FI has to issue 
a sustainability report and the quality of the information disclosed, c) the FI 
proactive or reactive reaction to the customers‘ complaints and, d) the FI 
reputation. The focus of analysis in this study is mainly the European financial 
services sector during the period 2005-2013.   
The recent changes in the financial services sector reveal the need for research 
to identify the characteristics of the banks that are incorporating the 
information provided by the regulatory stress testing exercise to adapt their risk 
profile and adjust their capital ratio, whether this attitude differs between 
emerging and developed markets, as well as the characteristics of the banks 
that get involved in corporate social responsibility activities to be closer to their 
customers and the characteristics of the banks with higher reputation.  
The need to understand the changes in this new global financial services sector 
is the main motivation of this thesis.  
The results of this study will be useful for regulators, to better understand the 
effect of the new regulatory tools used, how the supervised institutions react to 
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them and subsequently whether to adapt regulations and policies; for financial 
institutions, to understand the usefulness of stress testing as a component of 
their risk management system; for customers, to better understand the behavior 
of the financial institutions to which they trust their savings and finally for 
researchers, to build on the banking research literature and to identify future 
avenues for research. 
The general conclusions of the thesis, which relate to the general objectives, 
can be summarized as follows: 
First conclusion: Financial institutions with low liquidity risk, with high-
quality assets and that are efficient are better prepared to successfully 
overcome the stress tests of the European Union. 
To investigate how banks use the results of stress tests to adjust their risk 
profile and whether the stress tests play an informative and disciplinary role to 
determine the capital structure of banks (Objective 1) we use a sample of 
European Union (EU) banks covered by the 2011 stress test conducted by the 
Euroepan Banking Authority (EBA) with financial data available for the years 
2010, 2011 and 2012. The results show strong evidence that bank with higher 
liquid assets, with low levels of provisions for doubtful accounts and that are 
efficient perform better on the stress tests in the adverse scenario in 2012. 
These findings could be useful for regulators when focusing their efforts on 
supervision of financial institutions. The EBA stress tests are used as 
regulatory tools that help to identify the strength of financial institutions, and 
therefore the financial system as a whole, in a potential crisis scenario. If the 
scenarios designed by the regulator are sufficiently adverse to simulate a 
situation of financial crisis, our results are very useful for the stakeholders of 
the financial system that can identify financial institutions that will be less 
affected by a potential crisis scenario. We can therefore conclude that the 
financial institutions that invest in more liquid assets, which by definition are 
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less risky, with a high quality loan portfolio and that have an efficicient cost 
structure are less affected by a financial crisis. 
The first conclusion of the thesis identifies the risk profile of EU financial 
institutions that receive a less negative impact in a financial crisis. 
Second conclusion: Financial institutions in the European Union use the 
results of stress tests to adjust their capital structure, showing the 
informative role played by stress tests in the region. 
The results of the thesis also provide evidence of capital structure adjustment 
of financial institutions in the European Union through capital increase and 
assets decrease in the year in which the results of the stress tests are disclosed 
(2011) and also we found evidence that banks reverse in 2012 this potentially 
excessive adjustment. Based on these results we conclude that the financial 
institutions of the European Union use the results of stress tests disclosed to 
adjust its capital structure by increasing capital and reducing assets, resulting in 
an increase in its Tier 1 Capital ratio. This shows the tendency of financial 
institutions to create a capital buffer in the year in which the results of stress 
tests are disclosed. We also found that in the year following the year results are 
published, financial institutions reverse the increase in Tier 1 Capital ratio 
shifting their investments to riskier assets. This attitude of financial institutions 
allows us to conclude that the results of stress tests play an informative role to 
financial institutions because they are considered by management to make 
decisions regarding their capital structure and the level of risk assumed. 
The second conclusion of the thesis shows that the financial institutions of the 
European Union use the results of stress tests conducted by the European 
Banking Authority to modify its capital structure, which shows the informative 
role that stress tests play in the region. 
 
  
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
264 
 
 
Third conclusion: Financial institutions in the European Union use the 
results of stress tests to align its current Tier 1 capital ratio with the target 
Tier 1 capital ratio, showing the disciplinary role played by stress tests in 
the region. 
The results also show that banks in the European Union align its current Tier 1 
capital ratio with the target Tier 1 capital ratio after the results of stress tests 
conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) are disclosed. Financial 
institutions rationally align their current capital ratio to the target capital ratio 
over a period of 3 years: financial institutions with current ratio lower than the 
target ratio increase the current ratio, while financial institutions with current 
ratio higher than the target ratio decrease the current ratio. 
This allows us to conclude that the stress tests play a disciplinary role to banks, 
as the results of stress tests published provide useful information to banks and 
are incorporated in the decision-making process. This attitude is rational, since 
banks that are overcapitalized regarding its target capital ratio incur in 
additional costs to maintain the excess of capital, which also is inefficient; 
while financial institutions that are undercapitalized relative to their target 
capital ratio incur in risk of default and are exposed to receive penalties from 
the regulator, and this will also increase the cost of the additional capital 
needed by the bank to meet the minimum regulatory capital requirement. 
Our findings could help regulators to focus their regulatory efforts on banks 
that show risk profiles that tend to receive more negative results in this type of 
stress test and also help to understand the risk profile of banks using risk 
management strategies to modify its capital structure after the results of the 
stress tests are released. 
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The third conclusion of the doctoral thesis show that the stress tests carried out 
by the European Banking Authority play a disciplinary role in the financial 
institutions in the European Union, and that lead them to adjust their current 
capital ratio to its target capital ratio. 
Fourth conclusion: Financial institutions from emerging markets (Latin 
America) adjust its capital ratios differently than financial institutions in 
developed markets (EU) due to higher market opacity. 
To investigate whether financial institutions in emerging markets adjust the 
Tier 1 Capital ratio (T1CR, the risk-weighted capital ratio) differently from the 
total capital ratio (TCR, the book value capital ratio) taking advantage of the 
greater markets opacity in developed markets (Objective 2) using a sample of 
banks in emerging and developed markets with financial data available for the 
period 2008-2013. The sample of emerging market banks includes banks in 
Latin America (LAC), while the sample of developed market banks includes 
banks of the European Union (EU). We found evidence of different capital 
structure adjustment of banks in the EU and in LAC: EU banks adjust their 
T1CR and TCR together while LAC banks adjust them differently. 
As T1CR and TCR are calculated using different set of policies, Basel policies 
and accounting standards respectively, we conclude that LAC banks strictly 
follow these rules to calculate their capital ratios mainly based on the Basel 
rules and on accounting information because there is no other information 
available to consider in the calculation due to the higher market opacity in 
LAC, caused in part by the absence of stress tests on the financial sector. On 
the contrary, EU banks have additional information in a more transparent 
market and adjust their capital ratios in accordance with this additional 
information and not only on the accounting information. We conclude that EU 
financial institutions use TCR and T1CR indistinctly to make decisions about 
its capital structure and the level of risk assumed, while financial institutions in 
LAC use both ratios differently in decision-making process. 
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The fourth conclusion of the doctoral thesis shows that financial institutions in 
emerging markets, which are more opaque markets, adjust differentially the 
capital ratio calculated on the basis of their risk-weighted assets compared to 
the capital ratio calculated on the basis of total assets, while financial 
institutions in developed markets adjust both ratios jointly. 
Fifth conclusion: Financial institutions from emerging markets (Latin 
America) have higher capital ratio than financial institutions from 
developed markets (European Union), but thet are riskier. 
Our results show that banks in Latin America (LAC) are overcapitalized while 
banks in the European Union (EU) are undercapitalized relative to its target 
capital ratio measured either as Tier 1 Capital ratio (T1CR, the risk-weighted 
capital ratio) or total capital ratio (TCR, the book value equity ratio). 
Moreover, the current average level of risk (measured as the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets) in LAC financial institutions (90.10%) is close 
to its target level (91.70%) while in EU the average current risk level (64.10%) 
is above the target (55.40%). 
Based on these results we conclude that financial institutions in LAC have 
capitalization levels above the EU financial institutions capitalization level, yet 
the level of risk assumed by the former is much higher than the level assumed 
by the latter. This conclusion, analyzed in conjunction with the above 
conclusion allows us to understand that the higher risk shifting moral hazard in 
LAC financial institutions lead them to assume greater risk levels than 
financial institutions in the EU, partly due to the higher market opacity in LAC 
and also because the 2008/2009 crisis effect in LAC was not as negative as in 
the EU, and this allowed LAC financial institutions to have faster access to 
capital than the financial institutions in the EU. 
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Stakeholders in the LAC financial sector, especially regulators, could consider 
our findings since the level of capitalization of LAC financial institutions 
relative to EU financial institutions is on average 15% higher, while the level 
of risk is 41% higher in the former relative to the latter. This situation could 
imply that LAC financial institutions are in a weak position to face a financial 
crisis. 
The fifth conclusion of the thesis shows that financial institutions in emerging 
markets have a higher level of capitalization relative to financial institutions in 
developed markets, but they are in a weak position to face a a financial crisis 
due to the higher risk level assumed. 
Sixth conclusion: Financial institutions in the European Union that have 
greater loan portfolio, with higher deposit level and higher profitability 
tend to issue a corporate social responsibility report. 
To investigate the impact of the risk profile of a financial institution on the 
propensity to issue a sustainability report and the propensity to publish a 
sustainability report that contains high quality financial sector CSR specific 
information (Objective 3) we use a sample Banks targeted by the stress tests 
that the EU conducted in 2014 that have available financial information for the 
period 2011-2013. Our results indicate that financial institutions with lower 
capital risk, higher liquidity risk (greater loan portfolio), higher sensitivity to 
market risk and higher profitability in the banking business tend to issue a 
corporate social responsibility report (CSR). 
Based on these results we conclude that financial institutions with a higher loan 
portfolio and a greater number of deposits face greater demands from their 
clients to show a socially responsible attitude due to the higher visibility they 
have pn the markets, which leads them to issue a corporate social responsibility 
report.  
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Additionally, because these financial institutions also have a higher 
profitability level, they have available funds to issue a corporate social 
responsibility report. 
Corporate social responsibility reports are then used by European financial 
institutions with a significant number of customers to meet their requests for 
information, which can be interpreted as a communication strategy that can be 
carried out because they have the funds available to do so, as they are 
profitable financial institutions. 
The sixth conclusion of the thesis identifies the risk profile of financial 
institutions of the European Union that issue a corporate social responsibility 
report. 
Seventh conclusion: Among the financial institutions in the European 
Union that issue a corporate social responsibility report, the ones that  are 
less profitable and get the report assured by a non-Big 4 auditor disclose 
higher quality corporate social responsibility financial sector specific 
information. 
Additionally, the results of the thesis show that among banks that issue a 
corporate social responsibility report (CSR), those with a higher loan portfolio, 
higher level of other interest-bearing liabilities, and lower profitability in the 
banking business, issue a sustainability report that contains highest quality 
CSR financial sector (FS) specific information. When the CSR report is 
assured by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (EY) or the report 
is not assured, the quality of the CSR FS specific information disclosed is of 
lower quality. 
Based on these results we conclude that hiring a higher quality assuror such as 
PwC or EY could be a strategy to reduce transaction costs and serves as a 
protection to disclose lower quality CSR information, which is cheaper to 
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generate. Our findings have important implications for shareholders, investors 
and analysts that can see CSR reports as a vehicle that financial institutions use 
to show an ethical behavior. Stakeholders should be aware that the FI could use 
CSR reporting to improve their reputation and as an opportunity to do more 
business, especially in the aftermath of a financial crisis. The results can be 
considered by regulators to assess whether CSR related activities should be 
included in the CAMELS rating system. 
The seventh conclusion of the thesis identifies the risk profile of financial 
institutions of the European Union that disclose higher quality corporate social 
responsibility financial sector specific information in its corporate social 
responsibility report. 
Eighth conclusion: The Spanish financial institutions with lower loan 
portfolio, with higher profitability level and that issue a CSR report show 
a proactive attitude towards customers’ complaints, while financial 
institutions with higher credit portfolio show a reactive attitude. 
To investigate complaints management in the Spanish financial institutions we 
analyze the relationship between the financial institutions (FIs) risk profile and 
the attitude towards customers‘ complaints (Objective 4). We use a sample that 
includes Spanish financial institutions with available financial information for 
the period 2005-2012. The results show that FIs that issue a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) report, that are inefficient (have large and complex 
structures), have higher liquidity level, are highly profitable in the banking 
business (charge high fees and interest to customers) and are sensitive to 
market risk tend to amend (AMEND). As for the rectifications (RECTIF), the 
results show that IF that issue a CSR report, which have lower provisions for 
doubtful accounts, and have larger loan portfolios tend to rectify their mistakes. 
These results allow us to conclude that financial institutions that have larger 
loan portfolio and of higher quality, rectify the error once the regulator 
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decision favors the customer. Financial institutions that show a socially 
responsible attitude by issuing a corporate social responsibility report tend to 
have this positive attitude towards their clients. 
These results could help regulators to understand the characteristics of FIs that 
take into account the reports on complaints and claims from customers the 
regulator issues. Our findings are also useful for customers to identify FIs with 
greater customer orientation. 
The eighth conclusion of the thesis identifies the risk profile of the Spanish 
financial institutions that have a reactive or proactive attitude towards 
customers‘ claims and complaints. 
Ninth conclusion: The Spanish financial institutions that are inefficient, 
that have an higher capital risk, have higher profitability in the banking 
business, have a larger loans portfolio and that issue corporate social 
responsibility report have lower reputation. 
To investigate the relationship between the bank reputation and its risk profile 
(Objective 5) we use a sample that includes the Spanish financial institutions 
with available financial information for the period 2005-2012. Our results 
show that the institutions that are in a weak capital position, with a larger credir 
portfolio, which are inefficient, that show higher profitability level and issue a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) report have lower reputation. 
These results allow us to conclude that financial institutions with higher equity 
and liquidity risk, which are inefficient but that get higher rent from their 
customers through higher fees, commissions and interest rates tend to cause 
dissatisfaction among them, a situation that could lead customers to switch 
bank. Additionally, the results allow us to conclude that financial institutions 
that issue a CSR report have lower reputation, which means they can use these 
reports as a strategy to improve its reputation. 
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Our findings contribute to the extant literature and policy debate on the 
relationship between customer satisfaction, corporate reputation, CSR and risk 
management in the financial services sector. In fact, the results show the risk 
profile of financial institutions with lower reputation in the Spanish financial 
services sector. Our results could help regulators to understand the role that 
reputation plays in the financial services sector and could be useful in assessing 
whether the customer satisfaction and the reputation of financial institutions 
must be assessed in the CAMELS rating system  
The ninth conclusion of the thesis identifies the risk profile of the Spanish 
financial institutions that have lower reputation. 
The conclusions of the doctoral thesis identify the risk profile of European 
financial institutions that tend to receive a more negative impact in a financial 
crisis, that use the results of the stress tests to adjust its capital structure and as 
this adjustment differs in emerging markets financial institutions as a result of a 
higher market opacity. Additionally, the conclusions identify the risk profile of 
European financial institutions that tend to issue a corporate social 
responsibility report, the risk profile of Spanish financial institutions that have 
a proactive or reactive attitude towards customers‘ claims and complaints and 
the risk profile of Spanish financial institutions that have lower reputation. 
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Capítulo 8 – Resumen de la tesis doctoral en castellano 
8.1 Objetivos de la tesis doctoral 
La última crisis financiera mundial introdujo dudas sobre el nivel de 
entendimiento que los grupos de interés de los mercados financieros tienen 
sobre los riesgos y complejidades de las instituciones financieras. La recesión 
económica, que comenzó en el año 2008, dio lugar a la quiebra de algunas 
instituciones financieras que impulsaron el desarrollo de nuevas regulaciones  y 
normativa en el sector bancario. 
Una prueba de la actitud que tenían los bancos frente a la regulación fue 
evidente en el Q4 de 2012, cuando la Europena Banking Authority (EBA) llevó 
a cabo un estudio para entender cómo los bancos medían el nivel de riesgo de 
sus activos. La EBA concluyó que había "diferencias sustanciales" en la forma 
en que los riesgos se medían en 89 bancos de 16 países.  
En esta línea, el ex primer ministro británico Tony Blair asumió alguna 
responsabilidad por el estado de la economía de Gran Bretaña después de 
admitir que su gobierno no alcanzó a entender la complejidad del sector 
financiero para prever que se estaba al borde de la crisis.  
Una de las principales características del sector financiero es que está integrado 
por grandes empresas, muy complejas y "sistémicamente importantes". El 
profesor Simon Johnson argumenta que la mejor manera de prevenir futuros 
desastres financieros a expensas de la sociedad es la de evitar que las 
instituciones financieras sean más grandes. La razón que subyace detrás de este 
argumento es que con instituciones financieras más pequeñas, un colapso 
potencial de alguna de ellas no llevaría al caos del sistema financiero 
internacional (Johnson, 2011). Por otra parte, Johnson admite que tener 
instituciones financieras más pequeñas, no sería suficiente para garantizar la 
estabilidad financiera, pero aseguraría una supervisión más eficiente y reducirá 
los riesgos sistémicos en los casos de turbulencias financieras.  
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Para agregar complejidad al problema de "demasiado grande para quebrar", 
otro factor que distingue a los bancos de otras empresas es que sólo los bancos 
usan depósitos de terceros para financiase. Los depósitos, en forma de cuentas 
bancarias, no sólo tienen como titulares a las familias, sino también a las 
empresas que los utilizan para su operativa comercial y como reservas. Los 
bancos se financian con depósitos y capital e inverten en activos de riesgo. 
Archarya et al. (2014) muestran que "el apalancamiento debe ser lo 
suficientemente alto como para cumplir con el rol disciplinador de de los 
depositantes, pero lo suficientemente bajo como para asegurar que la toma de 
riesgos del banco no sea excesiva". El establecimiento de un requisito de 
capital óptimo es el deseo de todo el regulador del sector de los servicios 
financieros, ya que les ayudará a cumplir con su mandato de mantener la 
estabilidad financiera. Con el fin de abordar y controlar los riesgos del negocio 
bancario, los reguladores utilizan herramientas de gestión de riesgo para 
alcanzar sus objetivos regulatorios. Tales esfuerzos de supervisión aumentan 
durante los períodos de turbulencia financiera debido a que la opacidad 
bancaria tiende a aumentar (Flannery et al., 2010) y, por tanto, los reguladores 
utilizan pruebas de estrés para evaluar no sólo la vulnerabilidad de los bancos, 
sino también de todo el sistema bancario (Drehmann et al ., 2010; Sorge y 
Virolainen, 2006). Como una de las principales preocupaciones de los 
reguladores es la estabilidad financiera, ellos diseñan un sistema de supervisión 
que les permite evitar el fracaso institucional que podría conducir a la ruptura 
de las principales funciones financieras de la economía, tales como el sistema 
de pago, la transformación del ahorro y la política monetaria (Weber, 2014). 
El regulador del sector financiero europeo es la European Banking Authority 
(EBA), organismo creado en enero de 2011 a raíz de la crisis financiera en el 
marco del Sistema Europeo de Supervisión Financiera (SESF). La EBA realizó 
a partir de 2009 pruebas de estrés del sector financiero euroepo. La prueba de 
estrés que realizó la EBA en el año 2010 incluyó una muestra de 91 bancos 
europeos, que representan el 65% del mercado europeo en términos de activos 
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totales, y se realizó en coordinación con 20 autoridades nacionales de 
supervisión. Se llevó a cabo en un horizonte de 2 años, hasta finales de 2011, 
bajo supuestos de situación potencial adversa. La prueba de estrés se centró 
principalmente en los riesgos de crédito y de mercado, incluyendo las 
exposiciones a la deuda soberana europea. Como resultado del escenario 
adverso después de un shock soberano, se suponía que 7 bancos verían caer su 
Tier 1 capital ratio por debajo del 6%. Todos los bancos que eran supervisados 
en la UE debían tener un Tier 1 capital ratio mínimo de 4% ratio en ese 
momento. Para las instituciones que no cumplieran el umbral en la prueba de 
estrés, las autoridades nacionales competentes estaban obligadas a estar en 
contacto cercano con estos bancos para evaluar los resultados de la prueba y 
sus consecuencias, en particular en términos de necesidad de recapitalización. 
Un año más tarde, en 2011, la EBA realizó una prueba de estrés que abarcó a 
90 bancos de 21 países, mientras que la prueba de estrés del 2014 incluyó 123 
grupos bancarios en toda la UE incluyendo a Noruega, con un total de activos 
de 28.000 millones de euros que cubren más del 70% del total de los activos 
bancarios de la UE.  
Las pruebas de estrés también son utilizados por los bancos como una 
herramienta de gestión de riesgos para evaluar sus propias debilidades y su 
exposición al riesgo, siguiendo las directrices y recomendaciones establecidas 
por los reguladores que tienen como objetivo identificar la cantidad de capital 
que necesita el banco para estar preparado ante situaciones adversas que 
podrían impactar en su capital actual (Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de 
Basilea, 2006; Peura y Jokivuolle, 2004). La similitud de las pruebas de estrés 
utilizada en un nivel macro con las técnicas utilizadas por los bancos como 
parte integrante del sistema de gestión de riesgos (véase Verano, 2008), junto 
con la recomendación de los supervisores sobre el uso de las pruebas de estrés 
como herramientas de gestión de riesgos para la bancos (Comité de Basilea de 
Supervisión Bancaria, 2006; Foro de Estabilidad Financiera, 2008), sugieren 
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que las pruebas de estrés se están convirtiendo en una herramienta muy 
importante para los reguladores (Drehmann et al., 2010). 
Estudios recientes analizan el papel informativo que las pruebas de estrés 
tienen en la gestión bancaria y en los mercados financieros. Goldstein y Sapra 
(2013) discuten si los resultados de las pruebas de estrés deben ser divulgados 
o no. Con el argumento de que las pruebas de estrés no son capaces de simular 
escenarios que sean lo suficientemente extremos como para simular una 
verdadera crisis, Das (2011) sostiene que la divulgación de los resultados de las 
pruebas de estrés es inherentemente inútil.  
Como las instituciones financieras son vitales para la estabilidad financiera, los 
gobiernos tienen que evitar su colapso y por lo tanto, dedican una importante 
cantidad de recursos para el rescate de los bancos. La quiebra de un banco tiene 
costos sociales inmediatos sobre los depositantes, así como un impacto en otros 
bancos, en el sistema de pago, y puede desestabilizar todo el sector financiero. 
Es por esto que, a finales de febrero de 2009, los planes de rescate financiero 
que implicaban inyecciones de capital, compra de activos de los banco, la 
emisión de títulos bancarios, swaps y otras garantías, ascendieron a un 
compromiso total de los gobiernos de la EU del 22% del PIB de la región y el 
29% del PIB en los Estados Unidos.  
Como consecuencia del esfuerzo que la sociedad en su conjunto hizo para 
rescatar al sistema financiero, las instituciones financieras han sido vistas por la 
sociedad como empresas lucrativas que se ocupan únicamente de sus intereses, 
y no velan por los intereses de sus clientes (Dow 2011). El riesgo moral en el 
sector financiero se ha analizado en relación a los préstamos concedidos a 
clientes de alto riesgo, a los productos financieros sofisticados que se ofrecen a 
los clientes financieramente no sofisticados y también porque los estados 
proporcionaron apoyo ilimitado a los bancos en forma de seguro de depósitos y 
prestamista de último recurso (Dow, 2011). La discusión principal en torno al 
riesgo moral se relaciona con el hecho de que las instituciones financieras se 
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ven tentadas a asumir mayores riesgos debido a la protección que tienen por 
parte de los bancos mediante las salvaguardas (Calomiris, 1998; Önder y 
Ozyildirim, 2008; Ratnosvski y Huang, 2009). 
De acuerdo con una encuesta realizada entre ejecutivos bancarios en 225 
empresas por parte de la firma Makovsky a través del investigador de mercado 
Ebiquity a mediados de 2014, más del 80% de los directivos de comunicación, 
de marketing y asesores de inversión de las instituciones financieras piensa que 
la crisis financiera de 2008 todavía está teniendo un impacto negativo en sus 
empresas. Ejecutivos bancarios reconocen que tomará varios años más para 
que los bancos recuperen la confianza que perdieron
5
. Baker et al. (2013) 
encuentra que los clientes experimentam emociones negativas con una falla en 
el servicio y pueden presentar reclamanciones ante el regulardor. Si esto 
sucede, la institución financiera puede aparecer en un informe del regulador. 
Este hecho afectará a los futuros beneficios de la institución porque su 
reputación disminuirá (Rose y Thomsen, 2004).  
Las instituciones financieras pueden mostrar a los clientes que se preocupan 
por ellos mediante el manejo eficiente de las quejas que se presentan sobre los 
servicios que prestan. Para asegurarse de que este es el caso, los reguladores 
exigen a las instituciones financieras diseñar e implementar un proceso de 
tramitación de las reclamaciones. El Banco de España, regulador bancario 
español, publica información sobre las quejas de los clientes como una forma 
de aumentar la transparencia del sector de servicios financieros. Los usuarios 
deben presentar la queja directamente al Servicio de Reclamaciones de la IF 
(CS) o al Defensor del Pueblo. Si la IF no responde dentro de los dos meses o 
responde negativamente, el usuario puede presentar la queja con el CS del BE. 
Los informes de CS del BE no son vinculantes para las IF, quienes pueden: a) 
                                                     
 
5
 Money.cnn.com, 2014. Banks know that customers hate them. 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/17/investing/banks-crisis-reputation/ Accessed: 14/12/15 
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ignorar la decisión; b) ser proactivo y enmendar el error antes de que el BE 
emite el informe; o c) ser reactivos y rectificar el error después de la emisión 
de informe del regulador. Si la IF toma medidas correctivas durante ese 
proceso, el BE cierra el proceso.  
 El concepto de responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE) en el sector de los 
servicios financieros no sólo se refiere a la responsabilidad de la empresa por el 
impacto que sus acciones tienen en sus grupos de interés, sino también a su 
papel como intermediarios financieros (Prior y Argandoña, 2009). De la 
Cuesta-González et al. (2006) argumenta que el concepto de RSE afecta al 
sector financiero desde una perspectiva doble: a) en la dimensión interna que 
implica la implementación de iniciativas ambientales y de responsabilidad 
social dentro de los procedimientos de gestión interna de la entidad y b) en la 
dimensión externa, que implica la incorporación de la RSE en el negocio de la 
entidad de intermediación financiera y de inversión en los mercados 
financieros. Esto debería conducir a la incorporación de las consideraciones 
ambientales y sociales en el diseño de los productos financieros, en las 
políticas de crédito y estrategias de inversión. En consecuencia, la estrategia de 
negocio y la gestión de riesgos deben tener en cuenta la RSE.  
Teniendo en cuenta esto, la Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) ha publicado las 
revelaciones GRI del Sector de Servicios Financieros, un suplemento para el 
sector que se ocupa de cuestiones específicas de la industria que no están 
contemplados en las directrices generales del GRI. La dimensión exterior de la 
RSE en las instituciones financieras mencionadas por De la Cuesta-González et 
al. (2006) se contempla en la sección "impacto de productos y servicios" del 
suplemento GRI del Sector de Servicios Financieros (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2013). Se requiere a la empresa diseñar y poner en práctica 
procedimientos para evaluar y controlar los riesgos ambientales y sociales en 
las líneas de negocio, procesos y supervisar la aplicación por parte de los 
clientes de los requerimientos ambientales y sociales incluidos en acuerdos, 
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transacciones e iniciativas para mitigar los impactos ambientales de los 
productos y servicios (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013).  
Los cambios recientes que se han producido en el sector de servicios 
financieros muestra la necesidad de realizar investigación adicional que ayude 
a entender cuáles son las características de los bancos que están incorporando 
la información proporcionada por las pruebas de estrés realizadas por el 
regulador para adaptar su perfil de riesgo y ajustar su ratio de capital; si esta 
actitud es diferente entre los mercados emergentes y desarrollados; cuáles son 
las características de los bancos que se involucran en actividades de 
responsabilidad social empresarial para estar más cerca de sus clientes y cuáles 
son las características de los bancos con mayor reputación. 
La necesidad de entender los cambios en este nuevo sector de servicios 
financieros globales es la principal motivación de esta tesis doctoral. 
Los resultados de esta tesis doctoral serán de utilidad para los reguladores, para 
entender mejor el efecto que los nuevos instrumentos de regulación utilizados 
tienen sobre las instituciones supervisadas y evaluar si utilizan la nueva 
información obtendida sobre ellas para adaptar los reglamentos y las políticas. 
También consideramos que las conclusiones de esta investigación serán de 
interés para las instituciones financieras, ya que les ayudará a entender la 
utilidad de las pruebas de estrés como un componente de su sistema de gestión 
de riesgos. Nuestras conclusiones esperamos que también sean relevantes para 
los clientes, ya que les permitirá entender mejor el comportamiento de las 
instituciones financieras a las que confían sus ahorros Y por último deseamos 
contribuir a los trabajos previos de otros investigadores y ofrecer futuras 
oportunidades de investigación. 
El objetivo general de esta tesis doctoral es entender el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras que: a) utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés 
para ajustar su ratio de capital y cómo las pruebas de estrés impactan en dicho 
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ratio, b) tienden a emitir un informe de sostenibilidad y la calidad de la 
información divulgada en los mismos, c) reaccionan de manera proactiva o 
reactiva a las quejas de los clientes y, d) tienen una mayor reputación. 
Poco se sabe acerca de cómo los bancos utilizan los resultados de las pruebas 
de estrés para ajustar su perfil de riesgo y si las pruebas de estrés juegan un rol 
disciplinador e informativo para determinar la estructura de capital de los 
bancos, por lo que, este estudio tiene como objetivo investigarlo, y este es su 
primer objetivo (Objetivo 1). En el entendimiento de que las pruebas de estrés 
son parte del sistema de gestión de riesgos de los bancos, nuestro objetivo es 
identificar el perfil de riesgo de los bancos (siguiendo el enfoque CAMELS 
como en Kerstein y Kozbeg, 2013; Jin et al, 2011, Jin et al, 2013a; Jin et al., 
2013b) que tienden a recibir un impacto más negativo en las pruebas de estrés. 
También investigamos el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que utilicen la 
información proporcionada por los resultados de las pruebas de estrés para 
modificar su Tier 1 capital ratio. En esta investigación, también apuntamos a 
identificar el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que muestran una brecha más 
pequeña entre el ratio de capital actual y el objetivo, cómo ajustan su ratio de 
capital actual antes y después que los resultados de las pruebas de estrés son 
publicados. 
Es importante señalar que la prueba de estrés aún no es una práctica común 
entre los reguladores de los mercados emergentes. Esto se debe a la existencia 
de graves deficiencias en la contabilidad y en el marco regulatorio y la falta de 
mercados líquidos para acciones de los bancos, deuda subordinada y otros 
pasivos bancarios y activos necesarios para validar el valor real de un banco en 
lugar de su valor contable (Rojas-Suárez, 2002a). También es pertinente 
recordar que aunque el Acuerdo de Basilea no recomienda aplicación sus 
normas en los mercados emergentes, las instituciones financieras de los 
mercados emergentes usan los Acuerdos como normas bancarias adecuadas 
(Balin, 2008). Esto incluye el Tier 1 capital ratio que no está sujeta a pruebas 
de estrés regional en estos mercados emergentes. 
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Además, teniendo en cuenta los hallazgos de Petrella y Resti (2013) que 
muestran que los resultados de las pruebas de estrés reducen la opacidad 
bancaria, ya que proporcionan a los inversores información relevante, el 
segundo objetivo de este estudio es investigar si las instituciones financieras de 
los mercados emergentes ajustan su Tier 1 capital ratio (el ratio de capital con 
activos  ponderados por su riesgo) en forma diferente al Total capital ratio (el 
ratio de capital con activos a valor contable) aprovechando la mayor opacidad 
bancaria respecto a los mercados desarrollados (Objetivo 2). Esta investigación 
también analiza si los bancos en los mercados emergentes y desarrollados 
ajustan su nivel de riesgo en forma diferente. Esto es de especial interés porque 
no hay consenso sobre el ratio de capital que los bancos utilizan internamente 
para tomar decisiones (Jokipii y Milne, 2011). Este estudio proporciona 
evidencia respecto a si los bancos en los mercados emergentes y desarrollados 
utilizan el ratio de capital total (basado en las normas de contabilidad) o el Tier 
1 capital ratio (sobre la base de los Acuerdos de Basilea) para tomar decisiones 
y las características del banco que contribuyen a determinar la estructura de 
capital. Nuestra investigación también busca evidencia de mayor riesgo moral 
por desvío de riesgos en los mercados emergentes respecto a los mercados 
desarrollados como consecuencia de la mayor opacidad bancarios de los 
mercados emergentes. Además, el estudio explora si las instituciones 
financieras de los mercados emergentes alinean su Tier 1 capital ratio actual 
con el Tier 1 capital ratio objetivo. Es de especial interés saber si la crisis 
financiera de 2008/09 tiene un impacto en esas desviaciones (Teixeira et al., 
2014). 
Así pues, los dos primeros objetivos de este estudio investigan el papel 
informativo y disciplinador que las pruebas de estrés tienen para determinar la 
estructura de capital de los bancos y el impacto potencial que la ausencia de 
pruebas de estrés tiene sobre dicha estructura en los mercados emergentes. 
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Los objetivos restantes de esta tesis están relacionados con la relación entre el 
perfil de riesgo de las instituciones financieras con la responsabilidad social 
empresarial, la actitud del banco frente a las quejas y reclamos de los clientes y 
su reputación. 
La integración de la RSE en la gestión de riesgos no sólo ayuda a la empresa a 
obtener información acerca de los riesgos actuales que amenazan a la empresa, 
sino que también ofrece un medio eficaz para mitigarlos (Mengze y Wei, 2013; 
de la Cuesta-González et al 2006; Kytle y Ruggie 2005). Teniendo en cuenta 
esto, sostenemos que el perfil de riesgo de la institución financiera (siguiendo 
el enfoque CAMELS) influirá en la propensión a emitir un informe de RSE, así 
como la propensión a publicar un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene 
información de RSE específica del sector financiero de alta calidad. Basados en  
la teoría de que las instituciones financieras juegan un función social 
importante en el proceso de inclusión financiera en la economía y que la RSE 
es considerada en el proceso de diseño de producto y la política de crédito, las 
instituciones financieras incorporan la gestión del riesgo social y ambiental en 
su sistema de gestión de riesgos. El tercer objetivo de este estudio es investigar 
el  impacto del perfil de riesgos de de las instituciones financieras sobre la 
propensión de la empresa para emitir un informe sobre sostenibilidad y la 
propensión a publicar un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene información 
de RSE  específica del sector de servicios financieros de alta calidad (Objetivo 
3). Este estudio contribuye a la literatura existente al encontrar evidencia 
empírica sobre la existencia de una relación entre la emisión de informes de 
RSE y la calidad de las revelaciones de RSE específicas del sector de servicios 
financieros requeridas por el GRI (usando un índice de divulgación de 
información de RSE específica del sector de servicios financieros que hemos 
desarrollado (FSSI)) con el tipo de riesgo y la complejidad de las instituciones 
financieras.  
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El cuarto objetivo de este estudio es contribuir a la literatura existente mediante 
la investigación de la gestión de quejas en las entidades financieras españolas y 
mediante el análisis de la relación entre el perfil de riesgo de las IF y su actitud 
frente a las quejas y reclamanciones de los clientes y (Objetivo 4). El estudio 
proporciona una nueva visión de las motivaciones que las instituciones 
financieras españolas tienen para reaccionar de manera proactiva o reactiva a 
las quejas de los clientes.  
Por último, el quinto objetivo del estudio es investigar la relación entre la 
reputación del banco y su perfil de riesgo (Objetivo 5). 
Sobre la base de los principales objetivos del estudio que se han detallado 
anteriormente, esta tesis doctoral propone las siguientes preguntas de 
investigación específicas que se vinculan con los cinco objetivos: 
Objetivo 1: Investigar cómo los bancos utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de 
estrés para ajustar su perfil de riesgo y si las pruebas de estrés juegan un papel 
disciplinador e informativo para determinar la estructura de capital de los 
bancos: 
1) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que tienden a recibir un 
impacto más negativo en las  pruebas de estrés realizadas por la UE? 
2) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que utilizan la información 
proporcionada por los resultados de las pruebas de estrés de la UE para 
modificar su Tier 1 capital ratio? ¿Cómo este ratio de capital estresado 
se relaciona con el ratio de capital  que tenía el banco previo a la prueba 
de estrés? 
3) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que muestran una brecha más 
pequeña entre el ratio de capital actual y el objetivo? Cómo ajustan su 
ratio de capital actual y objetivo antes y después que los resultados de 
las pruebas de estrés son publicados? ¿Está relacionado el Tier 1 capital 
  
Capítulo 8 – Resumen de la tesis doctoral en castellano 
288 
 
 
ratio objetivo con el ratio de capital estresado  que se obtiene como 
resultado de la prueba de estrés? 
Objetivo 2: Investigar si las instituciones financieras de los mercados 
emergentes ajustan el Tier 1 capital ratio de en forma diferente al ratio de 
capital total, aprovechando la mayor opacidad bancaria que existe en 
dichos mercados en relación con los mercados desarrollados: 
4) ¿Los bancos de los mercados emergentes se aprovechan de la mayor 
opacidad para ajustar su Tier 1 capital ratio en forma diferenciada? 
5) ¿Los bancos en mercados emergentes y desarrollados ajustan su nivel 
de riesgo en forma diferente? 
6) ¿Es el riesgo moral de desvío de riesgo en los mercados emergentes 
más alto que en los mercados desarrollados como consecuencia de la 
mayor  opacidad que existe en dichos mercados? 
7) ¿Las instituciones financieras de los mercados emergentes alinean su 
Tier 1 capital ratio y Total capital ratio a los ratios objetivo 
correspondientes? ¿Está su perfil de riesgo relacionado con dicha 
desviación, teniendo en cuenta la mayor opacidad de los mercados 
emergentes en relación con la de los  mercados desarrollados? 
8) ¿Está el perfil de riesgo relacionado con el desvio que existe entre el 
ratio de capital actual y el ratio de capital objetivo de los bancos de 
igual forma en las economías emergentes que en los mercados 
desarrollados? 
Objetivo 3: Investigar si el perfil de riesgos de las instituciones financieras 
influye sobre la propensión de la empresa a emitir un informe de sostenibilidad 
y en la propensión a publicar un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene 
información de RSE específica del sector de servicios financieros de alta 
calidad: 
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9) ¿Tiene el perfil de riesgo de la institución financiera impacto sobre la 
propensión de la empresa para emitir un informe de sostenibilidad? 
10) ¿Tiene el perfil de riesgo de la institución financiera impacto sobre la 
propensión a publicar un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene 
información de RSE específica del sector de servicios financieros de 
alta calidad? 
Objetivo 4: Investigar la gestión de quejas en las instituciones financieras 
españolas mediante el análisis de la relación entre el perfil de riesgo de la IF y 
la capacidad de respuesta a las quejas de los clientes: 
11) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que reaccionan de forma 
proactiva a las quejas de los clientes? 
12) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que reaccionan de forma 
reactiva a las quejas de los clientes? 
Objetivo 5: Investigar la relación entre el perfil de riesgo de la IF y su 
reputación: 
13) ¿Cuál es el perfil de riesgo de los bancos con mayor reputación? 
 
8.2  Diseño de la investigación y metodología de la tesis doctoral 
El negocio bancario está altamente regulado porque las instituciones 
financieras captan ahorro público y tienen riesgos específicos y complejidades 
que hacen que sus estados financieros sean opacos y difíciles de analizar por el 
público en general (Petrella y Resti, 2013; Morgan, 2001). 
Para entender y monitorear los riesgos específicos en las empresas del sector 
financiero, el regulador estadounidense diseñó el sistema de evaluación 
CAMELS, que es comúnmente utilizado por los reguladores de todo el mundo 
para evaluar la solidez de las instituciones financieras y para evaluar el nivel de 
riesgo de los bancos (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2013). Los 
riesgos que este enfoque evalúa son los riesgos específicos de las instituciones 
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financieras, es decir, el riesgo de capital, la calidad de activos, las habilidades 
de gestión, el nivel de ingresos y rentabilidad, el riesgo de liquidez y la 
sensibilidad al riesgo de mercado. El enfoque CAMELS no sólo se utiliza en 
los EE.UU., sino que tiene una proyección más internacional siendo el enfoque 
utilizado por los reguladores de todo el mundo. Un ejemplo es el método de 
control utilizado por el Banco de España (el regulador español) denominado 
Risk-Based Supervisory Methodology Approach basado en el sistema de 
evaluación CAMELS. Este método ayuda a evaluar qué instituciones son más 
propensas a desarrollar problemas en el futuro, con el fin de dedicar recursos 
adicionales de supervisión y para prevenir futuras crisis (Banco de España, 
2011). 
En esta tesis doctoral utilizados el enfoque CAMELS como subrogado del 
perfil de riesgo de las instituciones financieras.  
El Capítulo 2  de esta tesis doctoral aborda empíricamente el perfil de riesgo de 
los bancos que reciben un impacto más negativo en las pruebas de estrés de la 
UE, el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que utilizan la información proporcionada 
por los resultados de las pruebas de estrés publicados para modificar su Tier 1 
capital ratio y el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que muestran una brecha más 
pequeña entre el ratio de capital actual y el objetivo. Los resultados de este  
capítulo proporcionan respuestas a las preguntas de investigación 1, 2 y 3 (H1, 
H2 y H3, respectivamente) que coinciden con el Objetivo de Investigación 1.  
El perfil de riesgo de los banco es representado por el enfoque de riesgo 
CAMELS. La muestra incluye a los bancos destinatarios de la prueba de estrés 
de la UE del 2011 llevado a cabo por la EBA con datos financieros disponibles 
para los años 2010, 2011 y 2012. Para probar H1 y H2 del estudio se utilizan 
modelos de regresión lineal y para probar H3 el estudio utiliza el Método 
Generalizado de Momentos (GMM). 
En el Capítulo 3 se examina empíricamente cómo los bancos en los mercados 
desarrollados y emergentes ajustan su estructura de capital, el ratio de capital 
  
Capítulo 8 – Resumen de la tesis doctoral en castellano 
291 
 
 
que usan los bancos en estos mercados para tomar decisiones, el riesgo moral 
de desvío de riesgos en estos mercados y los factores determinantes de la 
brecha entre el ratios de capital objetivo y actual y la relación entre el perfil de 
riesgo y las velocidades de ajuste correspondiente en ambos mercados, lo que 
está asociado a las preguntas de investigación de 4 a 8 (H1, H2, H3 y H4, 
respectivamente) y al Objetivos de Investigación 2. El perfil de riesgo de los 
banco es representado por el enfoque de riesgo CAMELS. La muestra incluye 
bancos de los mercados emergentes y desarrollados con datos financieros 
disponibles para el período 2008-2013. La muestra de bancos de mercados 
emergentes incluye a los bancos de América Latina (LAC), mientras que la 
muestra de bancos de mercados desarrollados incluye a los bancos de la Unión 
Europea (UE). Para probar H1 y H2 se utiliza el Método Generalizado de 
Momentos y para probar H3 y H4 se utilizan modelos de regresión lineal. 
En el Capítulo 4 de la tesis se investiga empíricamente el impacto que el perfil 
de riesgo de los bancos europeos tiene sobre la propensión a emitir informes de 
sostenibilidad y la calidad de la información incluida en dichos informes en los 
bancos abarcados por la prueba de estrés realizada en la UE en el 2014. Los 
resultados de este capítulo proporcionan respuestas a las preguntas de 
investigación 9 y 10 (H1 y H2, respectivamente) que coinciden con el Objetivo 
de Investigación 3. El perfil de riesgo de los banco es representado por el 
enfoque de riesgo CAMELS. La investigación empírica se realiza sobre una 
muestra de la muestra de bancos alcanzados por la prueba de estrés realizada 
en la UE en el 2014 con información disponible en el periodo 2011-2013. Para 
probar H1 y H2 el estudio utiliza modelos de regresión lineal. 
El Capítulo 5 de la tesis investiga empíricamente la relación en entre el perfil 
de riesgo de las instituciones financieras españolas y la propensión a enmendar 
o rectificar los errores que se derivan de las quejas y reclamaciones de los 
usuarios de servicios financieros. Los resultados de este capítulo proporcionan 
respuestas a las preguntas de investigación 11 y 12 (H1 y H2, 
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respectivamente), que coincide con el  Objetivo de Investigación 4. El perfil de 
riesgo de los banco es representado por el enfoque de riesgo CAMELS. La 
muestra incluye las instituciones españolas con información pública disponible 
para el perído 2005-2012. Para probar H1 y H2 el estudio utilizan modelos de 
regresión lineal. 
En el Capítulo 6 se investiga empíricamente el impacto que tiene perfil de 
riesgo de la IF con su reputación. Los resultados de este capítulo proporcionan 
respuesta a la pregunta de investigación 13 (H1) que coincide con el Objetivo 
de Investigación 5. El perfil de riesgo de los banco es representado por el 
enfoque de riesgo CAMELS. La muestra incluye las instituciones financieras 
españolas reguladas por el Banco de España, con información disponible para 
el periodo 2005-2012. En base a la información publicada por el Banco de 
España respecto de las reclamaciones y quejas presentadas por los clientes de 
las instituciones financieras, definimos los bancos de mala reputación como el 
las instituciones financieras que se encuentran entre las diez primeras empresas 
que recibieron el mayor número de reclamaciones y quejas durante el año. Para 
probar H1 y H2 del estudio utiliza modelos de regresión lineal. 
8.3 Conclusiones de la tesis doctoral 
La crisis financiera mundial reciente puso de manifiesto que los reguladores 
tienen debilidades en la forma de abordar adecuadamente los riesgos y 
complejidades del sector financiero. La era post-crisis financiera ha traído  
cambios en las herramientas de monitoreo utilizados por los reguladores de 
todo el mundo, y específicamente en la UE donde se han llevado a cabo 
pruebas de estrés,  que se han traducido también en cambios en los sistemas de 
gestión de riesgos de las Instituciones Financieras. Como resultado de la crisis, 
la reputación de las instituciones financieras se ha visto muy afectada. Así, con 
el fin de recuperar la confianza de los clientes y mejorar su reputación, las IF se 
han  involucrado en actividades de responsabilidad social empresarial. 
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El objetivo general de esta tesis es analizar cómo el perfil de riesgo de las IF se 
relaciona con: a) el impacto que los resultados de las pruebas de estrés tienen 
sobre el ratio de capital y cómo las IF utilizan estos resultados para ajustarlo, b) 
la propensión que una IF tiene para emitir un informe de sostenibilidad y la 
calidad de la información divulgada, c) la reacción proactiva o reactiva de las 
IF en relación a las quejas de los clientes y, d) la reputación de las IF. El foco 
de análisis en esta tesis es principalmente el sector de servicios financieros de 
Europa durante el período 2005-2013. 
Las conclusiones generales de la tesis, que se refieren a los objetivos generales 
definidos, se pueden resumir de la siguiente manera: 
Primera conclusión: Las instituciones financieras con bajo riesgo de 
liquidez, con activos de alta calidad y que son eficientes están mejor 
preparadas para superar en forma exitosa las pruebas de estrés de la 
Union Europea.  
Para investigar cómo los bancos utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés 
para ajustar su perfil de riesgo y si las pruebas de estrés juega un rol 
informativo y disciplinario para determinar la estructura de capital de los 
bancos (Objetivo 1) utilizamos una muestra de bancos de la Unión Europea 
(UE) cubiertos por la prueba de estrés del 2011 realizada por la Euroepan 
Banking Authority (EBA) con datos financieros disponibles para los años 
2010, 2011 y 2012. Los resultados muestran una fuerte evidencia de que los 
bancos con mayor nivel de activos líquidos, con  bajos niveles de provisiones 
para deudores incobrables y que sean eficientes obtienen mejores resultados en 
las pruebas de estrés en el escenario adverso del 2012.  
Nuestros resultados permiten concluir que los bancos de la Unión Europea con 
activos con menor exposición a los riesgos financieros, que cuentan con una 
cartera de créditos con bajo nivel de incobrabilidad y que a su vez presentan 
una estructura de costos eficiente, tienen un perfil de riesgo que les permite 
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estar más preparados para hacer frente a escenarios financieros adversos y 
evitar un impacto negativo en el Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Estos hallazgos resultan 
de gran utilidad para los reguladores a la hora de focalizar sus esfuerzos de 
supervisión de las instituciones financieras. La EBA utiliza las pruebas de 
estrés como herramientas regulatorias que le permiten identificar la fortaleza de 
las instituciones financieras, y por ende del sistema financiero, ante un 
escenario de crisis. Si los escenarios planteados por el regulador son lo 
suficientemente adversos como para simular una situación de crisis financiera, 
nuestros resultados resultan de gran utilidad para los grupos de interés del 
sistema financiero porque permiten identificar las instituciones financieras que 
serán menos afectadas en un potencial escenario de crisis. Podemos concluir 
entonces que las instituciones financieras que invierten en activos más liquidos, 
los que por definición son menos riesgosos, que tienen una cartera de créditos 
de buena calidad y que presentan una estructura de costos adecuada son menos 
afectadas por una crisis financiera.  
La primera conclusión de la tesis doctoral identifica el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea que recibirán un menor impacto 
negativo como consecuencia de una crisis financiera.  
Segunda conclusión: Las instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea 
utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés para ajustar sus estructuras 
de capital, lo que muestra el rol informativo que juegan las pruebas de 
estrés en la región.  
Los resultados de la tesis doctoral también proporcionan evidencia de ajuste de 
la estructura de capital de las instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea a 
través de aumento de capital y disminución de activos en el año en que los 
resultados de las pruebas de estrés se publican (2011) y también encontramos 
evidencia de que los bancos revierten en 2012 este ajuste potencialmente 
excesivo, mediante un desvio hacia activos de mayor riesgo y el aumento, 
  
Capítulo 8 – Resumen de la tesis doctoral en castellano 
295 
 
 
como consecuencia, de los activos ponderados por riesgo, ya que no muestran 
mayor Tier 1 capital ratio a pesar de que aumentan el capital.  
Basados en estos resultados podemos concluir que las instituciones financieras 
de la Unión Europea utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés publicados 
para ajustar su estructura de capital aumentando el capital y reduciendo los 
activos, lo que produce un aumento en su Tier 1 capital ratio. Esto muestra una 
tendencia de las instituciones financieras a crear un buffer de capital en el año 
en que los resultados de las pruebas de estrés test son publicados. También 
concluimos que en el año posterior a que los resultados son publicados, las 
instituciones financieras revierten el aumento de su Tier 1 capital ratio 
desviando sus inversiones hacia activos más riesgosos. Esta actitud de las 
instituciones financieras nos permite concluir que efectivamente los resultados 
de las pruebas de estrés juegan un rol informativo en las instituciones 
financieras ya que son considerados por la gerencia para tomar decisiones 
respecto a su estructura de capital y el nivel de riesgo asumido.  
La segunda conclusión de la tesis doctoral muestra que las instituciones 
financieras de la Unión Europea utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés 
realizadas por la European Banking Authority para modificar su estructura de 
capital, lo que evidencia el rol informativo que tienen las pruebas de estrés en 
la región.  
Tercera conclusión: Las instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea 
utilizan los resultados de las pruebas de estrés para alinear su Tier 1 
capital ratio actual al Tier 1 capital ratio objetivo, lo que muestra el rol 
disciplinario que juegan las pruebas de estrés en la región.  
Los resultados también muestran que los bancos de la Unión Europea alinean 
su Tier 1 capital ratio actual al Tier 1 capital ratio objetivo después de que se 
dan a conocer los resultados de las pruebas de estrés realizadas por la European 
Banking Authority (EBA). Las instituciones financieras alinean su ratio de 
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capital actual al ratio de capital objetivo en un período de 3 años y en forma 
racional, ya que las instituciones financieras cuyo ratio actual es superior al 
objetivo lo disminuyen, mientras que las instituciones financieras cuyo ratio de 
capital actual es inferior al objetivo lo aumentan.  
Esto nos permite concluir que las pruebas de estrés juegan un papel 
disciplinador con los bancos y que los resultados de las pruebas de estrés 
publicados proporcionan información útil a los bancos, la cual se incorpora en 
el proceso de toma de decisiones. Esta actitud es racional, ya que los bancos 
sobrecapitalizados respecto a su ratio de capital objetivo incurren en costos 
adicionales al mantener capital en exceso, lo que además resulta ineficiente; 
mientras que las instituciones financieras subcapitalizadas respecto a su ratio 
de capital objetivo incurren en riesgo de incumplimiento y quedan expuestas a 
recibir penalizaciones por parte del regulador, lo que incrementará el costo de 
capital adicional que necesitará el banco para cumplir con los mínimos 
exigidos por el regulador.  
Nuestras conclusiones ayudan a los reguladores a centrar sus esfuerzos de 
regulación sobre los bancos que muestran perfiles de riesgo que tienden a 
recibir resultados más negativos en este tipo de prueba de estrés y también 
ayudan a entender el perfil de riesgo de los bancos que utilizan estrategias de 
gestión de riesgo de modificar su estructura de capital después que los 
resultados de las pruebas de estrés se dan a conocer. 
La tercera conclusión de la tesis doctoral muestra que las pruebas de estrés 
realizadas por la European Banking Authority juegan un rol disciplinario en las 
instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea, ya que las lleva a ajustar su ratio 
de capital actual a su ratio de capital objetivo.  
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Cuarta conclusión: Las instituciones financieras de los mercados 
emergentes (América Latina) ajsutan sus ratios de capital en forma 
diferente a las instituciones financieras de los mercados desarrollados 
(Unión Europea) debido a una mayor opacidad del mercado.  
Para investigar si las instituciones financieras de los mercados emergentes 
ajustan el Tier 1 capital ratio (T1CR, el ratio de capital ponderado por riesgo) 
en forma diferente al Total capital ratio (TCR, el ratio de capital a valor 
contable) aprovechando la mayor opacidad respecto a los mercados 
desarrollados (Objetivo 2) utilizamos una muestra de bancos de mercados 
emergentes y desarrollados con datos financieros disponibles para el período 
2008-2013. La muestra de bancos de mercados emergentes incluye a los 
bancos de América Latina (LAC), mientras que la muestra de bancos de 
mercados desarrollados incluye a los bancos de la Unión Europea (UE). 
Encontramos evidencia de ajuste diferente de la estructura de capital en los 
bancos de la UE y LAC: los bancos de la UE ajustan su T1CR y TCR en 
conjunto mientras que los bancos de LAC los ajustan de manera diferenciada. 
 Como T1CR y TCR se calculan siguiendo diferentes políticas, políticas de 
Basilea y las normas contables respectivamente, concluimos que los bancos de 
LAC siguen estrictamente estas reglas para calcular sus ratios de capital 
basados principalmente en la normativa de Basilea y la información contable 
porque no hay otra información disponible a considerar en el cálculo debido a 
la mayor opacidad en el mercado de LAC, geenrada en parte por la ausencia de 
pruebas de estrés en el sector financiero. Por el contrario, los bancos de la UE 
cuentan con información adicional en un mercado más transparente y ajustan 
sus ratios de capital de acuerdo con esa información adicional y no en la 
información contable. Concluimos entonces que las instituciones financieras de 
EU utilizan el T1CR como TCR en forman indistinta para tomar decisiones 
sobre su estructura de capital y el nivel de rieso a asumir, mientras que las 
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instituciones financieras de LAC utilizan ambos ratios en forma diferenciada 
en su proceso de toma de decisiones.  
La cuarta conclusión de la tesis doctoral muestra que las instituciones 
financieras de los mercados emergentes, que son más opacos, ajustan en forma 
diferenciada el ratio de capital calculado en base a los activos ponderados por 
su riesgo respecto al ratio de capital calculado en base a los activos totales, 
mientras que las instituciones financieras de los mercados desarrollados los 
ajustan en forma conjunta. 
Quinta conclusión: Las instituciones financieras de los mercados 
emergentes (Amércia Latina) presentan ratios de capital mayores que las 
instituciones financieras de los mercados desarrollados (Unión Europea), 
pero son más riesgosas.  
Nuestros resultados muestran que los bancos de América Latina (LAC) estan 
sobrecapitalizadas mientras que los bancos de la Unión Europea (UE) están 
descapitalizados en relación con su capital objetivo, ya sea medido como Tier 1 
capital ratio (T1CR, el ratio de capital ponderado por riesgo) o como Total 
capital ratio (TCR, el ratio de capital a valor contable). Por otra parte, el nivel 
de riesgo actual (medido como el ratio entre activos ponderados por su riesgo 
sobre activos totales) promedio en las instituciones financieras de LAC 
(90,10%) está cercano a su nivel objetivo (91,70%) mientras que en EU el 
nivel de riesgo promedio actual (64,10%) está por encima del objetivo 
(55,40%).  
En base a estos resultados concluimos que las instituciones financieras de LAC 
presentan niveles de capitalización superiores a las instituciones financieras de 
EU, pero sin embargo, el nivel de riesgo asumido por las primeras es muy 
superior al asumido por las segundas.  Esta conclusión, analizada en forma 
conjunta con la conclusión anterior nos permite entender que el mayor riesgo 
moral de desvío de riesgo lleva a las instituciones financieras de LAC a asumir 
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mayores niveles de riesgo que las instituciones financieras de la EU, en parte 
por la mayor opacidad de los mercados financieros y porque la crisis del 
2008/2009 impactó en forma más leve en LAC que en la EU, lo que permitió a 
las instituciones financieras de LAC tener un acceso más rápido al capital que 
el que tuvieron las instituciones financieras de la EU.   
Las partes interesadas del sector financiero en LAC, en especial los 
reguladores, deben tener en cuenta nuestras conclusiones, ya que el nivel de 
capitalización de las instuciones financieras de LAC respecto a las instituciones 
financieras de EU es en promedio un 15% superior, mientras que el nivel de 
riesgo asumido es un 41% superior en las primeras respecto a las segundas. 
Esta situación muestra una debilidad de las institucions financeiras de LAC 
ante un potencial escenario de crisis financiera.  
La quinta conclusión de la tesis doctoral muestra que las instituciones 
financieras de los mercados emergentes presentan mayor nivel de 
capitalización en relación a las instituciones financieras de los mercados 
desarrollados, pero se encuentran peor posicionadas frente a una crisis 
financiera ya que presentan elevados niveles de riesgo asumido. 
Sexta conclusión: Las instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea con 
mayor cartera de créditos, con alto nivel de depósitos y que obtienen 
mayor renta de sus clientes emiten informe de responsabilidad social 
empresarial. 
Para investigar el impacto del perfil de riesgos de una institución financiera 
sobre la propensión para emitir un informe de sostenibilidad y en la propensión 
a publicar un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene información de RSE 
específica del sector financiero de alta calidad (Objetivo 3) utilizamos una 
muestra de bancos cubiertos por las pruebas de estrés que la EU realizó en 
2014 con información financiera disponible para el período 2011-2013. 
Nuestros resultados indican que las instituciones financieras con menor riesgo 
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de capital, riesgo de liquidez superior (mayor cartera de créditos), una mayor 
sensibilidad al riesgo de mercado y una mayor rentabilidad en el negocio 
bancario tienden a emitir un informe de responsabilidad social empresarial 
(RSE).  
Basados en estos resultados concluimos que las instituciones financieras que 
presentan una mayor cartera de créditos y un mayor número de depostiantes 
enfrentan mayores demandas de sus clientes para presentar una actitud 
socialmente responsable debido a la mayor visibilidad que tienen en los 
mercados, lo que las lleva a emitir un informe de responsabilidad social 
empresarial. Adicionalmente, debido a que estas instituciones financieras 
también presentan un alto nivel de rentabilidad, no tienen limitaciones 
financieras para emitir un informe de responsabilidad social empresarial.  
Los informes de responsabilidad social empresarial son utilizados entonces por 
las instituciones financieras europeas con un número significativo de clientes 
para satisfacer sus demandas de información, lo que puede ser interpretado 
como una estrategia comunicacional que puede ser llevada a cabo porque 
tienen los fondos disponibles para hacerlo, ya que son instituciones financiera 
rentables.  
La sexta conclusión de la tesis doctoral identifica el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea que emiten un informe de 
responsabilidad social empresarial.  
Séptima conclusión: Entre las instituciones financieras de la Unión 
Europea que emiten un informe de responsabilidad social emprearial, las 
que son menos rentables y aseguran el informe con un auditor no Big 4  
revelan información de responsabilidad social empresarial específica del 
sector financiero de mayor calidad. 
Adicionalmente, los resultados de la tesis doctoral muestran que entre los 
bancos que emiten un informe de responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE), los 
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que tienen una cartera de préstamos mayor, mayores nivel de otros pasivos que 
devengan intereses, y una menor rentabilidad en el negocio bancario, publican 
un informe de sostenibilidad que contiene información de RSE específica del 
sector financiero (SF) de mayor calidad. En cuanto al efecto del tipo de 
aseguramiento del informe de RSE, cuando PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) y 
Ernst & Young (EY) aseguran el informe y cuando no existe aseguramiento, la 
calidad de la información de RSE específica del sector financiero revelada es 
de menor calidad.  
Basados en estos resultados concluimos que la contratación de un asegurador 
de mayor calidad como PwC y EY para llevar a cabo el aseguramiento del 
informe de RSE es una estrategia para reducir los costos de transacción y sirve 
como una protección para revelar información de RSE de menor calidad, que 
puede resultar menos costosa generar. Nuestras conclusiones tienen 
importantes implicaciones para los accionistas, inversores y analistas que 
pueden considerar los  informes de RSE como un vehículo que usan las IF para 
mostrar un comportamiento ético. Las partes interesadas deben tener presente 
que las IF podrían utilizar la emisión de informes de RSE para mejorar su 
reputación y como una oportunidad para hacer más negocios, especialmente en 
un período posterior a una crisis financiera. Los resultados pueden ser 
considerados por los reguladores para evaluar si las actividades de RSE 
relacionados deberían ser incluídas en el sistema de calificación de riesgos 
CAMELS (un sistema de evaluación de riesgos específicos de las instituciones 
financieras). 
La séptima conclusión de la tesis doctoral identifica el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea que revelan información de 
responsabilidad social empresarial específica del sector financiero de mayor 
calidad en su informe de responsabilidad social empresarial.  
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Octava conclusión: Las instituciones financieras españolas con menor 
cartera de créditos, com mayor nivel de rentabilidad y que emiten informe 
de responsabilidad social empresarial presentan una actitud proactiva 
frente a las quejas de sus clientes, mientras que las instituciones 
financieras con mayor cartera de créditos presenta una actitud reactiva. 
Para investigar la gestión de quejas en las instituciones financieras españolas 
mediante el análisis de la relación del perfil de riesgo de las instituciones 
financieras (IF) y su capacidad de respuesta a las quejas de los clientes 
(Objetivo 4) utilizamos una muestra que incluye las instituciones financieras 
españolas con información financiera disponible para el período 2005-2012. En 
relación a las IF que tienden a enmendar (AMEND), los resultados muestran 
que las IF que emiten un informe de responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE), 
son ineficientes (tienen estructuras grandes y complejas), tienen alta liquidez, 
son altamente rentables en el negocio bancario (cobran altas comisiones e 
intereses a los clientes) y son sensibles al riesgo de mercado tienden a 
enmendar los errores. En cuanto a las rectificaciones (RECTIF), los resultados 
muestran que las IF que emiten un informe de RSE, que tienen provisiones 
para deudores incobrables más bajas, y que tienen carteras de préstamos más 
grandes tienden a rectificar sus errores.  
Estos resultados nos permiten concluir que las instuticiones financieras que 
tienen una mayor cartera de préstamos y los mismos son de alta calidad, 
esperan la decisión del regulador respecto a la necesidad de rectificar el error, y 
una vez que el regulador falla a favor del cliente, la institución financiera 
procede a rectificar el error. Las instituciones financieras que muestran una 
actitud socialmente responsable emitiendo un informe de responsabilidad 
empresarial tienden a tener esta actitud positiva frente a sus clients.  
Estos resultados ayudan a los reguladores a entender las características de las 
IF que tienen en cuenta los informes que los reguladores emiten sobre quejas y 
reclamaciones de los clientes. Nuestras conclusiones también son útiles para 
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que los clientes puedan identificar a las IF con una mayor orientación hacia el 
cliente. 
La octava conclusión de la tesis doctoral identifica el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras españolas que tienen una actitud reactiva o proactiva 
frente a las quejas y reclamaciones de sus clientes.  
Novena conclusión: Las instituciones financieras españolas que son 
ineficientes, que presentar un mayor riesgo de capital y mayor 
rentabilidad en el negocio bancario, que tienen una mayor cartera de 
préstamos y que emiten informe de responsabilidad social empresarial 
tienen menor reputación.  
Para investigar la relación entre la reputación del banco y su perfil de riesgo 
(Objetivo 5) utilizamos una muestra que incluye las instituciones financieras 
españolas reguladas por el Banco de España, con información pública 
disponible para el perído 2005-2012. Nuestros resultados muestran que las 
instituciones que se encuentran en una posición débil de capital, con una 
cartera de crédito mayor, que son ineficientes, que presentan un alto nivel de 
rentabilidad y que emiten informe de responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE) 
tienen menor reputación.  
Estos resultados nos permiten concluir que las instituciones financieras con 
riesgos de capital y liquidez altos, que son ineficientes pero que obtienen una 
renta significativa de sus clientes a través de los altos honorarios, comisiones y 
tasas de interés provocan insatisfacción entre ellos, situación que podría dar 
lugar a que dichos clientes decidan cambiar de banco. Adicionalmente, los 
resultados nos permiten concluir que las instituciones financieras que emiten 
un informe de RSE tienen baja reputación, lo que implica que pueden usar la 
emisión de estos informes como una estrategia para mejorar su reputación.   
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Nuestros resultados contribuyen a la literatura y al debate normativo sobre la 
relación entre la satisfacción del cliente, la reputación corporativa, la RSE y 
gestión de riesgos en el sector de servicios financieros. De hecho, los 
resultados muestran el perfil de riesgo de las instituciones financieras que 
tienen menor reputación en el sector de servicios financieros español. Nuestros 
resultados podrían ayudar a los reguladores a comprender el papel que la 
reputación tiene en el sector de los servicios financieros y podrían ser útiles 
para evaluar si la satisfacción del cliente y la reputación de las instituciones 
financieras deben ser evaluadas en el sistema de calificación de riesgos 
CAMELS (un sistema de evaluación de riesgos específicos de las instituciones 
financieras). 
La novena conclusión de la tesis doctoral identifica el perfil de riesgo de las 
instituciones financieras españolas que tienen menor reputación.  
Las conclusiones de la tesis doctoral permiten identificar el perfil de riesgo de 
las instituciones financieras de la Unión Europea que tienden a recibir un 
impacto más negativo en una crisis financiera, que utilizan los resultados de las 
pruebas de estrés para ajustar su estructura de capital y como este ajuste difiere 
en las instituciones financieras de los mercados emergentes como consecuencia 
de un mayor nivel de opacidad de dichos mercados. Adicionalmente, las 
conclusiones identifican el perfil de riesgo de las instituciones financieras 
euroepas que tienden a emitir un informe de responsabilidad social 
empresarial, de las instituciones financieras españolas que tienen una actitud 
proactiva o reactiva frente a las quejas y reclamaciones realizadas los clientes y 
el perfil de riesgo de las instituciones financieras españolas que tienen una 
menor reputación.   
